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ABSTRACT 
Background 
Outbreaks of infectious diseases contribute to premature mortality and 
underscore the importance of effective disease surveillance and response 
systems. There is limited knowledge on the performance of the South 
African notifiable disease surveillance system (NDSS). 
 
Objective 
The aim of this PhD study was to analyse the NDSS of South Africa. The 
specific objectives were to: analyse key informants’ perspectives on system 
attributes of the National NDSS; analyse the NDSS attributes through 
comparing notifications with laboratory surveillance; determine the factors 
influencing provider compliance with the NDSS; and make policy 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the NDSS. 
 
Methods 
This thesis combined a novel comparative analysis of laboratory and 
notification records for three tracer conditions of measles, meningococcal 
meningitis, and typhoid with two cross-sectional, analytical studies among 
NDSS key stakeholders (n=169) and health care providers (n=1050) 
respectively. STATA® 14 was used to conduct quantitative, statistical 
analyses. 
 
Results  
The key stakeholders’ survey had an 84% response rate: 25% perceived 
the system to be acceptable; 51%, flexible; 45%, timely; 61%, useful; and 
74%, simple. Stakeholders with more experience were less likely to 
perceive the NDSS as acceptable (OR 0.91, 95 % CI: 0.84–1.00, p = 
0.041); those in disease detection were less likely to perceive it as timely 
(OR 0.10, 95 % CI: 0.01–0.96, p = 0.046) and those participating in 
National Outbreak Response Team were less likely to perceive it as useful 
(OR 0.38, 95 % CI: 0.16–0.93, p = 0.034). 
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For all three diseases, fewer cases were notified than laboratory confirmed. 
Completeness for the laboratory system was higher for measles (63% vs. 
47%, p<0.001) and meningococcal meningitis (63% vs. 57%, p<0.001), 
but not for typhoid (60% vs. 63%, p=0.082). Stability was higher for the 
laboratory (all 100%) compared to notified measles (24%, p<0.001), 
meningococcal meningitis (74%, p<0.001), and typhoid (36%, p<0.001). 
Representativeness was also higher for the laboratory (all 100%) than for 
notified measles (67%, p=0.058), meningococcal meningitis (56%, 
p=0.023), and typhoid (44%, p=0.009). The sensitivity of the NDSS was 
50%, 98%, and 93%, and the PPV was 20%, 57%, and 81% for measles, 
meningococcal meningitis, and typhoid, respectively.  
The response rate for the health care provider (HCP) survey was 90%. In 
the year preceding the survey, 58% diagnosed a notifiable disease; 92% of 
these HCPs reported the disease, but only 51% notified correctly to the 
Department of Health. Factors influencing notification were HCPs 
perceptions of workload (OR 0.84, 95% CI 0.70 - 0.99, p=0.043) and that 
notification data are not useful (OR 0.84, 95% CI 0.71 - 0.99, p=0.040). 
Conclusion 
The NDSS in South Africa performed poorly on most of the system 
attributes. In addition, HCP compliance with the NDSS was suboptimal. The 
study generated new knowledge on the performance of the NDSS in South 
Africa, which should inform the revitalisation and reforms of the system. 
Keywords 
Notifiable diseases; surveillance system; acceptability; flexibility; 
simplicity; timeliness; usefulness; completeness; stability, 
representativeness, sensitivity; positive predictive value; health care 
providers; compliance and South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Communicable diseases constitute a major proportion of the global burden 
of disease; four of the top six causes of the global burden of disease in 
2016 were caused by communicable diseases [1, 2]. In the last decade 
pandemics have underscored the need for strong global and national 
notifiable disease surveillance systems (NDSS) to ensure appropriate public 
health preparedness and response. Notable examples include: the influenza 
pandemic (H1N1) of 2009 which caused 18,449 known deaths in 214 
countries and territories [3]; the 2012 outbreak of Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome Coronavirus with 1,952 cases and 693 deaths confirmed up to 
20 April 2017 [4]; the 2014 - 2016 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak 
with 28,616 cases and 11,310 deaths [5]; the Zikavirus outbreak of 2016 
with more than one million cases globally [6]; and the 2016 yellow fever 
outbreaks [7]. These epidemics caused public health emergencies of 
international concern (PHEICs) that could have been prevented through 
effective surveillance systems that enable early detection, management at 
source and prevention of their spread. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines surveillance as “the 
continuous, systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of health-
related data needed for the planning, implementation, and evaluation of 
public health practice” [WHO, 2017:webpage][8]. It is essential for any 
country to have a surveillance system to ensure its effective response to 
communicable diseases [9]. In the health system, surveillance of 
communicable diseases is used to: provide an early warning of a potential 
outbreak and facilitate early public health response interventions; track the 
impact of public health response interventions; monitor trends in the 
epidemiology of the communicable diseases in order to inform policy 
development and policy changes [8].  
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In this PhD study, I use a systems approach to analyse the notifiable 
disease surveillance system (NDSS) in South Africa in order to contribute 
to health policy changes during a critical stage of the country’s health sector 
reforms. 
This introductory chapter provides the background to and context of this 
PhD study. In section 1.2, I outline the evolution of the NDSS globally with 
particular focus on Africa. Section 1.3 summarises the development of the 
NDSS in South Africa, and health system reforms relevant to the NDSS. 
Section 1.4 underscores the importance of regular NDSS evaluations. In 
section 1.5 I describe the rationale for this PhD research, while section 1.6 
summarizes the development of a conceptual framework for the analysis; 
1.7 presents the conceptual framework used; section 1.8 summarises the 
aims and objectives of the study; while section 1.9, provides an overview 
of the structure of the PhD thesis. 
1.2 The evolution of Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
Systems 
Public health surveillance has its origins in the “great pestilence” that 
occurred in 3180 B.C. in Egypt [10]. Since this epidemic and throughout 
recorded human history, communicable disease surveillance systems have 
been developed and shaped by the occurrence of major outbreaks or 
pandemics [10]. In the last century in the USA, the fight against a malaria 
epidemic and the establishment of malaria surveillance systems in 1941, 
led to the establishment of the Communicable Disease Center, the 
precursor of the present Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
in the late 1940s [11]. In response to global health challenges accentuated 
by the second world war, the WHO was founded in 1948, after the 
establishment of the United Nations in 1945 [12]. In 1951, member states 
adopted the International Sanitary Regulations, which were aimed at the 
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surveillance and control of six epidemic-prone diseases; that were later 
reduced to three diseases, namely cholera, smallpox and yellow fever [13].  
The use of the surveillance systems in public health came to further 
prominence with the control of malaria in the USA by 1955, the global polio 
vaccination programme in 1955, the Asian influenza pandemic of 1957 and 
the global smallpox eradication programme between 1967 and 1977 [11].  
The International Sanitary Regulations were revised in 1969 and named 
the International Health Regulations (IHR) [13, 14]. Notwithstanding two 
amendments of the IHR in 1973 and 1981, these regulations were 
insufficient to provide for global public health security during the period 
1970 to 1995, when globalisation increased the threat of the spread of 
diseases, [15, 16]. The process to revise the IHR was started in 1995, and 
completed in 2005 with the adoption of IHR (2005) that came into effect in 
2007 [17]. 
Communicable diseases are associated with underdevelopment and poverty 
– they occur amongst the nations with the most inefficient health systems 
and the lack of resources to deal with them effectively [18-20]. 
Consequently low and middle income countries (LMIC), particularly African 
countries, have been disproportionately affected by a high burden of 
infectious diseases, while their core capacities are the weakest to combat 
these diseases [18, 19, 21]. Africa has the world’s highest burden of 
communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS [22-
25]. In 1998 members of the African region of the WHO adopted the 
integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR), thus committing 
themselves to increased surveillance for public health action [24, 25]. Since 
its adoption, a review in 2015 found that 43 African countries have 
implemented the IDSR [26]. Despite adoption of the IDSR, South Africa as 
a member state of the region has never implemented the IDSR. 
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1.3 Development of the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System in South Africa 
Early colonial health services in South Africa were established to deal with 
scurvy and imported infectious diseases of the immigrants at the time of 
the establishment of a Dutch colony in the Cape, in the 17th century [27-
29].  
The public health system had its origins in several quarantine ordinances 
and the Cape Public Health Act of 1883 which were aimed at controlling 
communicable diseases [27-29]. The devastation caused by the Spanish flu 
of 1918 underscored the need for a national public health system and led 
to the enactment of the Public Health Act of 1919 and the establishment of 
a national Department of Health (DOH) [27-29]. The national DOH played 
a major co-ordinating role and retained the power to intervene in provinces, 
but local authorities were responsible for the control and reporting of 
communicable diseases [27-29].  
The Public Health Act of 1919 was amended 21 times between the period 
1920 to 1975  but remained the main public health legislation in the country 
until 1977 when a new Health Act was adopted [29]. This Act laid the 
foundation for the present NDSS in South Africa. However, in 1998, 
Klugman, a distinguished infectious diseases expert in South Africa, 
described the NDSS as still “in its infancy” with a strong laboratory network 
but weak clinical and laboratory-based surveillance in place [30]. 
The advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 brought about the 
establishment of a unitary health system from the fragmented apartheid 
system of the past. This was accompanied by the adoption of enabling 
policies, such as the National Health Plan of 1994, through which free 
primary health care (PHC) services and free hospital services to children 
under five and pregnant women were introduced [31]. The 1997 White 
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Paper for the transformation of the health system in South Africa, provided 
for a major overhaul and restructuring of the health system focused on 
disease prevention health promotion and comprehensive management and 
treatment [32]. The South African Constitution was adopted in 1996; which 
provided for health as a concurrent responsibility of the national and 
provincial levels of government [33]. The Health Act of 1977 was reviewed 
and a new National Health Act was promulgated in 2005, which provides 
for communicable diseases and notifiable medical conditions regulations 
[34]. However, NDSS regulations to give effect to the provisions of the 
National Health Act have not yet been promulgated. 
Despite the transformation of the South African health system and the 
adoption of new policies and legislation, there is evidence that the 
performance of the health system is sub-optimal [35-39]. At the same time 
there is an increased need for health care services to manage South Africa’s 
quadruple burden of disease (tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS; maternal and 
child mortality, non-communicable diseases; and injury and violence) [35, 
38-43]. Population health indicators are poor relative to the country’s 
economic development indicators and health care expenditure. Contributing 
factors include: sub-optimal leadership and stewardship at various levels 
of the health system; resource constraints; major gaps in the quality of 
services; inequities between urban and rural areas, and between the public 
and private health sectors; and the sub-optimal monitoring, information 
and surveillance systems [35, 38-43]. 
In 2009, the Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, adopted a strong 
evidence-based approach to tackle these challenges [43, 44] and 
introduced several policy initiatives. These included: leadership to 
implement  the country’s HIV and AIDS strategic plan that ushered in the 
largest antiretroviral treatment programme in the world [45]; initiatives to 
strengthen the South African health system through the re-engineering and 
revitalisation of PHC [46, 47]; introducing strategies to improve human 
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resources for health [48]; and introducing an office of Health Standards 
Compliance with the mandate of implementing compulsory accreditation of 
all health facilities, in an effort to improve the quality of health care within 
public health institutions [49, 50]. More recently South Africa is in the 
process of reforming its health system to introduce universal health 
coverage through the phased implementation of a National Health 
Insurance (NHI) system [51, 52]. The department also announced its 
intention to establish a CDC-like organisation that will be responsible for 
disease surveillance, a National Public Health Institute for South Africa 
(NaPHISA) [53] and published an IHR bill with the intention of making the 
2005 IHR applicable in the country [54]. 
In light of the impending health reforms, a well-functioning surveillance 
system is vital to an effective and responsive health system. Research to 
provide scientific evidence that will inform policy reforms to the present 
NDSS is therefore opportune. 
South Africa presently has a NDSS that is non-electronic and tracks 33 
medical conditions [55]. Health care providers are legally obliged to notify 
these conditions to their local authority, which in turn reports it to the 
district, district to province, and province to the NDOH (Figure 1.1) [55].  
Parallel systems have been developed since 1996 for the surveillance of 
tuberculosis (TB), malaria and Expanded Programme on Immunisation 
(EPI) diseases. The NDSS relies on the clinical skills of health care providers 
to diagnose the list of communicable diseases based on clinical suspicion 
and to request laboratory confirmation. Case definitions are only used 
during outbreaks and for active surveillance [55]. There are no legal 
provisions for laboratories to notify communicable diseases [56, 57].  
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Figure 1.1: Schematic presentation of the South African 
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1.4 The case for regular NDSS assessments  
Regular evaluations of the NDSS are needed to ensure that the system is 
capable of the timely identification and response to the emergence of 
epidemic-prone diseases that may cause local, national, regional or global 
outbreaks. Shortly after the adoption of the 2005 IHR, in May 2006 the 
global community called for regular evaluations of the NDSS to ensure 
epidemic preparedness and response [58]. The legally binding 2005 IHR 
obligations took effect in June 2007 and compelled countries to report 
annually to the World Health Assembly (WHA), on the status of their 
surveillance system, amongst 12 other IHR core competencies [9]. Since 
2008, a standard format has been used for the report. Self-reporting by 
countries does not require the provision of objective scientific evidence. 
Annual reports are published by the WHO on a regional basis in their web-
based data repository, Global Health Observatory [59]. 
Since the implementation of the 2005 IHR, there has been a major cholera 
outbreak in 2008-2009 that affected nine of the 15 countries in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) region [60-63]. This 
outbreak tested the ability of the NDSS to detect and assist in containing 
these outbreaks. The outbreak started in a urban district in Harare, 
Zimbabwe, where it was detected early and brought under control [62]. 
However, it reoccurred in the same urban district and spread rapidly to 
other districts and cities in Zimbabwe before it was recognised as a 
potential PHEIC [62, 63]. It soon spread beyond Zimbabwe’s border to nine 
countries in the region, including South Africa [62, 63]. In South Africa the 
outbreak was not detected through the NDDS, but through parallel systems 
in the national laboratory system [60, 61]. The regional outbreak was only 
brought under control in August 2009, after more than 4300 deaths [62, 
63], 69 of which were in South Africa [60]. This regional outbreak 
demonstrated the need for assessment and strengthening of the NDSS to 
9 
 
deal with an outbreak effectively before it spreads beyond a country’s 
borders. 
At a global level, the H1N1-Pandemic of 2009 provided the first worldwide 
test to the strength of countries’ NDSS, after the adoption of the 2005 IHR. 
The hysteria around the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) in 2003 [64], and the high case fatality rate associated with the 
Avian Influenza A/H5N1 outbreak [65], underscored the need for a global 
focus on strong pandemic preparedness plans, with surveillance playing a 
central role. Mexico had a preparedness plan and routine surveillance 
system which enabled the country to detect and respond to the novel 
influenza cases that occurred there in April 2009 [66, 67]. However, the 
virulence of the influenza virus and the extensive nature of global travel 
contributed to the spread of the virus to more than 214 countries and 
territories around the world by mid-2010 [3]. In South Africa the first 
imported case was detected in July 2009 through enhanced laboratory 
surveillance and by October 2009, 12 331 cases and 91 deaths were 
laboratory confirmed [68, 69].  
In 2011 a WHO appointed independent Review Committee on the 
functioning of the 2005 IHR in relation to the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic, 
reported that although the IHR increased pandemic preparedness and 
helped the global community to deal with the pandemic, “the world is ill-
prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly 
global, sustained and threatening public-health emergency” [WHO, 
2011:12][70]. The pandemic therefore demonstrated the need for 
evidence-based improvements of the NDSS as part of strengthening 
national and global epidemic preparedness [71]. 
The Ebola outbreak of 2014-2016 underscored the finding of the WHO’s 
Review Committee that the world was ill-prepared for major public health 
emergencies. The index case of the outbreak was a two-year old patient 
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who died in December 2013 in Gueckedou, Guinea [72], and was not 
detected and identified as Ebola until March 2014, when the disease had 
spread to two other countries in West Africa [72]. EVD was only recognized 
as a PHEIC in August 2014 and dealt with as a global public health 
emergency [73, 74]; but by that time 1,711 cases had occurred and 932 
deaths resulting in a Case Fatality Rate (CFR) of 54% in four countries [75]. 
The PHEIC was declared over by March 2016 following 28,616 cases and 
11,310 deaths (CFR 40%) [5, 76]. In an effort to assess the global response 
to the EVD outbreak, the WHO appointed an independent panel in 2015 
which found that countries failed to develop IHR surveillance core capacities 
[77]. The panel questioned the reliability and validity of the annual 
mandatory IHR self-assessments and stressed the need for regular 
objective evaluations [77]. A United Nations High-level Panel on the Global 
Response to Health Crises concurred with the findings of the WHO 
independent panel, regarding inadequacy of health surveillance systems 
and recommended the need for objective evaluations [78]. On the strength 
of these findings the WHO adopted a new IHR monitoring and evaluation 
framework which included the concept of voluntary joint external 
evaluations (JEE) for the assessment of countries’ compliance to the IHR 
[79, 80]. 
Although the value of the JEE in strengthening surveillance still needs to be 
determined, it has introduced some objectivity in IHR assessments. By June 
2017, 44 countries had undergone a JEE [80, 81], but South Africa is not 
one of these countries. 
Hence the need for objective scientific evaluations of the NDSS has been 
established at a global level. 
There is a dearth of studies on the NDSS in South Africa. A 2009 study 
focused on the completeness and reliability of the electronic TB surveillance 
system in three provinces in the country [82], and a 2005 - 2009 study 
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assessing national WHO acute flaccid paralysis indicators used secondary 
data [83]. Both these studies are focused on parallel, vertical systems that 
have developed because of perceived weaknesses in the NDSS and do not 
represent the national NDSS. There have also been an evaluation of the 
NDSS in Gauteng province [84] and three studies on tuberculosis (TB) 
surveillance in two Western Cape districts [85-87]. These few studies were 
limited in scope and scale and cannot be generalised to the entire country. 
Furthermore, these studies predate the global policy initiatives, notably the 
JEE and the new IHR framework. The need for a systematic and objective 
evaluation of the NDSS at the national level in South Africa is critical. 
1.5 Study Rationale 
Since 1977, there has been no systematic and objective evaluation of the 
national NDSS in South Africa. More importantly, there has been no critical 
evaluation of the NDSS since the adoption of the WHO strategies on IDSR 
and the IHR. Consequently, the NDSS remains untransformed.  
This PhD study was conceived as addressing the knowledge gap on the 
South African national NDSS, thus contributing to proposed health sector 
reforms enunciated in the NHI White Paper [52]. The rationale for the PhD 
research study was premised on the following: 
1. The study was the first systematic, objective analytical study of 
the South African national NDSS. 
2. Generation of new knowledge on the:  
a. performance of the national NDSS against key system 
attributes;  
b. extent to which health care providers comply with the NDSS 
and the determinants of such compliance.  
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3. Contribute to health policy and health care system interventions 
that will lead to improvements in the functioning and effectiveness 
of the NDSS. 
1.6 Developing a framework for the assessment of the 
NDSS 
Over the last 20 years there have three frameworks used globally for the 
objective assessment of countries surveillance systems, these are the 
CDC’s “Updated guidelines for evaluating surveillance systems” [88], the 
WHO’s “Protocol for the assessment of national communicable disease 
surveillance and response systems: guidelines for assessment teams” [89], 
and the IHR JEE-tool referred to above.  
The CDC’s framework is the result of a review of the guidelines developed 
for evaluating surveillance systems in 1988 [90]. The 1988 guidelines were 
developed to ensure efficient health resource utilisation through effective 
surveillance systems [90]. The updated guidelines were developed in 2001 
at the time of the adoption of the IDSR by WHO Afro [88], with the CDC 
playing a leading role. The main purpose of the update was to 
accommodate the need to respond to emerging public health threats [88]. 
The 2001 guidelines used the approach of the “Framework for Program 
Evaluation in Public Health” [91] to update the 1988 guidelines and added 
the engagement of the stakeholders involved in the system to the 
assessment. 
The WHO’s “Protocol for the assessment of national communicable disease 
surveillance and response systems: guidelines for assessment teams” was 
developed at the time of the implementation of the IDSR in the WHO Afro 
region, to promote an integrated approach to the surveillance and control 
of communicable diseases [89]. The protocol proposes an assessment of 
core and support functions of the surveillance system and focused on the 
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structure, organisation, processes and output of surveillance and response 
systems at different levels of the health care system [89]. 
The JEE assessment tool is based on the Global Health Security Agenda 
(GHSA) external evaluation assessment tool developed by the CDC and 
piloted in five countries in 2015 [92, 93]. The GHSA is an initiative driven by 
the USA in 2014 [94-96] to “accelerate progress towards a world safe and 
secure from infectious disease threats” [CDC, 2017:Webpage][92]. With the 
call for more objective IHR reporting after the Ebola outbreak, the JEE tool 
was developed as an adaptation of the GHSA tool in 2016 [80, 97]. 
The IHR JEE-tool was not used in the conceptual framework for this PhD 
study for several reasons. It was developed after the conceptualisation of 
this study in 2014; it is broad-based and not specific for the assessment of 
surveillance systems [97]; and there are only a few countries that have 
published their experiences of undergoing a JEE [98-100]. 
1.7 Conceptual Framework for the PhD 
In this PhD study, I have used an adapted analytical framework that draws 
on the 2007 WHO systems approach [101, 102] and the internationally 
accepted principles and concepts of the WHO’s IDSR [24, 25], and the CDC 
guidelines [88].  
Elements of the framework used in this PhD study are shown in Figure 1.2 
below. The NDSS functions as a subsystem of the broader health system. 
The NDSS consists of three interlinked elements, namely: (a) the level of 
care where patients present for services or where individuals with 
infectious diseases present for the first time; (b) the policy actors or key 
stakeholders who interact with the NDSS or with patients at the different 
levels of the health system; and (c) the appropriate public health 
processes that are essential to the NDSS functioning. The attributes of 
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this interlinked system (shown in the surrounding circle) need to be 
evaluated to ensure effective performance.  
The NDSS is initiated when an individual person presents with a listed 
notifiable communicable disease at the appropriate level of care. A health 
care provider (HCP) at that level, whether in the public or private health 
sector, needs to identify the disease, notify on clinical grounds and then 
send specimens to the laboratory where pathologists confirm the diagnosis. 
The notification initiates an appropriate public health response by 
surveillance officers and communicable disease co-ordinators at the level 
of the local DOH after an analysis of the data. The local DOH reports on the 
occurrence of the communicable diseases to the higher level in the system, 
that in turn respond if needed. The compliance of the HCP with the NDSS 
is a key aspect to its successful functioning. 
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PPV=Positive Predictive value 
Figure 1.2: Conceptual framework for the analysis of the NDSS  
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1.8 Study Aim and Objectives 
 Aim 
The aim of the study was to conduct a systematic, objective analysis of the 
NDSS of South Africa, thereby informing health policy and health system 
interventions to improve the NDSS functioning and effectiveness. 
 Objectives 
The specific objectives of the study were to: 
1. Analyse key informants or policy actors’ perspectives on the 
system attributes of usefulness, timeliness, simplicity, flexibility 
and acceptability of the National NDSS. 
2. Analyse the NDSS attributes of representativeness, stability, data 
quality, sensitivity and positive predictive value. 
3. Determine the factors influencing provider compliance with the 
NDSS. 
4. Make policy recommendations to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the national NDSS in the country. 
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1.9 Structure of the PhD thesis 
Chapter 1: An appraisal of the need for and importance of a NDSS, followed 
by an outline of NDSS evolution both globally and in South 
Africa. The chapter concludes with the study justification, 
conceptual framework used, and study aims and objectives. 
Chapter 2: A description and critique of the relevant literature on the 
evaluation of the NDSS are presented. 
Chapter 3: A detailed description of the methods used in the PhD study is 
presented. 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7:  
The study findings as reflected in the relevant papers are 
presented under the following headings: 
Chapter 4: Survey of the perceptions of key stakeholders on the attributes 
of the South African notifiable diseases surveillance system. 
Chapter 5: Comparing laboratory surveillance with the notifiable diseases 
surveillance system in South Africa. 
Chapter 6: Health Care Providers' compliance with the notifiable diseases 
surveillance system in South Africa. 
Chapter 7: Perspectives of health policy actors on reforming the notifiable 
diseases surveillance system in South Africa.  
Chapter 8: This concluding chapter provides an integrated narrative for all 
the studies that form part of the PhD thesis. It presents the 
policy impact and scholarly contribution of the PhD; as well as 
recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I use the conceptual framework described in Chapter 1 to 
review the relevant literature and to identify the knowledge gaps, especially 
those that this PhD thesis focused on. Section, 2.2 contains the definition 
of terms used in the thesis. In section 2.3, I review and critique the 
literature on the opinions of policy actors or key stakeholders on the 
attributes of the NDSS; in section 2.4, I review the literature on laboratory 
surveillance in comparison to notifications. In section 2.5, I review the 
literature on the compliance of health care providers (HCPs) with the NDSS 
and the factors that influence their compliance. In the last section, 2.6, I 
summarize the gaps in the literature and the knowledge contribution of my 
thesis. 
2.2 Definition of terms 
This thesis used the following definitions: 
Acceptability Indicates the willingness of providers to participate 
in the surveillance system [88]. 
Correct notification 
/Compliance  
Compliance or “correct notification” is HCP 
notification to the local, provincial or national 
department of health. 
Data quality The completeness and validity of the data recorded 
in the surveillance system [88]. 
Flexibility Adaptability of the NDSS to changing circumstances 
and needs with little additional resource implications 
[88]. 
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Health care 
provider 
A medical doctor or professional nurse with at least 
four years of training. 
Notifiable diseases 
surveillance 
system (NDSS) 
Surveillance based on the notification of 
communicable diseases that is used to provide an 
early warning, and facilitate early public health 
response to an outbreak [8].  
Positive predictive 
value 
The proportion of reported cases diagnosed with the 
communicable disease under surveillance [88]. 
Representativeness The ability of the system to describe accurately the 
occurrence of a health-related event over time [88]. 
Sensitivity The proportion of cases of a communicable disease 
detected by the surveillance system [88]. 
Simplicity The ease of understanding the processes and 
procedures of the NDSS [88]. 
Stability The reliability of the data recorded in the 
surveillance system [88].  
Stakeholder These are individuals actively involved in the NDSS, 
or in structures and committees set up to deal with 
any aspect of the NDSS in South Africa, including 
individuals involved in disease control and response; 
disease detection; and health management. 
Surveillance “The continuous, systematic collection, analysis and 
interpretation of health-related data needed for the 
planning, implementation, and evaluation of public 
health practice” [WHO, 2017:webpage][8]. 
Systems approach An approach that “applies scientific insights to 
understand the elements that influence health 
outcomes; models the relationships between those 
elements; and alters design, processes, or policies 
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based on the resultant knowledge in order to 
produce better health” [Kaplan, 2013:4][102]. 
Timeliness The speed with which the provider takes the 
appropriate steps after an event came to her/his 
attention [88]. 
Tracer A specifically selected communicable disease that 
makes it possible to assess the attributes of the 
surveillance system in order to determine its 
performance [103]. 
Usefulness Whether the data contributes to an outbreak 
response, or the prevention and control of 
communicable diseases or improved public health 
knowledge of communicable diseases [88]. 
2.3 Policy actors and the attributes of the NDSS  
The involvement of stakeholders, also called policy actors, in health policy 
development or analysis is critical, both to obtain their inputs and to build 
mutual understanding and trust [104-108]. Furthermore, studies have 
highlighted the importance of the roles, power, interests, and values of 
stakeholders in developing and implementing health policies or reforms 
[109-111].  
The CDC framework for the evaluation of surveillance systems advocates 
the involvement of key stakeholders in assessments [88], and the WHO’s 
2020 strategic policy framework [112] emphasises the importance of 
including all stakeholders in decision-making and health system reform 
initiatives [113]. In South Africa, several studies have pointed to sub-
optimal policy implementation or policy failures because of the lack of 
involvement of policy actors, particularly those responsible for the 
implementation of these policies [110, 114-117]. Hence, it is critical to 
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obtain the perspectives of key health policy actors on the attributes of the 
NDSS and the reforms that are needed. 
The 2001 framework developed by the CDC [88] and that of the WHO, have 
been widely used to evaluate surveillance systems. A 2009 literature review 
by Sahal et al, reported on 20 NDSS evaluations in high-income countries 
(HICs) and 12 in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) that used either 
the CDC or WHO framework [118]. In HICs in Europe [119] and Australasia 
[120, 121], evaluations of the NDSS used the CDC framework and focused 
on data quality, usefulness, acceptability, timeliness, as well as the 
simplicity of the system. Studies in LMIC in the Americas [122, 123], Europe 
[124], Asia [125], and Africa [126-129],  focused mainly on core and 
support surveillance functions, such as provision of laboratory services, 
supervision, monitoring, organisational capacity, staffing and resources. 
These LMIC studies found that challenges with laboratories, supervision, 
monitoring, organisational capacity, staffing and resources impede NDSS 
functioning [126-129]. 
In recognition of the importance of stakeholders, several countries have 
conducted surveys among NDSS stakeholders’ to ascertain their 
perceptions of system attributes. A 2003 German assessment of the NDSS 
scored the system 90% on acceptability [130]; a Canadian study published 
in 2018, rated the usefulness of their surveillance system between 74-97% 
[131]; in Australia, a NDSS study on the attribute of usefulness found that 
94% of participants reported  reading NDSS reports and 85% reported 
utilisation of the data [120]. In Thailand, a 2016 study on the malaria 
surveillance system measured timeliness at three to four days [132], while 
in the Maldives, timeliness for dengue fever was two days and acceptability 
levels were only 2% amongst doctors [133]. In Africa, a 2017 study on 
influenza in Madagascar showed acceptability levels that ranged from 84%-
98%, timeliness of reporting of 70% within 48 hours, 94% of stakeholders 
found the system simple and the system was reportedly flexible in that it 
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was used for four diseases and able to pick up 14 respiratory viruses [134]. 
A 2010 Ugandan study found that stakeholders scored the timeliness of the 
NDSS at 68%-73% [126]; and a 2016 study on measles in a Nigerian state 
found the timeliness of the system to be 65% [135]. 
Some studies among stakeholders have used a qualitative approach. In a 
2004 study on the Australian NDSS, stakeholders rated their operations and 
processes as complex [120]. In China, stakeholders reported the 
surveillance system as flexible, useful and acceptable [136], and in Taiwan 
stakeholders reported the NDSS as acceptable [137] and useful [138].  
Despite the literature on stakeholder perceptions on NDSS attributes, these 
findings are not generalisable to South Africa due differences in context, 
the burden and profile of infectious diseases, structure of the health care 
system, and in the availability of resources [24, 88, 139]. Furthermore, 
there is a dearth of studies on stakeholder perceptions of the attributes of 
the NDSS and that focus on the entire country [84, 86, 87]. Hence, 
generating new information on stakeholders’ perceptions of the NDSS 
attributes in South Africa can assist policy-makers with efforts to improve 
the performance of the system, and contribute to the successful 
implementation of health sector reforms.  
 
2.4 NDSS attributes, laboratory surveillance and 
notifications  
Laboratories play an essential and important role in the management of 
communicable diseases, and are often the first to identify or confirm the 
organism involved, except when point of care diagnostic equipment is used. 
They serve to confirm the clinical diagnosis made by the HCPs. For these 
reasons many countries have introduced measures to make it compulsory 
for laboratories to notify communicable diseases and have dual reporting 
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systems in order to overcome the problem of under-reporting and 
timeliness of reporting [137, 140-147].  
In many HICs, the strong laboratory networks have made the mandatory 
reporting by laboratories an effective step in improving the functioning of 
the NDSS [140-144, 148]. However, many of these countries also 
introduced further steps, such as the introduction of electronic laboratory 
reporting, to improve compliance and the timeliness of reporting. In the 
USA, many states introduced laboratory reporting at the onset of 
mandatory reporting by clinicians [149] and after the terror attacks of 11 
September 2001, funds were provided through CDC for the implementation 
of electronic laboratory reporting in states and local territories [150-152]. 
By 2013, 62% of approximately 20 million laboratory reports were received 
electronically [152], and by July 2014, this had increased to 67%, with the 
aim of  reaching 80% by 2016 [153]. Comparisons of electronic and paper-
based laboratory reporting in the USA showed that electronic reporting 
identified 4.4 times more cases and 7.9 days earlier than paper-based 
reporting [144]. 
The majority of studies that compare electronic laboratory reporting 
systems with paper-based notifications have been done in HICs [144, 148, 
154-156]. Some of these comparative studies in HICs have examined the 
attributes of surveillance systems [142, 144, 154, 155, 157-159], while 
some have compared different electronic systems with each other [157, 
158], or active surveillance with passive surveillance systems [159, 160]. 
However, there is a dearth of studies that compared national notification 
systems with laboratory surveillance. I could only find one 2005 Swedish 
study that compared the parallel systems of clinical and laboratory 
notifications [142]. This study on the sensitivity of the Swedish NDSS used 
four tracer diseases and found that dual reporting was beneficial and that 
the sensitivity of clinical and laboratory notification was higher than 91% 
for all the tracers [142]. 
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Some LMIC in the Far East, such as China and Taiwan, have stronger 
laboratory systems and have been able to emulate practices in HICs, 
through the introduction of electronic laboratory reporting [137, 145-147]. 
In many LMIC, particularly in Africa, laboratory networks are relatively 
weak and the reliance on HCPs to notify diseases is therefore stronger. In 
Africa evaluation studies have focused on the implementation of the 
integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR), and have emphasised 
weak laboratory networks that impede the effective functioning of the 
NDSS [118, 127-129]. Hence, the evidence on the extent of the 
improvement in timeliness and compliance in LMIC, brought about by the 
introduction of laboratory reporting is scant. There is also a dearth of 
comparative studies that focus on notification and laboratory surveillance 
systems in LMIC.  
In South Africa, despite a relatively strong laboratory network, these 
laboratories are not required by law to report communicable diseases [55-
57]. Since the 2000s, several laboratory-based sentinel surveillance 
initiatives have been implemented, such as influenza-like illness (ILI) and 
severe acute respiratory illness (SARI) surveillance [161], as well as the 
group for enteric, respiratory and meningeal disease surveillance (GERMS) 
[162]. However, these sentinel surveillance systems were developed by 
researchers independently of the NDSS in South Africa. Although the 
knowledge generated has contributed to health policy development such as 
the introduction of rotavirus and pneumococcal vaccination programmes 
[163-165], the overall NDSS in South Africa has not changed 
fundamentally. 
Importantly, there is a knowledge gap on how the paper-based notification 
system compares with the laboratory surveillance system.  Although a 
South African study compared notifications and laboratory surveillance for 
hepatitis B  for the period 1985 – 1988 [166], this was more than 28 years 
ago, and the South African health system has undergone major changes 
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since the 1980s. This PhD is novel as it was one of the first studies to use 
three tracer conditions to compare laboratory surveillance with the 
notifications of these tracer conditions to the department of health. 
2.5 Health care providers’ compliance with the NDSS 
Notifiable communicable diseases need to be reported to the relevant 
health care authorities to ensure appropriate investigation and 
implementation of disease prevention and control measures. HCPs are at 
the coalface of service delivery, responsible for the diagnosis and treatment 
of infectious diseases; they are critical to an effective NDSS and resilient 
health systems [167]. The optimal performance of the NDSS is dependent 
on HCPs who in addition to the management of patients with infectious 
diseases, are also aware of measures to prevent the spread of the infection, 
the importance of notification to enable an appropriate public health 
response.  
Around the world, many countries have made it mandatory for HCPs to 
report notifiable diseases upon clinical suspicion and/or laboratory 
confirmation [55, 141-144, 149, 159, 160, 168-187]. The timely 
compliance of HCPs is essential to the effective functioning of any NDSS. 
Information on HCP compliance is important for shaping NDSS reforms, 
ensuring effective disease response and compliance with the IHR, and 
monitoring trends and/or benchmarking the performance of HCPs [167]. 
In the USA, individual states are responsible for the monitoring of 
communicable diseases. Mandatory reporting by HCPs in some states dates 
back a time prior to the establishment of the CDC. In Michigan, which was 
the first state to take action to make reporting by HCPs mandatory, 
mandatory reporting dates back to 1883 [149]. By 1925, all states in the 
USA were taking part in a national reporting system, resulting in a system  
of reporting morbidity and mortality data on 49 infectious diseases to the 
CDC [149]. However, despite the legal obligation, as early as 1999 an 
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analytical review of studies in the USA has shown that underreporting 
affected all states and all notifiable diseases and was as low as 9% for some 
diseases [141]. This review has shown that the reporting was higher for 
tuberculosis, AIDS, and sexually transmitted diseases (mean 79 %) than 
for all other diseases (mean 49 %) [141]. In 2004, the median timeliness 
of national reporting in the USA  ranged from 12 days for meningococcal 
disease to 40 days for pertussis [188]. 
Some European countries [142, 143, 169-175] and Australia [159, 176-
178] have documented the problems of under-reporting in the NDSS, 
despite compulsory notification by HCPs. These countries have taken steps 
to identify and address the factors which cause non-compliance or under-
reporting. Factors found to influence compliance were: willingness to notify, 
workload, training on the NDSS, understanding of the purpose of the NDSS, 
knowledge on what to notify, possession of notification forms and feedback 
given [141, 176, 177]. Many of these countries have introduced parallel 
laboratory reporting and electronic systems in order to address HCPs’ non-
compliance. Studies in LMIC in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia have 
found that the factors influencing HCP compliance with the NDSS were 
similar to those in HICs, and included lack of knowledge, understanding of 
the purpose of notifications or lack of logistics needed to notify [160, 179-
184]. Timeliness studies in these countries showed delays of up 20 days 
median time from disease onset to notification in China and Korea [145, 
146]; in Thailand reporting was considered timely in 45% of cases [147]. 
These countries have also introduced laboratory and electronic reporting to 
increase compliance and timeliness [137, 145-147]. 
There is a dearth of studies on the compliance of HCPs with the NDSS in 
Africa. I could only find three studies in Nigeria [185-187] and a study in a 
district in Zimbabwe [189]. A study in one of provinces of Nigeria showed 
that 38% of HCPs surveyed were aware of the NDSS [185] and two national 
Nigerian studies showed that the most common reasons for not reporting 
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were lack of knowledge amongst HCPs and lack of infrastructure or logistics 
for reporting [186, 187]. The study in the Zimbabwean district showed that 
only 20% of HCPs surveyed knew about their legal requirement to notify 
infectious diseases [189]. Both Nigeria and Zimbabwe lack the necessary 
infrastructure and resources to introduce electronic systems to improve the 
compliance and/or timeliness of reporting [186, 187, 189]. 
In South Africa, there have only been a few evaluations of HCPs compliance 
with the NDSS since its inception in the 1970s [84, 166, 190, 191]. These 
included a study on reporting of hepatitis B for the period 1985 to 1988 
[166]; a 1996 study at one institution on reasons for under-reporting 
[191]; a study on rheumatic fever for the period 1990-2004 [190]; and one 
on notifications amongst private general practitioners (GPs) in Gauteng 
province in 2006 [84]. These studies precede the implementation of the 
2005 IHR and are focused on limited geographical settings or diseases. 
Furthermore, the South African health system has undergone with the 
revitalisation of primary health care [46, 47], the introduction of universal 
health coverage through the NHI [51, 52], and the establishment of a public 
health institute [53]. There is a dearth of information on factors associated 
with HCPs compliance with the NDSS, with only one study found that is 
more than 20 years old and was done at one institution [191]. Given this 
knowledge gap, this PhD was one of the first studies to examine HCPs' 
compliance with the NDSS in South Africa and the factors associated with 
their compliance. The information so generated could inform NDSS reforms 
and/or continuing education programmes. 
2.6 Summary 
Table 2.1 summarises the identified gaps in the literature, and the 
contribution of the PhD in addressing some of the gaps. 
Table 2.1: Summary of the Literature Review 
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Study 
Objectives 
What is known Knowledge Gaps Scholarly 
contribution of the 
PhD 
Policy actors 
and the 
attributes of the 
NDSS  
Policy actors or 
stakeholders are critical 
to NDSS performance 
Majority of surveys on 
stakeholder perceptions 
of NDSS attributes done 
in high income countries 
Dearth of studies 
assessing the NDSS 
attributes from 
perspectives of key 
stakeholders in South 
Africa and in Africa 
This PhD contributes to 
new knowledge on the 
NDSS attributes of 
acceptability, flexibility, 
simplicity, timeliness 
and usefulness. in 
South Africa 
 
Comparing  
laboratory 
surveillance 
with the NDSS 
Laboratories are critical 
in the NDSS for 
diagnosis or confirmation 
of the infectious agent In 
high-income countries, it 
is mandatory for 
laboratories to notify 
infectious diseases 
In LMIC, laboratory 
networks are weak 
In South Africa, despite 
a strong network of 
laboratories, they are 
not required to notify 
infectious diseases  
 
There is a dearth of 
studies: 
 assessing the NDSS 
attributes of data 
quality, 
representativeness 
sensitivity stability 
and positive 
predictive value 
 comparing 
notifications with 
laboratory 
surveillance 
 Knowledge gaps are 
more pronounced in 
LMIC, especially in 
Africa 
 In South Africa, no 
comprehensive 
study that 
compares 
laboratory 
surveillance with 
notifications 
 No NDSS evaluation 
since the 2005 IHR   
The PhD is the first 
comparative study 
between the NDSS and 
laboratory surveillance  
It has generated new 
knowledge on the 
attributes of the NDSS 
of data quality, 
representativeness, 
sensitivity stability and 
positive predictive 
value 
 
Health care 
providers’ 
compliance with 
the NDSS and 
the 
determinants of 
their 
compliance 
The notification of 
communicable diseases 
must lead to an 
appropriate public health 
response 
 
HCPs are critical to the 
optimal performance of 
the NDSS Extensive 
literature on HCP 
compliance and factors 
influencing compliance in 
HICs and LMIC in Asian 
countries of China, 
Thailand and Taiwan 
Knowledge on measures 
introduced to overcome 
non-compliance and 
under-reporting 
Dearth of HCP 
compliance studies in 
Africa 
Lack of HCPs 
compliance is unknown 
in South Africa 
One of the first studies 
on the compliance of 
HCPs with the NDSS in 
South Africa and 
determinants of their 
compliance 
Add to the body of 
knowledge on 
determinants of HCP 
compliance in an 
African and middle-
income country setting 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the methods used in the PhD to achieve the study 
objectives. In section 3.2, I outline the overall methodological approach, 
including the timeframes within which the PhD was completed. In section 
3.3 the ethical considerations are discussed. In sections 3.4 to 3.8, I 
summarise the study setting, the study population, sampling methods, 
development of data collection tools, data collection, data management and 
data analysis. In section 3.9, I outline the triangulation methods, and in 
Section 3.10, I discuss the study limitations and the steps taken to prevent 
or overcome these. In the concluding section 3.11, I highlight the strengths 
of my PhD study. 
3.2 Overall methodological approach 
This PhD thesis consisted of three inter-related components, based on the 
objectives of the doctoral study described in Chapter 1. The three distinct, 
but inter-linked studies were derived from the conceptual framework to 
answer the research questions and meet the study objectives. The three 
studies were: 
I. A survey of the opinions of key informants (or policy actors) in the 
NDSS on system attributes of usefulness, timeliness simplicity, 
flexibility and acceptability; 
II. An analysis of NDSS system attributes of representativeness, 
stability, data quality, sensitivity and positive predictive value; and 
III. An analysis of health care provider compliance with the NDSS and 
the factors that influences compliance. 
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A fourth objective focuses on NDSS reforms needed and was addressed by 
a combination of studies I, and III. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the 
objectives, methods used, data collection instruments used in the studies 
and the publication outputs; while Table 3.2 shows the overall study 
components of the PhD. Each of the studies is described individually. 
Table 3.3 shows the timeframes within which the PhD study was completed. 
The development of the study protocol started in February 2014 and its 
approval from the Faculty of Health Sciences Graduate Studies Committee 
was obtained in June 2014. Approval from the University Ethics Committee 
was obtained in August 2014 (Appendix 1) and that from the relevant 
health authorities, such as the Director-General of Health (Appendix 2) and 
provincial Heads of Departments (Appendix 3), as well Chief Executive 
Officers of the national laboratory and private hospital groups (Appendices 
4 and 5) were obtained over a six month period until February 2015. Data 
collection for all three studies started in March 2015 – I personally collected 
the data for studies I and II and trained 12 fieldworkers in May 2015 to 
assist with data collection for study III. This was because 77 health facilities 
and 70 general practitioners’ (GPs) practices were involved and it was not 
possible for me to do all the data collections in three provinces. I provided 
leadership, on-site supervision and ensured the overall quality assurance 
for the study. 
 
Data for study I was captured electronically by participants at the time of 
completion of the questionnaires into the secure, web-based Research 
Electronic Data Capture (REDCap) programme hosted at the University of 
Witwatersrand [26]; data for study II was captured by me in Microsoft Excel 
over a three month period starting from May 2015. Two data capturers 
were trained in June 2015 to double capture the study III data on REDCap 
over a two month period. The data analysis and report writing was 
staggered one after the other from June 2015; each manuscript took about 
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one year from data analysis to final publication (paper 4 has not yet been 
published at the time of submitting my thesis). 
 
Table 3.1: Methodological Approach 
Objective Methods Data collection 
Instrument(s) 
Research 
Output 
1. Determine  key 
informants’ 
opinions on the 
NDSS attributes of  
simplicity, 
timeliness, 
acceptability, 
usefulness and 
flexibility  
 A survey of 
communicable 
diseases co-
ordinators, 
surveillance 
officers at 
national, provincial 
and district level, 
as well as role-
players in NDSS 
stakeholder 
forums. 
 Semi-structured 
questionnaire 
specifically designed 
for the survey 
 
 Survey of key 
stakeholders 
on the 
Notifiable 
Diseases 
Surveillance 
System in 
South Africa 
Chapter 4 
2. Analyse the system 
attributes of data 
quality, stability, 
representativeness, 
sensitivity and 
positive predictive 
value of the 
National NDSS 
 Retrospective 
record review and 
comparison of the  
data on 3 tracer 
notifiable diseases 
for 2013, using 
both the Central 
Data Warehouse 
of the National 
Health Laboratory 
Service (NHLS) 
and the records of 
notifications at the 
Department of 
Health. 
 Specifically 
designed record 
review form 
 Comparing 
laboratory 
surveillance 
with the 
Notifiable 
Diseases 
Surveillance 
System in 
South Africa 
Chapter 5 
3. Determine the 
factors influencing 
provider 
compliance with 
the NDSS 
(knowledge, 
attitudes and 
practices) 
 A survey of health 
care providers 
(doctors and 
nurses) at 
provincial and 
district levels 
 
 Semi-structured 
questionnaire 
specifically designed 
for the survey 
 
 Health care 
providers' 
compliance 
with the 
Notifiable 
Diseases 
Surveillance 
System in 
South Africa 
Chapter 6 
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Objective Methods Data collection 
Instrument(s) 
Research 
Output 
4. Make policy 
recommendations 
for  interventions 
to improve the 
effectiveness and 
efficiency of the 
National NDSS in 
the country 
 Draw conclusions 
from questions 
raised in the 
surveys in studies 
one and three and 
make relevant 
policy 
recommendations 
 Self-administered 
questionnaires used 
in studies one and 
three 
 
 Perspectives of 
health policy 
actors on 
reforming the 
notifiable 
diseases 
surveillance 
system in 
South Africa 
Chapter 7 
 
Table 3.2: Overall PhD study components 
Components Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Study Setting 9 Provinces 9 Provinces 3 Provinces – urban, 
rural, mix 
Study 
Population 
Key stakeholders 
involved with 
analysing, 
interpreting, 
responding, 
reporting and 
providing feedback; 
as well as 
monitoring and 
evaluation 
All data for three 
tracer notifiable 
diseases (measles, 
meningococcal 
meningitis and 
typhoid) in the 
laboratory records and 
records of notifications 
for 2013 
Health care providers, 
doctors and professional 
nurses, involved with the 
identification and 
notification of 
communicable diseases 
Sampling 
approach 
Entire population of 
key stakeholders 
All data for the 
selected notifiable 
diseases for 2013 
A multistage stratification 
by province and type of 
facility 
Sample size n = 169 measles = 8,228 
meningococcal 
meningitis = 8,714 
and  
typhoid  = 24,264  
n = 1050 
Data 
collection 
Electronic REDCap  
self-administered 
questionnaire 
Record review data 
collected from the 
NHLS and NDOH 
Field worker assisted 
data collection using self-
administered 
questionnaires 
Data Analysis Quantitative 
analysis with 
STATA® 14 
Quantitative analyses 
with Microsoft Excel 
and STATA® 14 
Quantitative analysis with 
STATA® 14 
Integrating 
narrative 
Triangulation and integration of the findings of the various studies 
REDCap = Research Electronic Data Capture, programme hosted at the University of 
Witwatersrand [26] 
NHLS = National Health Laboratory Services 
NDOH = National Department of Health  
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Table 3.3:  Time-frames of the various studies 
Studies 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 Semes  
1 
Semes 
2 
Semes 
1 
Semes 
2 
Semes 
1 
Semes 
2 
Semes 
1 
Semes 
2 
Study 1 
Protocol 
develop
-ment 
Obtaining 
approvals 
Data 
Collection 
and Data 
Capturing 
Data 
Analysis 
Report 
Writing 
P1 
  
Thesis 
Writing 
and 
Report 
writing 
P4 
Study 2 Data 
capturing  
Data 
Analysis 
Report 
Writing 
P2 
 
Study 3 Data 
capturing  
 Data 
Analysis 
Report 
Writing 
P3/P4  
Semes = Semester   P = Paper 
3.3 Ethics 
I obtained ethical approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Medical) of the University of the Witwatersrand, in August 2014 (Clearance 
certificate M140624, attached as Appendix 1). Approval for the research 
was also obtained from the Director- General of the DOH, the heads of the 
relevant provincial DOHs (Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo), the Chief 
Executive Officers of the NHLS and each of the private hospital groups. 
(Appendices 2 -5)  
The PhD research study also complied with all the ethical guides of the 
Singapore Statement on Research Integrity in that it adhered to the 
principles of honesty, accountability, professionalism, and stewardship 
[192]. The ethical matters considered and how they were addressed, are 
outlined below: 
 
a. Compliance of fieldworkers with principles of honesty, accountability, 
professionalism and good stewardship of the research 
I developed a procedure manual (Appendix 6) and trained all skilled 
fieldworkers who were professional nurses for one day on all aspects of the 
study and data collection. The training focused on their professionalism and 
courtesy in providing information to potential participants, the importance 
of informed consent, maintaining confidentiality and good stewardship of 
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the data. I accompanied each provincial group on the first day of data 
collection to ensure that they performed as trained and required. All 
fieldworkers were given the contact details of the researcher to ensure that 
urgent queries that arose were addressed immediately. 
 
b. Potential of my position as Chief Director: Communicable Diseases to 
influence participation in the survey 
At the time of my PhD, I was the Chief Director: Communicable Diseases 
at the NDOH. Hence I was in a senior position to many of the study 
participants. To ensure that this did not have an influence on their 
participation, I drew a clear distinction between the research undertaken 
by me as a PhD student of the University of Witwatersrand, and emphasised 
that it was not part of my official work. The information sheet (Appendix 7) 
only referred to my status as a university student and did not refer to my 
official position. I further took steps not to involve any of my subordinates 
as fieldworkers or promoters of the research. Invitations to participants 
were sent from my private e-mail address and all were given the option to 
refuse participation, with the guarantee that there would be no negative 
consequences should they decline participation. 
 
c. Informed and voluntary participation 
All participants received an information sheet (Appendix 7) and voluntary, 
informed consent was obtained prior to their participation in the research. 
It was emphasized that participation was voluntary and of their own free 
will – there were no consequences for refusal to participate and no direct 
benefits of participation (besides the indirect benefits that may arise from 
policy recommendations for improvements to the NDSS at the conclusion 
of the study). All participants received the contact details of the researcher, 
the research supervisors and the Chair of the Human Research Ethics 
committee of the University of the Witwatersrand on the information sheet.  
 
d. Privacy and confidentiality for the participants of surveys 
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The survey questionnaires were completed anonymously. Questionnaires 
were coded and no personal identifiers were obtained to ensure 
confidentiality. 
 
e. Privacy and confidentiality for the patients whose records were reviewed 
The researcher is registered with the Health Professions Council of South 
Africa as a medical practitioner, and understands the importance of 
confidentiality. Only the researcher had access to the personal identifiers, 
obtained from patient laboratory and notification records. This information 
was stored in a password protected computer that only the researcher had 
access to.  
f. Securing the information after data collection and maintaining 
confidentiality of records   
Responses from the two questionnaires (studies I and III) and the record 
review (study II) were stored on a secure computer. These responses were 
password protected and only the researcher had access to this password.  
3.4 Study setting 
The study setting for studies I and II covered all nine South African 
provinces and 52 health districts. The nine provinces consists of two urban 
ones, Gauteng and Western Cape; four rural provinces, Limpopo, 
Mpumalanga, Northwest, and Northern Cape; and three mixed urban-rural 
provinces, Eastern Cape, Free State and Kwazulu-Natal [193].  
In study III, three provinces were randomly selected, namely Gauteng, 
Kwazulu-Natal, and Limpopo. They represent the urban, rural and mixed 
urban-rural groups of provinces. Gauteng is geographically the smallest 
province with the biggest population and the economic capital of South 
Africa; Limpopo is the country’s northern most province that borders on 
three countries, and has a high influx of migrant populations en route to 
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Gauteng province; and Kwazulu-Natal is the second most populous 
province with the country’s biggest seaport [193].  
3.5 Study I 
The methods used in this study are summarized below with further details 
provided in Chapter 4. 
 Study population 
The study population for this study consisted of all stakeholders involved 
with analysing, interpreting, responding, reporting and providing feedback 
on data collected; as well as those involved with monitoring and evaluation 
of the system at a national and provincial level. These stakeholders were: 
all surveillance officers at national and provincial levels; all communicable 
disease co-ordinators at national and provincial levels; and participants of 
the National Surveillance Forum, the South African Malaria Elimination 
Committee, the National Outbreak Response Team (NORT), the South 
African Expanded Programme on Immunisations Committee and the 
Provincial Outbreak Response Teams (PORTs).  
 Sampling  
The sample size included the entire population of key stakeholders. As 
experience is an important determinant of the perspectives of the 
stakeholders, those with less than one year experience of the NDSS and 
those not working in a health-related field were excluded from the study.  
 Development of data collection tool 
I could not find a standardised tool to measure key stakeholders 
perceptions on the attributes of the national NDSS. I therefore designed an 
information sheet (Appendix 7) and a self-administered questionnaire in 
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English (Appendix 8) for use in the survey. English is one of the 11 official 
languages of South Africa and is the main language used to conduct official 
business in. It was assumed that all of the key stakeholders had a good 
working knowledge of this language and no translations were made of the 
questionnaire. The different components of the questionnaire are shown in 
figure 3.1.  
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Key Stakeholders Questionnaire 
Consists of 3 main sections 
 
Who are the 
key 
stakeholders 
21 Questions 
Skills on the 
NDSS 
23 Questions 
Perceptions on NDSS 
Attributes 
33 Questions 
Reviewing and Piloting of Data Collection Instrument 
 Peer review during protocol assessment by two peer assessors 
 Review by assessors of the Faculty Graduate Students Committee 
 Piloting of instrument 
 Determining Cronbach’s alpha coefficient on questionnaires to assess 
reliability and inter-item correlation = 0.82 to 0.97 
 
Figure 3.1:  Development of Key Stakeholder data collection 
instrument 
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 Piloting of data collection instruments 
The questionnaire was piloted with three key stakeholders similar to the 
study population, prior to data collection, to determine the clarity of 
questions and time taken for completion. The questionnaire took an 
average of 20 minutes to complete and no changes were deemed necessary 
after the pilot study. These questionnaires completed in the pilot study were 
excluded from the main study. 
 Determining reliability and inter-item correlation 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were calculated on the key stakeholders’ 
questionnaire to determine reliability and coherence between items. They 
were found to be ranging from 0.82 to 0.97, which indicated a high 
reliability and inter-item correlation.  
 Data collection 
The e-mail addresses of all key stakeholders were obtained through the 
secretaries of all the national committees and my address book of provincial 
coordinators, that I had as part of my portfolio as Chief Director: 
Communicable Diseases at the NDOH. Steps were taken to ensure that my 
position did not interfere with the study, as described under ethics above. 
I used the secure, web-based Research Electronic Data Capture, REDCap, 
programme hosted at the University of Witwatersrand [26], to send 
invitations to key stakeholders to participate in the electronic survey and 
sent weekly reminders to non-responders (see Chapter 4). The data were 
recorded directly into REDCap upon their completion of the questionnaire. 
 Data capturing and management 
The participants completed an electronic survey on REDCap. Upon the 
completion of the questionnaire, it was checked for quality, cleaned, coded 
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and stored on a secure computer. The data were password protected and 
only the researcher had access to this password. Data were labelled and 
exported into STATA® 14 for analysis (see section 3.8).  
3.6 Study II 
Chapter 5 describes the methods used in study II in detail. Here, I 
summarize the methods briefly. 
 Study population 
For purposes of the study, three tracer notifiable communicable diseases 
were selected for inclusion into the study based on the following: each 
condition is discrete and easily identified or diagnosed; the condition is a 
good indicator to measure the attributes of the NDSS; and the condition 
result in considerable morbidity and mortality that require an urgent public 
health response (see Chapter 5 and paper 2 for more details [57]). All 
records of the three tracer conditions: measles, meningococcal meningitis 
and typhoid, in the data of the National Health Laboratory Services (NHLS), 
the national public sector laboratory service provider, and the records of 
notifications held at the national Department of Health (DOH), for the 
selected study period, 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013, were included 
in the study.  
 Selection of tracers 
In this study, I selected three tracer diseases for the comparative study: 
measles, meningococcal meningitis, and typhoid. Measles and 
meningococcal meningitis were selected as they are endemic in all 
provinces [194, 195], highly contagious, distinct and easily identifiable 
diseases for which early notification on clinical grounds [55] and a public 
health response is needed. Measles is also a re-emerging, vaccine-
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preventable disease, aimed at elimination [196, 197], that had two recent 
major outbreaks that affected all provinces in 2003-5 [198] and 2009-11 
[199-201]. Typhoid is less clinically distinct, but is also endemic in South 
Africa and has caused considerable morbidity and mortality, which are 
largely preventable through public health measures [202, 203]. These 
factors make the tracers good indicators to measure the attributes of the 
NDSS. 
 Sampling  
The study sample included all data (both from NHLS and the DOH) for the 
selected notifiable diseases for 2013, which was the study period. All 
records with inconclusive diagnostic information were excluded from the 
laboratory records. 
 Record review form and study pilot 
I developed a record review form (Appendix 9) to extract socio-
demographic, travel history and clinical information from the laboratory and 
notification records. 
The record review form was piloted for both the laboratory and notification 
systems, using three records for each of the tracers for the year 2012. 
During the pilot study, I found that due to the high level of incomplete 
information in the records, case-matching between the two systems was 
difficult without including names, hence, the record review form was 
revised to include the names of individuals with the tracer conditions. 
 Data collection, capturing and data management  
I reviewed and extracted all the laboratory data at the NHLS and the 
national records of notifications at the DOH for the period, 1 January 2013 
to 31 December 2013, on the three tracer diseases, captured them into 
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Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. I cleaned and coded the data in Microsoft 
Excel. The data were password protected on a computer that only the 
researcher had access to in order to ensure confidentiality. Microsoft Excel 
was used to determine some of the system attributes (as discussed below) 
and the data were exported into STATA® 14 for further analysis. Figure 3.2 
shows the development of the record review form, data capturing and data 
management of study II. 
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Figure 3.2:  Development of record review form, data capturing 
and data management of Study II  
Socio-
Demographics 
7 Questions 
Travel History 
2 Questions 
Clinical Information 
5 Questions 
A. Notification Records 
Measles 
Meningococcal Meningitis 
Typhoid 
B. Laboratory Records 
Measles 
Meningococcal Meningitis 
Typhoid 
 
Matched by 
Name and 
Socio-
demographics 
 
Record Review Form  
Used to review Jan to Dec 2013 records on three tracer diseases from: 
A. Notifications at Department of Health and 
B. Laboratory data at NHLS  
 
 
Reviewing, Piloting and Data Management 
 Subjected to peer review during protocol assessment by two peer 
assessors 
 Subjected to review by assessors of the Faculty Graduate Students 
Committee 
 Piloting record review on three 2012 records per tracer for each source 
 Data for Jan to Dec 2013 entered, coded and cleaned in Microsoft Excel 
 Each record in the notification database was matched with that in the 
laboratory database 
 Microsoft Excel used for data analysis 
 Data exported into STATA 14 for further analysis 
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3.7 Study III  
The methods used in study III are summarized below and discussed further 
in Chapter 6.  
 Study population 
The study population consisted of all health care providers (HCPs), 
specifically doctors and professional nurses (with four years of training), 
involved with the identification and notification of communicable diseases 
at institutional level in both the public and private health sectors. These 
providers include: primary health care (PHC) clinicians; frontline hospital 
clinicians (in medical casualty, medical and paediatric out-patients’ 
departments, internal medicine and paediatrics); infection prevention and 
control nurses at hospitals; and GPs.  
Enrolled and student nurses were excluded from the study, because they 
are not involved in the notification of infectious diseases. 
 Sampling 
The sample size was estimated using Epi Info statistical software, version 
7.2, for population surveys, assuming: a) the acceptable margin of error as 
+ 5%; b) approximately 40% would notify correctly (estimated from a 
previous Gauteng study [84]); and c) design effect of 2.5 to account for 
clustering effects (this is conservative). This required an overall sample size 
of 936 HCPs. To allow for a non-response of 10% I targeted 1,050 HCPs. 
Figure 3.3 shows the sampling approach used in study III. 
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Figure 3.3: Sampling approach used in Study III 
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Three of the nine provinces were selected randomly, and the final sample 
consisted of the provinces of Gauteng (urban), KwaZulu-Natal (mixed 
urban-rural) and Limpopo (rural). I then stratified by type of health 
facilities, namely central /tertiary hospitals, regional hospitals, district 
hospitals, primary health care facility (which included community health 
centres (CHCs) and clinics), private hospitals and private general 
practitioners (GPs). Satellite and mobile clinics (as they operate only for a 
few hours per week and therefore see a very limited number of patients), 
as well as private hospitals with fewer than 100 beds (which have limited 
scope and practices, and do not have the targeted health disciplines that 
deal with the NDSS) were excluded from the study. 
The target sample size for each province was chosen proportional to the 
number of HCPs in that province. In order to select the number of facilities 
of each type to be sampled in each province, I assumed an average number 
of HCPs for that facility (e.g. I assumed that at each clinic around seven 
HCPs would be present on the day of the survey); a pre-specified number 
was chosen to lead to an overall sample of 1050 HCPs. This allowed us to 
select a sample of facilities randomly in each province.  
In each sampled facility, all nurses and doctors who worked in the divisions 
of internal medicine, out-patients, medical casualty, critical care, 
paediatrics and infection control units were targeted on the survey day. In 
PHC facilities all nurses and doctors were requested to participate in the 
study. I also randomly selected 70 general practitioners (GPs) in private 
practice as part of the private sector facilities: 20 in Gauteng province, 20 
in Limpopo and 30 in KwaZulu-Natal, using an electronic database of 
private GPs. Sampling weights were calculated based on the total number 
of HCPs in each stratum. 
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 Development of data collection tool  
I could not find a standardised tool to measure HCP compliance and 
perceptions on national NDSS. I therefore designed an information sheet 
(Appendix 7) and adapted the questionnaire developed for key stakeholders 
(section 3.6.3) for use by HCPs (Appendix 10). The questionnaire was 
developed in English, the official business language of South Africa, to 
measure compliance with the NDSS as well as factors associated with 
compliance, as reported in the literature. Figure 3.4 outlines the 
development of the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Development of the HCP data collection instrument 
Socio-
demographics 
14 Questions 
NDSS Skills  
18 Questions 
NDSS 
Compliance 
8 Questions 
Perceptions on 
NDSS Attributes  
35 Questions 
Reviewing and Piloting of Data Collection Instruments 
 Subjected to peer review during protocol assessment by two peer 
assessors 
 Subjected to review by assessors of the Faculty Graduate Students 
Committee 
 Piloting of the instrument 
 Determining Cronbach’s alpha coefficient on questionnaire to assess 
reliability and inter-item correlation = 0.82 to 0.97 
 
Health Care Providers Questionnaire 
Consists of 4 sections 
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 Piloting of data collection instruments 
The questionnaire was piloted amongst three HCPs, similar to the study 
population, prior to data collection, to determine clarity of questions and 
time taken for administration. It took an average of 20 minutes to complete 
and no changes were deemed necessary upon completion of the pilot study. 
The questionnaires completed in the pilot studies were excluded from the 
main study. 
 Determining reliability and inter-item correlation 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were calculated on the HCP questionnaire to 
determine reliability and coherence between items. The results were similar 
to the key stakeholders’ questionnaire and ranged from 0.82 to 0.97, 
indicating high reliability and inter-item correlation.  
 Data collection 
I identified and recruited 12 professional nurses as fieldworkers, five each 
in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces, and two in Limpopo province, 
through Health Systems Trust, a non-governmental organisation in South 
Africa. I developed a procedure manual (Appendix 6) and trained each 
group of fieldworkers over one day on all aspects of the study and data 
collection. I accompanied each provincial group to two institutions where 
they needed to collect data, to ensure that they performed as trained and 
required. The fieldworkers collected data at two central, three tertiary, 
seven regional and eight district hospitals, as well as 11 CHCs and 38 clinics 
in the public sector. In the private sector, they collected data from 18 
hospitals. I took responsibility for ensuring procedures were adhered to and 
overall quality assurance. I provided my contact details to all fieldworkers 
and participants and remained in contact for consultation and questions as 
they arose (further information is provided in Chapter 6). 
50 
 
 Data management and capturing 
Responses from the HCPs questionnaire of Study III were checked for 
quality and completeness by a trained senior fieldworker per province, 
sealed in an envelope and hand delivered (in the case of Gauteng province), 
or couriered (in the case of the other two provinces) to the researcher. Two 
data capturers were recruited and trained to double capture the data into 
REDCap. This data were checked again for quality, cleaned and coded. The 
data were password protected and only the researcher had access to this 
password – data capturers had limited access to REDCap to ensure the 
double capturing of data.  
3.8 Data analysis 
Data were exported into STATA® 14 for further cleaning and analysis. Data 
analysis is outlined in Table 3.4 and is described further in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6.  
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Table 3.4: Outline of Data Analysis 
Sections Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Data 
Cleaning 
Imported, coded 
and cleaned in 
STATA® 14 
Coded and 
Cleaned in 
Microsoft Excel 
Imported, coded 
and cleaned in 
STATA® 14 
Socio-
Demographic 
Tables 
 
Descriptive 
statistics - 
Frequencies and 
percentages of 
categorical data 
Medians and 
Interquartile 
ranges of 
continuous data 
Descriptive 
statistics - 
Frequencies and 
percentages of 
categorical data 
Medians and 
Interquartile 
ranges of 
continuous data 
Descriptive 
statistics - 
Frequencies and 
percentages of 
categorical data 
Medians and 
Interquartile 
ranges of 
continuous data 
Perceptions/ 
System 
Attributes  
Descriptive 
statistics – 
Percentages of 
who agreed/ 
disagreed with 
an attribute.  
Performed 
sensitivity 
analysis  
Descriptive 
statistics – 
Calculated three 
system attributes 
as percentages in 
Microsoft Excel. 
Determined two 
attributes as 
percentages in 
STATA® 14 
Inferential 
statistics –  
Chi-square test 
on two 
attributes; non-
parametric 
Wilcoxon test on 
one attribute 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
performed 
Not Done 
Practices Not applicable Not applicable Descriptive 
statistics - 
frequencies and 
weighted 
percentages of 
diagnosis and 
notification 
Inferential 
statistics - the 
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Sections Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Rao-Scott 
correction to the 
Chi-square test to 
compare public 
and private 
systems 
Factors 
associated 
with 
attributes / 
practices 
Unconditional 
multiple logistic 
regression model 
at significance 
level of 0.05 
Not applicable Robust survey 
logistic regression 
at a significance 
level of 0.05 
 
 
I computed frequency and summary tables to describe participants’ age, 
gender, location, professional category, experience and training on the 
NDSS. I summarized categorical variables in tables showing frequency and 
percentages and numerical variables using medians (inter-quartile ranges).  
I used the Chi-square test (the Rao-Scott correction to the Chi-square test 
[204] in study III) to compare groups with each other. I determined 
whether participants’ age, gender, experience, training, professional 
category, sector  and place of employment, workload, possession of 
notification forms, knowledge of the NDSS were associated with each of the 
NDSS attributes (study I) or correctly notifying (study III) using the 
unconditional multiple logistic regression model and robust survey logistic 
regression respectively. The outcome variables were whether the 
participant agreed with the attribute or not (study I) or correct notification 
of relevant disease/s (study III). I calculated odds ratios (OR), 95% 
confidence intervals (95% CI) and p-values. P-values of less than 0.05 were 
considered to be statistically significant.  
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3.9 Integration of the key findings from studies I, II and 
III 
I summarised and integrated the key results of studies I, II and III, as well 
as the results of the analysis described above, using the conceptual 
framework of the PhD. I used three of the four triangulation strategies, 
namely: methodological, data, and theoretical triangulation [205-207]. 
Methodological triangulation was done through conducting two cross-
sectional surveys, one among key stakeholders/policy actors and the other 
among health care providers, as well as a review of 2013 notifications and 
laboratory records for three tracer diseases. Data triangulation was done 
through collecting and comparing data from two sources in the record 
review, as well as contrasting this to the data collected in the surveys. I 
used theoretical triangulation in deriving a conceptual framework that 
draws on the WHO health systems model [101], the IDSR [24] and the CDC 
frameworks [88] for the assessment of surveillance systems 
3.10 Study Limitations and prevention/amelioration  
 Cross-sectional nature of the surveys 
The main limitation of the cross-sectional nature of the two surveys, which 
were done over the period April to June 2015, is that it gives a picture of 
what the perceptions of key stakeholders and HCPs were at the time of the 
study. These views may have changed since the surveys have been 
conducted. However, they were balanced by the more longitudinal nature 
of the record review. Furthermore, they provide important information on 
the views of key policy actors on the NDSS. 
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 Social desirability bias  
The two surveys were reliant on the perceptions and reporting of key 
informants and HCPs which were subject to social desirability bias and may 
have resulted in over- or under-reporting [208]. However, the questions 
were phrased in such a manner as to get truthful responses. These were 
again balanced by the comparative analysis of three tracer conditions that 
examined attributes of the system between the actual notification system 
and the laboratory records. 
 Selection bias 
The study setting for studies I and II represents the entire country and is 
therefore generalisable. However, the setting for study III represents three 
of the nine provinces and the inclusion of the urban, rural and mixed urban-
rural provinces. This study may be affected by a selection bias. However, 
clusters of HCPs were randomly selected per type of health facility in 
proportion to their number in each province. The novel nature of the study, 
the high number of 1,050 HCPs recruited, and the high response rate of 
90%, present an objective evaluation of HCPs compliance with the NDSS  
 Data limitations 
There were limitations arising from the data collected, which were 
addressed in the analysis of data through sensitivity analyses, as described 
in the relevant papers and in Chapters 4 and 5. The first issue that arose 
was in study I, with the number of key stakeholders that answered neither 
agreed nor disagreed to a statement on the attributes of the NDSS. Three 
scenarios were assumed in sensitivity analysis: in Scenario I the total 
number of stakeholders that gave this answer was excluded from the 
analysis; in Scenario II the total number of stakeholders that gave this 
answer was assumed to have agreed to the statement and added to this 
figure in the analysis; and in Scenario III these stakeholders were assumed 
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to have disagreed and added to those in the analysis as described in 
Chapter 4.  
The second issue was with the percentage of cases in the notification 
records that could not be matched to the cases in the laboratory records 
due to insufficient information in Study II. Similarly were three scenarios 
assumed in sensitivity analysis to address this problem: these records were 
first excluded from the analysis in Scenario I; in Scenario II the records 
were regarded as positive in the data analysis; and in Scenario III the 
records were regarded as negative in the analysis, as described in Chapter 
5. 
Hence the analysis dealt adequately with the data limitations. 
3.11 Strengths of the PhD study 
 Scholarly contribution 
This study is the first systematic and objective evaluation of the national 
NDSS in South Africa since its inception in 1977, and since the adoption of 
the WHO strategies on IDSR and the 2005 IHR. The study has generated 
new knowledge on the present status of the NDSS in South Africa at a time 
when the Ebola outbreak underscored the importance of these surveillance 
systems to national and global health security [209]. 
Studies I and II had a national coverage and are therefore representative 
of the entire country. Study III covered 77 randomly selected institutions, 
both in the public and private sectors, as well as 70 randomly selected GP 
practices in three provinces. Each of these provinces represented the 
urban, rural and urban-rural mix of the provinces in the country.  
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Both of the surveys had high response rates; study I, 84%; and study III, 
90%. The survey conducted as part of study I involved all key stakeholders 
involved with the NDSS at a national and provincial level, while the survey 
conducted with the 1,050 HCPs as part of study III was the first such broad 
study done on the compliance of HCPs in South Africa. 
Study III was the first comparative study between the NDSS and laboratory 
surveillance that employed methodology was new and described by Girdler-
Brown as “the first of its kind for South Africa” [210]. It provides the basis 
for future research in the country and the broader scientific community; it 
was further described as  “important, both for the southern African region 
as well as more widely” [Girdler-Brown, 2017:140][210]. 
 Policy relevance 
A well-functioning NDSS is not only important in the fight against the 
emergence and re-emergence of infectious disease epidemics. It is also 
vital to the monitoring and evaluation of public health interventions, and 
can assist with resource allocation decisions [210]. An effective and 
efficient system has major public health policy relevance. This current 
research study into the status of the NDSS is aimed at informing policy 
interventions to ensure a well-functioning surveillance system in South 
Africa. 
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CHAPTER 4. SURVEY OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF KEY 
STAKEHOLDERS ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN NOTIFIABLE DISEASES 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM  
4.1 Background 
Notifiable disease surveillance systems (NDSS) in the 21st century should 
be capable of rapid identification of priority diseases that cause national, 
regional or public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC). An 
effective and efficient NDSS could enhance the ability of a country to 
respond rapidly to outbreaks before they become PHEICs. Regular 
evaluations of the surveillance system are needed to ensure this capability, 
as well as relevance and usage by the key stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
PHEICs caused by the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak from 2014 to 
2016 [73] and the 2016 Zika virus outbreak [211] demonstrated that the 
status of the NDSS in each country could impact on global health security. 
Hence the outcome of NDSS evaluations is of relevance to the global 
community.  
At a global level, an independent panel appointed by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in response to the EVD outbreak found that countries 
failed to develop International Health Regulations (IHR) surveillance core 
capacities [77]. The panel also questioned the reliability of the annual 
mandatory self-administered IHR assessment questionnaires that are 
required by WHO of all member states [77].  These findings underscore the 
need for objective evaluations of the NDSS at country level. Many countries 
have begun to use to framework developed by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) to evaluate their surveillance systems [88]. 
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In high-income countries in Europe [119] and Australasia [120, 121], 
evaluations of the NDSS have focused on data quality, usefulness, 
acceptability, timeliness, as well as the simplicity of the system. Studies in 
low- and middle-income countries in the Americas [122, 123], Europe 
[124], Asia [125], and Africa [126-128],  have found that challenges with 
laboratories, supervision, monitoring, organisational capacity, staffing and 
resources  impede NDSS functioning. These findings might not be relevant 
to South Africa as a comparative study of the NDSS in China and the USA 
found that differences in context, background and resource availability 
among countries make it difficult to generalize findings from one country 
to the other [212].   
The NDSS in South Africa has been in existence since the late 1970s. The 
NDSS in South Africa is a paper-based system that tracks 33 medical 
conditions. In terms of existing legislation, all health care providers are 
obliged to notify these 33 conditions to their local authority, which in turn 
reports it to the district, district to province, and province to the NDOH 
(Chapter 1) [55]. In the preceding 15 years, parallel surveillance systems 
have been developed for tuberculosis (TB), malaria and vaccine-
preventable notifiable diseases. We could only find three evaluations of 
specific diseases at provincial level in South Africa [84-86]. However, there 
has been no systematic and objective evaluation of the NDSS at the 
national level or an evaluation of the NDSS since the adoption of the IHR 
in 2007. The need for such an evaluation is critical, in light of health sector 
reforms in South Africa, which include the implementation of a National 
Health Insurance System [51] and the establishment of a National Public 
Health Institute [53].  
The involvement of key NDSS stakeholders in evaluations and policy 
development is critical to obtain their inputs and to build mutual 
understanding and trust [106-108]. In this paper, the term stakeholder is 
used to describe individuals actively involved in the NDSS, or in structures 
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and committees set up to deal with any aspect of the NDSS in South Africa. 
The stakeholders include individuals involved in disease control and 
response; disease detection; and health management. 
As part of a broader evaluation of the NDSS in South Africa, a survey was 
conducted among key stakeholders in South Africa on their perceptions of 
the NDSS attributes of acceptability, flexibility, simplicity, timeliness and 
usefulness.  
4.2 Methods 
During April and May 2015, we invited all communicable diseases 
coordinators, epidemiologists and surveillance officers at the National 
Department of Health (NDOH) and all nine provincial health departments, 
as well as members of the National Surveillance Forum, the South African 
Malaria Elimination Committee, the South African Expanded Programme on 
Immunisations Committee and the National and Provincial Outbreak 
Response Teams (NORT and PORT respectively), to participate in a cross-
sectional survey. Exclusions were as stated in the previous chapter.  
 Measurement and data collection 
We used an electronic questionnaire in REDCap to elicit information on 
participants’ perceptions of the NDSS attributes of acceptability, flexibility, 
simplicity, timeliness and usefulness [88], in addition to socio- 
demographic information.  
The questionnaire consisted of one to four questions per attribute for each 
of the five system attributes. The questions were designed on a 7-point 
Likert-scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The 
questions were phrased in a manner that attempted to minimise an 
unreflective response by participants, for instance questions requiring a 
positive response were alternated with questions requiring negative 
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responses so that respondents would not be tempted to continue answering 
all the questions using the same response. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
were calculated to determine reliability and coherence between items and 
ranged from 0.82 to 0.97, indicating high reliability and inter-item 
correlation.  
On 7 April 2015, we sent electronic invitations for participation in the survey 
to all identified key stakeholders. The information sheet was the first page 
of the questionnaire, as well as a consent or opt out option. We sent four 
reminders to participants who did not respond after two weeks and we 
closed the survey on 31 May 2015, after 54 days from the enrolment date.  
 Data Analysis 
We captured data entered by participants in REDCap and exported the data 
into STATA® 14 for cleaning and analysis.  
We analysed responses from 7-point Likert scale attribute questions by 
describing the frequency distribution for each point on the scale. In order 
to simplify the interpretation of the results, we then categorized the 
responses to each question on NDSS attributes as agree or disagree. We 
excluded the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ response in the analysis. We then 
computed the percentage of respondents who agreed with a particular 
attribute. We conducted a sensitivity analysis using two additional 
scenarios:  in ‘scenario 2’, we combined the responses of participants who 
indicated ‘neither agree nor disagree’ with the responses of those 
participants who indicated ‘agree’ to the questions; in ‘scenario 3’, we 
combined the responses of participants who indicated ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ with the responses of those participants who indicated ‘disagree’ 
to the questions. In the final stage of the analysis, we determined whether 
participants’ age, experience, training and roles with regards to the NDSS 
were associated with each of the attributes using the unconditional logistic 
regression model.  
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4.3 Results  
 Key stakeholders’ socio-demographic information  
We enrolled a total of 141 participants and obtained a response rate of 
84%. After excluding those who did not give consent (n=11), worked in a 
non-health related field (n=9), and with less than one year’s experience 
with the NDSS (n=7), the final sample size was 114. The median age of 
key stakeholders was 49 years, ranging from 26 to 69 years. The median 
number of years of experience in the NDSS was 11 years (inter-quartile 
range (IQR): 5 to 20 years). The median duration of NDSS training was 2 
weeks. Most of the key stakeholders who participated in NDSS committees, 
participated in the NORT (43%).  
Key stakeholders’ areas of work responsibilities were regrouped into 
disease control and response (communicable disease co-ordinators and 
public health officials); disease detection (epidemiologists, surveillance 
officers and pathologists); health management (general health managers); 
and others (undetermined responsibility in the NDSS). Most key 
stakeholders were involved in disease control and response (53%), and 
these stakeholders were younger, with a median age of 41 years, compared 
to 55 years in the health management group (Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1: Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample of 
key stakeholders of the South African Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System, April - May in 2015  
Socio- demographic 
Characteristics (N= 114) 
N       (%) 
Age (years)   
      25-34        14 (13%)        
      35-44           30 (27%) 
      45-54                  31 (28%)  
      55-64           33 (30%) 
      65-69                 3   (3%)           
Experience in NDSS (years)   
        1-5                31 (27%) 
       6-10               24 (21%) 
      11-15                 19 (17%) 
      16-20                  13 (11%)   
      21-25                     9 (8%) 
        >25 18 (16%)     
Training in the NDSS   70 (61%) 
Duration  of  Training in NDSS    
          <= 1 week          31 (46%)        
          2 to  4 weeks   21 (31%) 
          5 to 12 weeks 7   (10%) 
        13 to 26 weeks                  3   (4%) 
        27 to  56 weeks       5   (7%)   
        57 to 104 weeks                1   1%)     
Participation on NDSS Committees    
 National Outbreak Response Team 46 (43%) 
 Provincial Outbreak Response Team 26 (25%) 
 Malaria Elimination Committee 21 (21%) 
 Surveillance Forum 22 (22%) 
 EPI Committee 19 (19%) 
Area of Responsibility    
   Health Management  10 (9%) 
   Disease Detection 38 (33%) 
   Disease Control and Response  60 (53%) 
   Other 6 (5%) 
NDSS = Notifiable disease Surveillance System  
*Not all participants answered all questions, and 
some participated in more than one committee 
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 Perceptions on the NDSS attributes  
The proportion of participants who strongly agreed with any of the 
attributes was small, with the highest value of 7.5% for simplicity. The 
proportion of participants who agreed was slightly higher at around 10% 
except for timeliness. An even higher proportion slightly agreed, at around 
30%, with the exception of acceptability. The proportion of participants who 
neither agreed nor disagreed was also around 30% for all attributes with 
the exception of flexibility. The proportion of those who slightly disagree 
were higher in all attributes with the exception of simplicity. The proportion 
of those who either disagreed or strongly disagreed was higher for 
acceptability and flexibility, but negligible for the other attributes. The 
perceptions of participants for each attribute are shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Perceptions of a sample of South African Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System stakeholders on the 
system attributes, April 2015 
 
Acceptability Flexibility Simplicity Timeliness Usefulness
Strongly agree 2 3 8 2 7
Agree 11 18 22 5 17
Slightly agree 8 31 38 34 35
Neither disagree nor agree 24 5 30 41 21
Slightly disagree 25 21 6 20 21
Disagree 24 21 3 5 5
Strongly disagree 13 11 0 0 1
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After categorising the responses into agree/disagree and excluding those 
that neither agreed or disagreed, we found that 25% of the stakeholders 
perceived the NDSS to be acceptable, 51% to be flexible, 74% to be simple, 
45% to be timely, , and 61% to be useful . A higher percentage of 
participants in Health Management perceived the system to be simple, 
useful and timely.  Participants from the ‘Other’ category that includes 
those with an undetermined responsibility in the NDSS, perceived the 
system to be more flexible. Similarly, stakeholders participating in PORT 
perceived the system to be more simple and useful, compared to those in 
other NDSS committees. (Table 4.2) 
 
Table 4.2: Key stakeholders’ perceptions on the attributes of the 
South African Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
by role, training and participation on committees in 
2015,  
(%) Acceptability Flexibility Simplicity Timeliness Usefulness 
Overall sample (N=107*) 25 51 74 45 61 
Area of Responsibility  
Health Management  
Disease Detection 
Disease Control and Response  
Other 
 
14 
30 
27 
0 
 
50 
44 
50 
100 
 
100 
75 
72 
50 
 
86 
38 
46 
0 
 
100 
56 
58 
60 
Training in the NDSS 29 61 77 41 68 
Participation on NDSS Committees   
National Outbreak Response Team 
Provincial Outbreak Response Team 
Malaria Elimination Committee 
Surveillance Forum 
EPI Committee 
 
29 
23 
13 
30 
31 
 
49 
53 
64 
50 
57 
 
70 
100 
71 
74 
73 
 
45 
52 
33 
47 
35 
 
50 
79 
67 
57 
61 
NDSS = Notifiable disease Surveillance System 
* = 7 participants did not record their perceptions on the NDSS  
EPI = Expanded Programme on Immunisations    
The results of the sensitivity analysis showed that the scores on simplicity 
and timeliness were higher in Scenario 2, when “neither agreed nor 
disagreed” were added to “agreed”. (Table 4.3) 
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Table 4.3: Sensitivity Analysis of Key stakeholders’ perceptions 
on the attributes of the South African Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System in 2015. 
(%) N=107 Acceptability Flexibility Simplicity Timeliness Usefulness 
Scenario 1: used in the 
study – “Neither agree 
nor disagree” excluded 
25 51 74 45 61 
Scenario 2 :  “Neither 
agreed nor disagreed” 
included as part of 
“agree” 
42 65 92 77 75 
Scenario 3 : “Neither 
agree nor disagree” 
included as “disagree” 
20 36 64 38 55 
 
Scenario 1 was used to determine the factors influencing key stakeholders’ 
perceptions on specific attributes of the NDSS. The logistic regression 
analysis revealed that the stakeholders with more years of experience were 
significantly less likely to perceive the NDSS system as acceptable (OR 
0.91, 95% CI: 0.84 - 1.00, p=0.041). Participants working in disease 
detection were less likely to perceive the NDSS as timely (OR 0.10, 95% 
CI: 0.01 - 0.96, p=0.046), while those participating in NORT were less likely 
to perceive the NDSS as useful (OR 0.38, 95% CI: 0.16 - 0.93, p=0.034). 
However, there was no association between years of experience or 
respondents’ place of employment and the stakeholder perceptions on the 
NDSS attributes of flexibility and simplicity (Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.4:  Factors associated with the key stakeholders’ 
perceptions on the attributes of acceptability, 
simplicity, usefulness, flexibility and timeliness of the 
South African National Diseases Surveillance System 
in 2015 
 
*p values significant at 5% level   95% CI = 95% Confidence Interval;  
PORT = Provincial Outbreak Response Team;  
NORT = National Outbreak Response Team 
NDSS = Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
In Scenario 2, participants younger than 35 years were more likely to 
perceive the NDSS as acceptable (OR 0.96, 95% CI 0.92 - 0.99, p-value 
0.044) and those trained in the NDSS perceived the system to be simpler 
(OR 4.74, 95% CI 1.17 - 19.33 p-value 0.030).  
System 
Attribute 
Factor Logistic Regression 
Analysis 
Multivariate Analysis 
  Odds 
Ratio 
 
95% CI  p-value Odds 
Ratio 
 
95% C I p-value 
Acceptability 
 
Years  of 
Experience  
0.91  0.84 - 1.00 0.041*      0.91    0.84 - 1.00 0.041*   
Participation 
in NORT 
1.21  0.44 - 3.32 0.708     
Participation 
in PORT 
0.76 0.24 - 2.44 
 
0.651    
 
 
Training in 
the NDSS 
1.36  0.43 - 4.31 0.601     
Flexibility 
 
Training in 
the NDSS 
2.18  0.80 - 5.95     
 
0.129     
Simplicity 
 
Training in 
the NDSS 
1.85  0.67 - 5.09 0.234      
 
 
 
     
 
 Participation 
in NORT 
0.75  0.29 - 1.95 0.550     
Timeliness 
 
Participation 
in NORT 
1.17 0.50 - 2.76 0.714     
Disease 
Detection 
0.10  0.01 - 0.96 0.046* 0.10     0.01 - 0.96 0.046*      
Usefulness 
 
Training in 
the NDSS 
2.47  1.00 -  6.07       0.049* 1.98    0.75 - 5.21 0.168      
 Participation 
in NORT 
0.41  0.17 - 0.98      0.045* 0.38    0.16 - 0.93 0.034*      
 Participation 
in PORT 
2.5  0.83 - 7.56    0.105     
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4.4 Discussion  
Our findings indicate that 25% of key stakeholders perceived the NDSS to 
be acceptable, 51% to be flexible, 74% to be simple, 45% to be timely, 
and 61% to be useful. Overall, these findings contrast with the 2014 self-
administered questionnaire that South Africa submitted to the WHO on the 
implementation of the IHR core competencies in which it scored 100% in 
surveillance core capacity [59]. The variation in scores could be explained 
by the different methodologies used, the differences in study periods, and 
because the 2014/16 EVD outbreak in West Africa could have influenced 
the perceptions of key stakeholders in this study.   
The NDSS perceptions of key stakeholders in this study differed from the 
experience of the successful containment of several high profile outbreaks 
in South Africa since 2008, which included a novel arena virus, Lujovirus 
[213]; a major cholera outbreak [60, 62]; influenza pandemic [68]; a Rift 
Valley Fever outbreak [214]; and a measles outbreak [215]. However, the 
high media attention during these events could have increased the index 
of suspicion and sensitivity of the surveillance system, which might not be 
a true reflection of the South African NDSS. Laboratories, which are not 
obliged by current legislation to notify diseases, may also provide 
information during high profile outbreaks which contribute to enhanced 
surveillance during these periods. Nonetheless the difference in the findings 
of this study and the 2014 IHR report indicates the need for more objective 
IHR core capacity assessments. 
The study found that only 25% of the stakeholders perceived the system 
to be acceptable, which implies that the stakeholders may be unwilling to 
participate in the system. This score of less than 50% is similar to the 
finding of the 2007 study in one South African province, which found that 
37% of general practitioners indicated that they complied with the NDSS 
(reflection of acceptability) [84]. Comparing acceptability against the 
German NDSS [130] score of 90%, the South African NDSS score was 
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significantly lower. The participation of the health care providers is essential 
to ensure an effective and efficient system. Hence, this attribute needs to 
be addressed in the reform of the South African NDSS.  
Only 51% of key stakeholders perceived the system to be flexible, implying 
that there are problems with the adaptability of the NDSS to changing 
circumstances and needs. This finding is similar to that of a qualitative 
evaluation study on TB surveillance in one district in the Western Cape 
Province of South Africa that found that although the software used was 
adaptable, the system did not adjust according to the changing needs [86]. 
It should be noted that TB has an electronic surveillance system, whereas 
the surveillance system for all other notifiable diseases is paper-based. 
Although a comparison with TB surveillance should be made with caution 
due to these technological differences, the adaptability of the NDSS to the 
development of new technology appears to lag behind. This suggests the 
future use of an electronic NDSS system that is responsive to the needs of 
various stakeholders.  
In this study, simplicity obtained the highest score of 74% compared to the 
other NDSS attributes. This finding is comparable to a study on the 
Australian NDSS system in 2004 [120] which rated their operations and 
processes as complex. The introduction of a simple electronic NDSS system 
in South Africa could potentially address the perceived complexities of the 
NDSS [216] and also increase efficiency. The timeliness score of 45% is 
also lower compared to the findings of a 2010 Ugandan study that found a 
score of 68%-73% [126]. Although the different methodologies of the two 
studies may account for the differences, the lower score in our  study may 
imply that many health care providers and public health officials do not take 
prompt appropriate steps when an increase in specific diseases come to 
their attention through the NDSS. As prompt action is essential to contain 
any outbreak, timeliness must be addressed in the future reforms of the 
South African NDSS.  
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The usefulness score of 61% was also lower than the one obtained in the 
Australian study that found that 94% of participants reported reading NDSS 
reports and 85% reported using the data [55]. This may indicate that there 
are gaps in South Africa in the utilisation of the NDSS data for outbreak 
response, or for prevention and control of communicable diseases. This 
attribute must therefore be addressed in the reform of the South African 
NDSS. 
When considering perceptions in terms of responsibility in the system, 
those stakeholders involved at an operational level (disease detection and 
response) scored the usefulness, simplicity and timeliness of the NDSS 
lower than those in health management. The perceptions of health 
management may be an overestimation because they may have regarded 
the NDSS evaluation as a reflection of their own performance. Hence the 
scores may reflect social desirability bias. In terms of participation in NDSS 
committees, those participating in the provincial committees, PORT, scored 
the simplicity and usefulness of the NDSS higher than those in national 
committees. As is the case with health management, social desirability bias 
may again have played a role here as provinces are mainly responsible for 
the NDSS implementation.  
Results from the logistic regression analysis showed that the stakeholders 
in disease detection and national committees, NORT, involved with 
oversight of the system, as well as those with more years of experience 
with the system were less likely to perceive the NDSS as acceptable, timely 
or useful. This may represent a true reflection of the level of functioning of 
the system as the surveillance officers, epidemiologists, pathologists, 
communicable disease coordinators and public health officials are involved 
with the NDSS on a daily basis in an operational and monitoring capacity – 
the acceptability, timeliness and usefulness of the NDSS have direct 
application to their daily work. On the other hand, the perceptions of 
oversight structures may be a reflection of their distance from the 
operational functioning of the NDSS.  
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Although the result of the sensitivity analysis in Scenario 2 showed an 
increase in timeliness to 77%, this would not alter our conclusion as it still 
fall below a level that could be regarded as satisfactory for the effective 
function of the NDSS. However, in Scenario 2, a score of 92% for simplicity 
is very good, and implies that no intervention is needed to improve the 
simplicity of the NDSS.  
With regard to factors found to be associated with the perceptions in 
Scenario 2, the finding that training was associated with simplicity imply 
that addressing training needs would increase the understanding of the 
processes and forms used in the system. The finding that participants 
younger than 35 years found the system more acceptable, should inform 
additional training and feedback that should be used to revitalise the NDSS. 
Training and feedback influence the value that stakeholders at the coalface 
attach to the system and affect their willingness to participate in it. Without 
the participation of stakeholders at all levels the NDSS cannot fulfil its 
purpose.  
4.5 Limitations of the study 
The main limitation of this study was that it was based on the perceptions 
of individuals and not on the actual records of notifications, which is the 
focus of another study. Perceptions are influenced by social desirability bias 
among stakeholders surveyed. Although every attempt was made to 
include all the relevant key stakeholders at national and provincial levels, 
some stakeholders may not have been identified. The findings of this study 
will be validated through further studies on the actual records of 
notifications. Another limitation was the dearth of national or provincial 
studies on the South African NDSS to compare the research findings with.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
The study findings suggest the need for reforms of the South African NDSS, 
with particular focus on the attributes of acceptability, flexibility, timeliness 
and usefulness. We recommend the phased introduction of an electronic 
system that includes the use of mobile telephone technology to address the 
current perceived weaknesses in the NDSS attributes. This is because the 
latter has a high penetration in the South African population. In 2015 there 
have been some encouraging developments with regard to malaria 
surveillance [217] that could be built upon. The 2014-2016 EVD outbreak 
and the current Zika virus outbreak provide a window of opportunity that 
should be used to strengthen the NDSS system. We further recommend 
additional training and feedback to all stakeholders in the system.  
At a global level, the findings of this study indicate a need for objective 
evaluations in support of annual IHR country submissions to the WHO. We 
recommend that objective assessments, using the baseline data provided 
in this study, be conducted every three to five years. This should be 
complemented with comparative studies of notification versus laboratory 
surveillance to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the NDSS in South 
Africa. 
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CHAPTER 5. COMPARING LABORATORY 
SURVEILLANCE WITH THE NOTIFIABLE DISEASES 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA  
5.1 Introduction 
An effective notifiable diseases surveillance system (NDSS) is essential for 
any country to respond to communicable disease outbreaks [218]. 
Outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging communicable diseases threaten 
the health and wellbeing of communities and when uncontrolled can lead 
to a global threat. National and global disease vulnerabilities were 
demonstrated by the 2014 to 2016 Ebola Virus Disease outbreak [219], the 
2016 Zika virus [220] and the 2016 yellow fever outbreaks [7]. When a 
country deals effectively with an outbreak at source, it prevents the spread 
of the disease beyond its borders, thus preventing spill-overs into 
neighbouring countries and beyond.  
All countries need to evaluate their surveillance system regularly to ensure 
an effective NDSS. Several countries have done so using the 2001 
framework developed by the United States Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention [88]. A 2009 review of NDSS evaluations in 20 high-income 
countries (HICs) and 12 low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) found 
weaknesses in data quality in HICs, resource constraints, health 
infrastructure challenges and sub-optimal NDSS functioning in LMIC [118]. 
Several comparative studies have examined the attributes of surveillance 
systems [142, 144, 154, 155, 157-160], including comparisons of 
electronic reporting versus traditional reporting systems [144, 154, 155], 
different electronic systems with each other [157, 158], and active 
surveillance with passive surveillance systems [159, 160]. In Africa, 
evaluation studies have focused on the implementation of the integrated 
disease surveillance and response (IDSR) [127-129]. These studies support 
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the findings of the 2009 NDSS review that health system challenges impede 
the effective functioning of the NDSS [118].  
South Africa is a member state of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
that adopted the IDSR in 1998, but is one of the few African countries that 
has never implemented the IDSR. The NDSS in South Africa is a paper-
based system that tracks 33 medical conditions. In terms of existing 
legislation, all health care providers are obliged to notify these conditions 
to their local authority, who in turn reports it to the district, district to 
province, and province to national [55]. The NDSS relies on the clinical 
skills of health care providers to diagnose the list of communicable diseases 
based on clinical suspicion and to request laboratory confirmation. Case 
definitions are only used during outbreaks and for active surveillance [55]. 
There are no legal provisions for laboratories to notify communicable 
diseases [56].  
There has been no systematic and objective evaluation of the NDSS in 
South Africa since its inception in the 1970s. There have only been a few 
evaluations of the surveillance systems at provincial level in South Africa 
[84-86], one on the NDSS in one South African province and two evaluation 
studies on tuberculosis (TB) surveillance in two Western Cape districts. 
These studies were focused on limited settings and hence cannot be 
generalised to the entire country. Although a South African study compared 
notifications and laboratory surveillance for hepatitis B  for the period 1985 
– 1988 [166], this was more than 28 years ago,  and the South African 
health system has undergone major changes since the 1980s. South Africa 
is in the process of reforming its health system through the phased 
introduction of a National Health Insurance system [51], and the 
establishment a National Public Health Institute that will be responsible for 
disease surveillance [53]. An evaluation of the current status of the NDSS 
is timely and will feed into the reform processes.  
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There is a dearth of studies, especially in low-and middle-income countries 
that compare national notification systems with laboratory surveillance 
because many countries require and rely on laboratories to report notifiable 
diseases. We could only find one 2005 Swedish study that compared the 
parallel systems of clinical and laboratory notifications [142]. 
The purpose of this study was to describe and compare the South African 
NDSS and laboratory system attributes of data quality, stability, 
representativeness, sensitivity and positive predictive value (PPV) for the 
tracer diseases of measles, meningococcal meningitis and typhoid, as part 
of a larger doctoral study aimed at generating new information on the 
performance of the NDSS.  
5.2 Methods 
 Study design  
This was a retrospective record review of the national public sector 
laboratory data and the national records of notifications for the study 
period, 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013, on the three tracer diseases.  
 Selection of tracer conditions 
The three tracer diseases for the study were measles, meningococcal 
meningitis, and typhoid. Measles and meningococcal meningitis were 
selected as they are endemic in all provinces [194, 195], highly contagious, 
distinct and easily identifiable diseases for which early notification on 
clinical grounds [55] and a public health response is needed. Measles is 
also a re-emerging, vaccine-preventable disease, aimed at elimination 
[196, 197], that had two recent major outbreaks that affected all provinces 
in 2003-5 [198] and 2009-11 [199-201]. Typhoid is less clinically distinct, 
but is also endemic in South Africa and has caused considerable morbidity 
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and mortality, which are largely preventable through public health 
measures [202, 203]. These factors make the tracers good indicators to 
measure the attributes of the NDSS.  
 Measurement and data collection 
We included all available data for the study period on the tracer diseases 
from the two data sources into the study sample. All records with 
inconclusive diagnostic information were excluded from the laboratory 
records. 
 Data Analysis 
After data cleaning, we measured data quality (measured by the 
percentage of completeness of all data on the record review form), as well 
as stability (reliability of the system in providing a diagnosis – percentage 
of cases with a diagnostic result) and representativeness (percentage of 
provinces represented in the system) in Microsoft Excel. We exported the 
data into STATA® 14 for further analysis. We used the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon test to compare the completeness of the two systems.  We 
determined reliability and representativeness as indicated above and used 
the Chi-square test to compare the two systems.  All tests were conducted 
at 5% significance level. 
We name-searched and matched (names, age, sex, date and place of 
occurrence) each positive, negative and case without laboratory result in 
the NDSS database with the NHLS database to determine sensitivity (the 
proportion of cases detected by the surveillance system) and PPV (the 
proportion of reported cases that actually have the communicable disease 
under surveillance). The NHLS database was used as the gold standard to 
compare with the NDSS. Table 5.1 shows the calculation of sensitivity and 
positive predictive value.  
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Table 5.1: Calculation of Sensitivity and Positive Predictive 
Value 
 
NDSS Laboratory Surveillance        
Positive                             Negative 
TOTAL 
Positive True Positive (A) 
 
False Positive (B) A + B 
Negative False Negative 
(C) 
True Negative (D) C + D 
TOTAL A + C B + D  
Sensitivity = A/(A +C); Positive Predictive Value = A/(A + B)  
NDSS = Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
 
We defined true positives as either (1) both positive NDSS and laboratory 
cases or (2) no result in NDSS and positive laboratory case. We defined 
true negatives as either (1) negative NDSS cases (suspected cases are 
notified) and negative laboratory cases or (2) no result in NDSS and 
negative laboratory case.  We defined false positive as positive NDSS cases 
that were not positive laboratory cases and false negative as NDSS negative 
cases that were not negative laboratory cases. For unmatched NDSS cases 
with no results in the laboratory database, we did a sensitivity analysis 
using the following three scenarios: Scenario I excluded cases without 
laboratory results from the analysis (this was the selected scenario); 
Scenario II assumed that these cases were laboratory positive (therefore 
true positive); Scenario III assumed that these cases were laboratory 
negative (therefore true negative).  
5.3 Results 
 Socio-demographic information on the tracer diseases 
For the study period from 1 January until 31 December 2013, the NHLS 
recorded 8,310 measles, 8,862 meningococcal and 24,516 typhoid patients 
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tested. Following exclusion of records with inconclusive diagnoses, the final 
sample size was 8,228 for measles; 8,714 for meningococcal meningitis 
and 24,264 for typhoid.  
The socio-demographic information of the measles IgM positive cases, 
Neisseria meningitides and Salmonella typhi culture positive cases, in 
comparison to the cases that were notified during the same period are 
shown in Table 5.2. The number of notified cases is fewer than laboratory 
cases for all three tracer diseases - measles and meningococcal meningitis 
were less than 1.5% of the patients tested. Three provinces, Mpumalanga, 
Northern Cape and North West, provided no notification data on all three 
diseases; Limpopo province, on meningitis and typhoid ; and Free State 
province, on typhoid. For meningococcal meningitis and typhoid, most 
cases fell in the same age-group for both notifications and the laboratory, 
whereas for measles, most cases fell into different age-groups for the two 
systems.  
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Table 5.2: Socio-demographic factors of laboratory diagnosed 
versus notified cases with Measles, Meningococcal 
Meningitis and Typhoid, South Africa, 1 January to 31 
December 2013 
NDSS = Notifiable diseases surveillance system          
Not all cases had socio-demographic information  
 
Of the laboratory cases, 190 meningococcal sero-groups (not shown) were 
typed, with W135 the most common type 51% (97); no meningococcal 
sero-groups were recorded in the notification records.  
 Results on system attributes  
The comparative result on the system attributes is shown in Table 5.3. It 
shows that the completeness for the laboratory was higher than the notified 
cases for both measles and meningococcal meningitis.  The attribute of 
stability was significantly higher for the laboratory cases for all three tracer 
diseases, as well as for representativeness of meningitis and typhoid. The 
Variable Measles N (%) Meningococcal Meningitis 
N (%) 
Typhoid N (%) 
 Laboratory NDSS Laboratory NDSS Laboratory NDSS 
Province  
Eastern Cape 
Free State 
Gauteng 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Limpopo 
Mpumalanga 
Northern Cape 
North West 
Western Cape  
 Total 
 
3  (2) 
2  (1) 
159 (92) 
3  (2) 
0  (0) 
0  (0) 
1  (1) 
1  (1) 
4  ( 2) 
173 (100) 
 
 
2   (2) 
4   (4) 
21  (19) 
52  (46) 
7  (6) 
No data 
No data 
No data 
27  ( 24) 
113 (100) 
 
46 (20) 
13  (6) 
68 (30) 
39 (17) 
1 ( 0.4) 
4  (2) 
2  (1) 
7  ( 3) 
50 ( 22) 
230 (100) 
 
 
1  (1) 
5  (4) 
62 (48) 
11  (9) 
No data 
No data 
No data 
No data 
49 (38) 
128 (100) 
 
 
1  (2) 
2  (3) 
24 (38) 
11  (17) 
0    (0) 
11  (17) 
0    (0) 
1    (2) 
14  (22) 
64  (100) 
 
 
2   (7) 
No data 
7 (25) 
8 (29) 
No data 
No data 
No data 
No data 
11  (39) 
28 (100) 
 
Age (years) 
    <1 
    1-4        
    5-14           
   15-24          
      25-34        
      >=35  
   Total  
 
38 (29) 
25 (19) 
13 (10) 
25 (19) 
23  (17) 
9  (7) 
133 (100) 
 
 
2   (2) 
23  (25) 
57  (63) 
3   (3) 
2   (2) 
4   (4) 
91 (100) 
 
51  ( 23) 
54  ( 24) 
44   (19) 
27  ( 12) 
29  (13) 
22  (10) 
227 (100) 
 
 
3   (5) 
24 ( 36) 
17 ( 26) 
8  ( 12) 
6   ( 9) 
8  ( 12) 
66 (100) 
 
2  ( 3) 
9  (16) 
16  (28) 
8  (14) 
14  (24) 
8 (14) 
57 (100) 
 
 
3  (15) 
2  (10) 
5  (25) 
4  (20) 
4  (20) 
2   (10) 
20 (100) 
 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
Total 
 
74 (53) 
65 (47) 
139 (100) 
 
46 (51) 
45 (49) 
91 (100) 
 
102 (46) 
118 (54) 
220 (100) 
 
28 (43) 
37 (57) 
65 (100) 
 
32 (52) 
30 (48) 
62 (100) 
 
14 (67) 
7 (33) 
21 (100) 
79 
 
sensitivity of the NDSS ranged from 50% to 98% and the PPV ranged from 
20% to 81 % for the three diseases.  
Table 5.3: Comparison of system attributes of notified versus 
laboratory diagnosed cases of measles, 
meningococcal meningitis and typhoid for South 
Africa, 1 January to 31 December 2013 
(1) Attributes Measles         Meningococcal  Meningitis Typhoid         
 NDSS Lab p-value NDSS Lab p-value NDSS Lab p-value 
Completeness  % 
Median 
Range 
 
47 
20-67 
 
63 
37-
69 
 
<0.001a 
 
57 
40-80 
 
63 
50–69 
 
<0.001a 
 
63 
40–80 
 
60 
54-67 
 
0.0818a 
Stability % 24 100 <0.001b 74 100 <0.001b 36 100 <0.001b 
Representativeness % 
 
67 
 
100 0.058b 56 100 0.023b 44 100 0.009b 
(2) Attributes Measles  Meningococcal  Meningitis Typhoid  
Sensitivity % 50  98  93  
         95% CI 15.7-84.3  90.9-100  66.1-99.8  
PPV     % 20  57  81  
95% CI 5.7-43.7  46.7-66.6  54.4-96.0  
(1) Attributes were determined using the full dataset of notified and laboratory diagnosed cases 
(2) Attributes were determined by excluding NDSS data that were not matched in the laboratory 
dataset 
To determine Sensitivity and PPV the laboratory surveillance was used as the gold standard 
NDSS = Notifiable diseases surveillance system 
Lab = Laboratory 
PPV = Positive Predictive Value 
CI = Confidence Interval 
a. Determined through the nonparametric Wilcoxon test 
b. Determined through the Chi-square test 
In the sensitivity analysis (Table 5.4), Scenario III showed similar results 
to Scenario I, adopted in this study. In scenario II the sensitivity and PPV 
for all the three tracer diseases were higher, the sensitivity ranged from 
94% to 99% and PPV ranged from 65% to 88%.  
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Table 5.4: Sensitivity Analysis of Sensitivity and Positive 
Predictive Value of the NDSS for measles, 
meningococcal meningitis and typhoid for South 
Africa, 1 January to 31 December 2013 
 
 Measles Meningococcal 
Meningitis 
Typhoid 
Number of NDSS cases  113 128 28 
 
Number of unmatched NDSS cases with no 
results,  
59 23 10 
Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios I II III I II III I II III 
Number True Positive (A)  4 63 4 58 81 58 13 23 13 
Number False Positive (B) 16 16 16 44 44 44 3 3 3 
Number False Negative (C) 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Number True Negative (D) 30 30 89 2 2 25 1 1 11 
A + B 20 79 20 102 125 102 16 26 16 
A+ C 8 67 8 59 82 59 14 24 14 
Sensitivity (A/(A+C)) 50% 94% 50% 98% 99% 98% 93% 96% 93% 
Positive Predictive Value (A/(A+B)  20% 80% 20% 57% 65% 57% 81% 88% 81% 
NDSS = Notifiable diseases surveillance system. Laboratory surveillance was used as the gold 
standard 
Scenario I: Unmatched NDSS cases with no results excluded from the analysis 
Scenario II: Unmatched NDSS cases with no results, assumed as laboratory positive (therefore 
true positive) 
Scenario III: Unmatched NDSS cases with no results, assumed as laboratory negative (therefore 
true negative) 
True positive cases = either (1) positive NDSS cases and positive laboratory cases or (2) no result 
in NDSS and positive laboratory case 
True negative = either (1) negative NDSS cases (suspected cases are notified) and negative 
laboratory cases (2) no result in NDSS and negative laboratory case   
False positive = positive NDSS that were not positive laboratory cases 
False negative = NDSS negative cases that were not negative laboratory cases  
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5.4 Discussion 
This is one of the first studies in South Africa to compare laboratory 
surveillance with the NDSS. The study found that for most attributes, 
notifications for all three tracer diseases were significantly lower than cases 
that were laboratory diagnosed. These findings give credence to the survey 
among  key NDSS stakeholders that scored the NDSS low on the attributes 
of acceptability, flexibility, simplicity, timeliness and usefulness [56]. 
The finding of around 64% completeness for both the laboratory and NDSS 
is low compared to a 2013 study on tuberculosis (TB) and HIV surveillance 
systems in a Western Cape district of  South Africa, which showed 
completeness levels of above 98% for socio-demographic variables  and 
above 75% for most clinical variables [85]. Some of the differences in our 
findings may be due to the existence of a TB electronic surveillance system 
for reporting, whereas the NDSS is paper-based. However, a 2013 study, 
evaluating the quality of mortality reporting in South Africa, describes 
completeness of less than 90% as unsatisfactory [221]. Although it can be 
argued that these systems do not necessarily require the same standard as 
mortality reporting to be used effectively, the findings indicate that both 
the laboratory system and the NDSS require substantive improvement.  
The low NDSS scores on stability imply that the reliability of the NDSS in 
providing a diagnostic result on the tracer diseases is low – it is expected 
that all cases notified on clinical suspicion to have these diseases, would be 
followed through to obtain a diagnostic result. A 2013 study on the 2009-
2011 measles outbreak in South Africa[199] recommended that all 
suspected measles cases should be managed and followed up to confirm 
the diagnosis. Studies on meningococcal meningitis [222-224] also 
demonstrated the importance of diagnosis and sero-grouping in the 
effective surveillance and epidemiology of this disease; as did studies on 
typhoid [202, 203, 225, 226]. Our finding that in a large percentage of 
82 
 
NDSS cases a diagnostic result was not obtained is a cause for concern that 
should be addressed in the reform of the South African NDSS. 
Our finding on the low (44-67%) representative coverage of all the 
provinces in the country demonstrates a further NDSS weakness that needs 
to be addressed. For the NDSS to be effective and efficient, a representative 
coverage of all the provinces of the country is essential. A 2013 mortality 
study similarly described coverage of less than the total population as 
unsatisfactory [221]. The fact that the tracer diseases should be notified 
on clinical suspicion [55] and that thousands of laboratory tests were 
requested in 2013 on all three diseases in all provinces, demonstrates that 
the NDSS is underperforming in this specific area. The high number of 
laboratory tests conducted is a reflection of the quadruple burden of disease 
in South Africa, including a large burden of communicable diseases such as 
HIV &AIDS and TB [35]. The number of laboratory positive cases of the 
tracer diseases is in line with the level of endemicity of the diseases - the 
number of positive bacterial meningitis and typhoid cases correspond to 
the number of cases as stated in the National Institute of Communicable 
Diseases (NICD) Bulletin of April 2014 [227]. Measles is the only disease 
with different numbers from the NICD bulletin because of a parallel 
surveillance system for the Expanded Programme on Immunisation 
diseases that has been developed over the years in the country - 
differences in measles surveillance is therefore a subject of a further paper 
in our broader study on the South African NDSS. A recently published South 
African paper on meningitis [228] indicated different numbers to our study, 
mainly because they cover a different study period and only one province. 
Our findings have shown that measles and meningococcal meningitis 
notifications were less than 1.5% of the suspected cases (patients tested). 
The provinces of Free State, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, and 
North West did not report some notification data for 2013 and our findings 
have further shown that few cases (only one each in the provinces of 
Limpopo, Northern Cape and North West) were laboratory confirmed as 
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positive. The finding of fewer laboratory confirmed cases in rural provinces 
with a lower number and concentration of laboratories [195] reflects the 
financial and human resource inequities between urban and rural provinces 
that need to be addressed. It is likely that the few diagnosed cases in these 
provinces were not detected by the NDSS as illustrated by the general low 
rate of notifications versus laboratory cases.  
The finding on the low sensitivity of 50% for measles is similar to the finding 
of a study in Gauteng, South Africa in 2006 [84] which showed a sensitivity 
of 26% for malaria. The findings of sensitivities of above 90% for typhoid 
and meningococcal meningitis are similar to a 2005 Swedish study that 
found sensitivities for salmonellosis of 99.9%, and meningococcal infection 
of 98.7% [142]. Notwithstanding the lack of  international standards, as 
reported by a 2010 systematic review of surveillance systems [229], and 
the difficulties of comparing international surveillance systems because of 
differences in context, disease profiles and resources [139], the study 
findings suggest low sensitivity for measles, but high for the other two 
tracer diseases. However, when Scenario II is used which assumes that 
unmatched NDSS cases with no results are laboratory positive the 
sensitivity for all three tracer diseases was high. 
We found that the PPV levels were 20%, 57% and 81% for measles, 
meningococcal meningitis and typhoid, highlighting the variation in the 
proportion of reported cases that actually have the communicable diseases 
across the three tracer conditions. However, the PPV is influenced by 
differences in disease prevalence and disease management programmes 
[230]. The low PPV for measles, which is targeted for elimination and 
notified on clinical suspicion, is acceptable as it translates into a low number 
of notified cases that actually had measles. This is similar for meningococcal 
meningitis, which clinicians are strongly encouraged to notify on clinical 
suspicion, although it is not targeted for elimination. The PPV for typhoid is 
similar to a 2011 North Carolina study which considered PPV levels of above 
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80% as high [231] and a 2014 South African study, that compared verbal 
autopsies and death certification records, which considered a PPV level of 
78% as relatively high [232]. When Scenario II was used that assumed 
unmatched NDSS cases with no results as laboratory positive, the PPV for 
the three diseases were 80%, 65% and 88% respectively. The variation in 
the sensitivity and PPV due to the large number of NDSS cases without 
results underscores the need to address this shortcoming in the NDSS. 
We found under-reporting for the three tracer diseases in the NDSS. This 
is a common finding for passive surveillance systems [84, 141, 160, 190, 
191]. The reasons why clinicians do not report notifiable cases include 
insufficient knowledge and understanding of the public health reasons to 
notify, their perceptions of the seriousness of the condition that they are 
dealing with, and perceived or real impediments to the process of 
notification such as workload, unavailability of forms and/or means of 
communication [84, 141, 160, 190, 191]. As control for this we selected 
tracer diseases that can be identified on clinical suspicion and for which 
prompt public health interventions are indicated; one of which (measles) 
caused a major national outbreak the year preceding the study and for 
which we assumed that a high index of suspicion existed among clinicians. 
The fact that thousands of laboratory tests for these diseases were 
performed countrywide during the study period, means that the number of 
notified, clinically suspected cases should have exceeded laboratory 
confirmed cases.  
5.5 Limitations 
A limitation of the study is that the numbers used in the calculation for 
sensitivity and PPV were low as a result of the low number of notification 
cases that cross-matched with laboratory cases, due to incomplete 
information. Low numbers have resulted in less precise estimates for the 
sensitivity and PPV, as shown by the wide 95% confidence intervals in some 
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instances. However, this limitation is a confirmation of the poor quality of 
the NDSS records and indicates the need to recalculate sensitivity and PPV 
once data quality is addressed. A further limitation is the exclusion of data 
from private laboratories. This may account for some of the cases that did 
not match between the two systems, because the notified NDSS cases 
include those cases seen in the private sector. Although a much lower 
percentage of patients with infectious diseases are seen in the private 
sector [35], it is necessary to include them in national surveillance systems 
and our recommendations are therefore also applicable to private 
laboratories. 
Another limitation of this study is that three to five provinces did not report 
notifications of the tracer diseases during the study period. The non-
reporting is in itself an illustration of the underperformance of the NDSS.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Despite the above limitations, the comparison of laboratory surveillance 
with the NDSS provides empirical evidence of the under-performance of the 
NDSS, which need to be addressed as part of the South African health 
sector reforms. A system that would make it easy for clinicians to complete 
and submit the minimum information needed to trigger further public 
health investigation should be introduced.  We also recommend a revision 
in the legislative requirements to compel all laboratories in South Africa to 
notify the 33 conditions as this would help to address gaps in the NDSS.  
The problem with the completeness of laboratory records may relate to the 
same reasons why clinicians fail to comply with the completion of 
notification forms and should also be addressed.  
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CHAPTER 6. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS' 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTIFIABLE DISEASES 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
6.1 Introduction 
The 2014 to 2016 Ebola Virus Disease outbreak [219], the 2016 Zika virus 
[220] and yellow fever outbreaks [7] underscore the need for effective 
country-based notifiable diseases surveillance systems (NDSS). An 
effective NDSS enables a country to deal with outbreaks of emerging and 
re-emerging communicable diseases at source and to prevent their spread 
within and beyond its borders.  
Health care providers (HCPs), defined as medical doctors and professional 
nurses, are critical to strong, resilient health systems, [167] and are at the 
coalface of service delivery, responsible for the diagnosis and effective 
management of infectious diseases. The optimal performance of the NDSS 
is dependent on HCP compliance with communicable disease notification. 
Their compliance ensures appropriate investigation and control measures 
by relevant health care authorities. Furthermore, compliance with the NDSS 
facilitates uniformity in morbidity and mortality reporting that allows for 
comparisons within and among countries. However, differences in context, 
background, healthcare systems and resource availability complicate 
comparisons among countries. Nonetheless, many countries around the 
world have made it mandatory for HCPs to notify certain notifiable diseases 
upon clinical suspicion and/or laboratory confirmation [55, 149, 168]. 
Despite this legal obligation, underreporting of notifiable diseases is a 
common problem for passive surveillance systems in all countries, 
regardless of income [141-144, 159, 160, 169-187]. Many high-income 
countries (HICs) [140-143] have introduced measures to make it 
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compulsory for laboratories to notify communicable diseases and have dual 
reporting systems in order to overcome the problem of under-reporting. 
However, the strong laboratory networks in these HICs proved effective in 
improving the functioning of the NDSS. In contrast, in low- and middle-
income countries (LMIC), a 2009 review of NDSS evaluations found that 
resource constraints and health infrastructure challenges contributed to 
sub-optimal NDSS functioning [118]. In these countries, particularly in 
Africa, laboratory networks are relatively weak and the reliance on HCPs to 
notify diseases is therefore stronger. Hence, there is a need in these 
countries to assess the level of compliance amongst HCPs periodically and 
to take steps to identify and address the factors which cause non-
compliance or under-reporting. 
In South Africa, the NDSS is a paper-based system that tracks 33 medical 
conditions. Existing legislation obliges all HCPs to notify these conditions to 
their local authority, which in turn reports it to the district, district to 
province, and province to the national department of health (DOH) [55, 
56]. There are no legal provisions for laboratories to notify any 
communicable disease in the country.  
In South Africa, there have only been a few evaluations of HCPs compliance 
since the inception of the NDSS in the 1970s [84, 166, 190]. These include 
studies on reporting of hepatitis B for the period 1985 to 1988 [191], 
rheumatic fever for the period 1990-2004, and notifications amongst 
private general practitioners (GPs) in Gauteng province in 2006. A 
limitation of these previous studies is that they precede the implementation 
of the International Health Regulation (IHR) and are focused on limited 
geographical settings or diseases and hence cannot be extrapolated to the 
entire NDSS. There is a dearth of information on factors associated with 
HCPs compliance with the NDSS. Furthermore, the South African health 
system has undergone and continues to undergo major changes, and is 
inter-connected with a global world.  Information on HCP compliance is 
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important for shaping NDSS reforms, ensuring effective disease response 
and compliance with the IHR, and monitoring trends and/or benchmarking 
the performance of HCPs [167]. In light of this, and the dearth of empirical 
information, the objectives of this study were to determine HCPs' 
compliance with the NDSS in South Africa; and to determine the factors 
associated with their compliance. The study is part of broader doctoral 
study to evaluate the performance of the NDSS in South Africa.  
6.2 Methods 
 Study setting 
The study was conducted in three of the nine South African provinces, one 
of each representing the urban, rural and the mixed urban-rural groups of 
provinces.  
 Study population 
The study population consisted of all HCPs, specifically doctors and 
professional nurses (with four years of training) involved with 
communicable diseases, working in the public and private health care 
sectors at primary health care (PHC) and hospital levels.  
Enrolled and student nurses were excluded from the study. There were 
49,260 eligible HCPs working in the selected facilities (see sampling 
design). 
 Sample size 
The sample size was estimated using Epi Info statistical software, version 
7.2, for population surveys, assuming: a) the acceptable margin of error as 
+ 5%; b) approximately 40% would notify correctly (estimated from a 
previous Gauteng study [84]); and c) design effect of at most 2.5 to 
90 
 
account for clustering effects (this is conservative). This required an overall 
sample size of 936 HCPs. To allow for a non-response of 10% we targeted 
1050 HCPs. This number was 2.1% of the total eligible HCPs in the study 
population. 
 Sampling design 
Three of the nine provinces were selected randomly, and the final sample 
consisted of the three provinces of Gauteng (urban), KwaZulu-Natal (mixed 
urban-rural) and Limpopo (rural). We then stratified by type of health 
facilities, namely central /tertiary hospitals, regional hospitals, district 
hospitals, primary health care facility (which included community health 
centres (CHCs) and clinics), private hospitals and private general 
practitioners (GPs). Satellite and mobile clinics (as they operate only for a 
few hours per week and therefore see a very limited number of patients), 
as well as private hospitals with fewer than 100 beds (which have limited 
scope and practices, and do not have the targeted health disciplines that 
deal with the NDSS) were excluded from the study.  
The target sample size for each province was chosen proportional to the 
number of HCPs in that province. In order to select the number of facilities 
of each type to be sampled in each province, we assumed an average 
number of HCPs for that facility (e.g. we assumed that each clinic would 
contain 7 HCPs on the day of the survey); a pre-specified number was 
chosen to lead to an overall sample of 1050 HCPs. This allowed us to select 
a sample of facilities randomly in each province. 
In each sampled facility, all nurses and doctors who worked in specific 
divisions (internal medicine, out-patients, medical casualty, critical care, 
paediatrics and infection control units) were targeted on the survey day. In 
PHC, all nurses and doctors were requested to participate in the study. We 
also randomly selected 70 general practitioners (GPs) in private practice as 
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part of the “private sector facilities” (20 in Gauteng province, 20 in Limpopo 
and 30 in KwaZulu-Natal) using an electronic database of private GPs. 
Sampling weights were calculated based on the total number of HCPs in 
each stratum. 
 Measurement and data collection 
We could not find a standardised tool to measure HCP compliance with the 
national NDSS. We designed a self-administered questionnaire in English, 
the official business language of South Africa (Supplementary file 1).  The 
questions focussed on socio-demographics, participant knowledge, 
attitudes and practices to disease notification and factors influencing 
compliance with notification reported in the literature. We defined “correct 
notification” as notification to the local, provincial or national DOH. An 
assessment of the quality of the information they provided to the DOH did 
not form part of this study and is therefore not included in the definition of 
“correct notification”. We calculated Cronbach’s alpha coefficients to 
determine reliability and coherence between items - they ranged from 0.82 
to 0.97, indicating high reliability and inter-item correlation. We piloted the 
questionnaire among 12 HCPs similar to the study population prior to data 
collection to determine clarity of questions and time taken for 
administration, and no changes were deemed necessary. 
The survey was conducted from 22 May to 19 June 2015. Twelve 
professional nurses were recruited as field workers and trained to assist 
with data collection in the selected facilities. 
On the day of the survey, all eligible study participants were given an 
information sheet and requested to participate in the study on a voluntary 
basis.  
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We double captured data into the web-based Research Electronic Data 
Capture (REDCap), programme hosted at the University of Witwatersrand 
in Johannesburg [233].  
 Data Analysis 
We exported the data into STATA® 14 for cleaning and analysis. To specify 
the survey design, we used the stratum (combination of province and type 
of facility), the cluster (i.e. facility) and calculated sampling weights based 
on the number of doctors and nurses in each stratum. All analyses were 
appropriate for survey data using the identifiers for stratum and cluster as 
well as the calculated sampling weights.  
We computed frequency and summary tables to describe participants’ age, 
gender, location, professional category, experience and training on the 
NDSS. We summarised categorical variables in tables showing frequency 
and weighted percentages of each category.  We summarised numerical 
variables using medians (inter-quartile ranges).  
We analysed the number and weighted percentage of HCPs who diagnosed 
and notified notifiable diseases in the preceding year. We used the Rao-
Scott correction to the Chi-square test [204] to compare the practices of 
public and private HCPs. The outcome variable was correct notification of 
relevant disease/s. We determined whether participants’ age, gender, 
experience, training, professional category, ownership (public or private)  
and place of employment, workload, possession of notification forms, 
knowledge of the NDSS were associated with correct notification (to the 
DOH) using robust survey logistic regression. We calculated odds ratios 
(OR), 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) and p-values. P-values of less 
than 0.05 were considered to be statistically significant.  
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 Ethics approval and consent to participate 
The Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical) of the University of the 
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg provided approval for the study (Clearance 
certificate M140624). All participants provided written informed consent, 
no personal identifiers were collected and data are reported in aggregate. 
6.3 Results 
 Socio-demographic factors of health care providers 
Of the total of 1,050 HCPs that were targeted, we enrolled a total of 942 
participants (response rate 90%). After excluding those who did not give 
consent (n=5), were enrolled nurses (n=10), or did not state their 
professional category (n=8), the final sample size was 919. The majority 
of participants (81%) were in the public health sector and professional 
nurses (76%).  
The median age of the HCPs was 41 years, inter-quartile range (IQR) 33 to 
50 years. In the public sector, the median age of doctors was 37 years (IQR 
30 - 44). The majority of all participants were female (81%). In the private 
sector, the majority of doctors were male (72%), compared to the public 
sector in which the majority of doctors were female (55%).  In the public 
health sector, 39% of doctors were from regional hospitals, and 41% of 
nurses from PHC facilities. In the private sector, 59% of nurses reported 
that they were trained in the NDSS, while 41% of public sector nurses 
reported NDSS training. The median number of years of experience in the 
NDSS was 4 years (IQR 0 - 10). The experience of private sector doctors, 
10 years (IQR 3 - 25), was higher than public sector doctors, 6 years (IQR 
0 - 15) (Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1: Socio-demographic factors of health care providers 
2015 
Weighted percentages are presented 
NDSS = Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
GP = General Practitioner 
ICU = Intensive Care Unit 
PHC = Primary Health Care 
IQR = Inter quartile range 
Variable Public Sector N (%) Private Sector N (%) Total 
 Medical 
Doctors 
Professional 
Nurses 
Medical 
Doctors 
Professional 
Nurses 
n=919 
Province       
Gauteng 91 (46) 178 (43) 14  (40) 91 (42) 374 (43) 
KwaZulu-Natal 68 (30) 188 (35) 17  (48) 98 (45) 371 (36) 
Limpopo 41 (24) 96 (21) 8  (11) 29 (13) 174 (20) 
Total 200 (100) 462 (100) 39 (100) 218 (100) 919 (100) 
Type of facility      
Central/Tertiary 76 (7) 52 (1)   128 (3) 
Regional Hospital 68 (39) 78 (13)   146 (19) 
District Hospital 34 (36) 68 (23)   102 (26) 
PHC 22 (11) 264 (41)   286 (34) 
Private Hospitals   11 (4) 218 (23) 229 (18) 
Private GP practice   28 (3) 0 (0) 28 (1) 
Total 200 (94) 462 (77) 39 (6) 218 (23) 919 (100) 
Age Median (IQR) 37 (30 – 44) 43 (34 – 52) 41 (36 - 52) 41 (34 - 49) 41 (33 - 50) 
Age (years)      
20-30 55 (30) 71  (15) 1 (2) 28 (14) 155 (18) 
31-40 64 (33) 103 (27) 17 (46) 61 (33) 245 (30) 
41-50 38 (24) 121 (30) 8 (22) 66 (35) 233 (29) 
51-60 12 (6) 90  (23) 7 (25) 27 (14) 136 (18) 
61-70 11 (7) 15  (4) 3 (5) 5  ( 3) 34 (5) 
Total 180 (100) 400 (100) 36 (100) 187 (100) 803 (100) 
Gender      
Female 104 (55) 415  (89) 8 (28) 196 (90) 723 (81) 
Male 96 (45) 43  (11) 31 (72) 21  (10) 191 (19) 
Total 200 (100) 458 (100) 39 (100) 217 (100) 914 (100) 
Nurse Category      
PHC Trained  153 (31)  19 (9) 172 (26) 
General Nurse  217 (46)  102 (47) 319 (46) 
Trauma and Casualty  2 (1)  17 (8) 19 (2) 
ICU and High Care  11 (2)  27 (12) 38 (4) 
Midwifery  14 (5)  7 (3) 21 (4) 
Theatre  1  (0)  8 (4) 9 (1) 
Infection Prevention  29 (7)  22 (10) 51 (8) 
Paediatric  35 (9)  16  (7) 51 (8) 
Total  462 (100)  218 (100) 680 (100) 
Doctor Category      
Intern 17 (7)  0  (0)  17 (6) 
Medical Officer 92 (63)  2  (7)  94 (60) 
Private GP 13 (7)  27 (43)  40 (9) 
Registrar 23 (4)  0  (0)  23 (4) 
Specialist Physician 19 (4)  6 (29)  25 (5) 
Paediatrician 29 (14)  2  (11)  31 (14) 
Other Specialists 7 (2)  2  (11)  9 (3) 
Total 200 (100)  39 (100)  239 (100) 
Training in NDSS 66 (35) 180 (41) 16 (44)  126 (59) 388 (43) 
Formal training in 
Epidemiology 
 
52  (27) 
 
  78 (16) 
 
11  (24) 
 
51 (24) 
 
192 (20) 
Experience in the NDSS – years     
Median (IQR) 6 (0 - 15) 4 (0 - 10) 10 (3 - 25) 4 (0 - 10) 4 (0 - 10) 
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 Diagnosis of notifiable diseases 
More than half of the HCPs (58%), reported that they have diagnosed a 
notifiable disease in the year preceding the survey, with a significantly 
higher percentage in the public sector (62%), compared to 43% in the 
private sector (p=0.001). A significantly higher percentage of public sector 
nurses in KwaZulu-Natal province (57%) reported diagnosis of a notifiable 
disease, compared to private sector nurses (41%, p=0.019). In the public 
sector, 94% of doctors, reported diagnosis of a notifiable disease, 
compared to 89% in the private sector.  
In both the public and private sectors, 92% of all study participants who 
have diagnosed a notifiable disease(s) indicated that they reported the 
notifiable disease(s). Public sector doctors in KwaZulu-Natal and private 
sector doctors in Limpopo notified lower percentages of cases (80% and 
75% respectively) compared to other HCPs (Table 6.2). Two thirds (67%) 
of HCPs who indicated that they notified in the preceding year, reported 
that they did so within 24 hours of diagnosis; only 1% reported that they 
did so after more than 1 week (Figure 6.1).  
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 Table 6.2: Health care providers  who: (a) have diagnosed, and 
(b) notified a notifiable communicable disease in the  
preceding year, South Africa, by sector, professional 
category and province, 2015.  
Weighted % 
* Significant P-value 
c) Test specific P-values are from the Rao-Scott correction to the Chi-square Test [204] 
"Unsure" was regarded as missing data in the calculation of P-values   
a) Health Care Providers who have diagnosed a notifiable disease in the  preceding year    
i) By Sector          
Sector No Yes Unsure Total     P-valuec 
Public 231 (37)        397 (62)       11 (1)      639 (100)      
Private 128 (56) 113 (43) 3 (1) 244 (100)     0.001* 
Total 359 (41) 510 (58) 14 (1)   883 (100)      
ii) Doctors  by   Province       
Province Public Sector Private Sector  
 No Yes   Unsure Total No Yes  Unsure Total  
Gauteng 9 (8) 81 (92) 0 (0) 90 (46) 2 (17) 12 (83) 0 (0) 14 (40) 0.094 
KwaZulu-Natal 6 (6) 61 (93) 1 (1) 68 (30) 3 (9) 14 (91) 0 (0) 17 (48) 0.715 
Limpopo 2 (1) 38 (98) 1 (2) 40 (24) 0 (0) 8 (100) 0 (0) 8 (11) 0.902 
Total 17 (6) 180 (94) 2 (1) 197 (100) 5 (11) 34 (89) 0 (0) 39 (100) 0.199 
iii) Professional Nurses by  Province       
Gauteng 97 (59) 59 (40) 3 (1) 159 (43) 53 (65) 28 (34) 1 (1) 82 (42) 0.512 
KwaZulu-
Natal 
84 (42) 96 (57) 5 (2) 185 (35) 57 (59) 39 (41) 0 (0) 96 (45) 0.019* 
Limpopo 33 (43) 62 (54) 1 (1) 96 (21) 13  (48) 12 (44) 2 (7) 27 (13) 0.502 
Total 214 (49) 217 (49) 9 (2) 440 (100) 123 
(60) 
79 (39) 3 (1) 205 (100) 0.073 
 
b) Health Care Providers who have notified the diagnosed disease(s) in the  preceding year   
 
i) By Sector          
Sector No Yes Unsure Total      
Public 26 (5)       358 (92)       11 (3)       395 (100)      
Private 11 (6)         100 (92) 2 (1)       113 (100)     0.602 
Total 37 (6)          458 (92) 13 (3)       508 (100)      
ii) Doctors  by   Province       
Province Public Sector  Private Sector   
 No Yes Unsure Total No Yes  Unsure Total  
Gauteng 7 (7) 73 (93) 1 
(0.1) 
81 (46) 1 (4) 11 (96) 0 (0) 12 (40) 0.720 
KwaZulu-Natal 8 (11) 48 (80) 5 (9) 61 (30) 3 (10) 10 (87) 1 (3) 14 (48) 0.906 
Limpopo 2 (3) 35 (94) 1 (2) 38 (24) 2 (25) 6 (75) 0 (0) 8 (11) 0.115 
Total 17 (7) 156 (89) 7 (4) 180 (100) 6 (10) 27 (89) 1 (2) 34 (100) 0.736 
iii) Professional Nurses by  Province       
Gauteng 4 (6) 53 (91) 1 (3) 58 (43) 3 (11) 25 (89) 0 (0) 28 (42) 0.189 
KwaZulu-
Natal 
3 (2) 91 (97) 1 (1) 95 (35) 2 (5) 36 (92) 1 (3) 39 (45) 0.368 
Limpopo 2 (4) 58 (93) 2 (4) 62 (21) 0 (0) 12 
(100) 
0 (0) 12 (13) 0.688 
Total 9 (4) 202 (94) 4 (2) 215 (100) 5 (6) 73 (92) 1 (1) 79 (100) 0.333 
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(Weighted %) 
Figure 6.1: Timeframe after diagnosis of a notifiable 
communicable disease in the preceding year that 
health care providers reported they notified the 
disease, South Africa, 2015   
 
 Correct notification of diseases 
Only 217 (51%) of the HCPs who reported diseases, indicated that they 
notified the case(s) to the DOH, while 34% of HCPs reported notifiable 
disease(s) to institutional infection control nurses; these categories where 
mutually exclusive – the few who indicated they reported to the department 
and others, were taken as reporting to the department (Table 6.3). Fewer 
HCPs in the private sector notified cases correctly, but this was not 
statistically significant (p=0.091). Professional nurses in the public sector 
(58%) were more likely than those in the private sector (37%) to report, 
correct notification, compared to 58% in the public ( p= 0.042). In Limpopo 
province, private sector HCPs reported significantly lower correct 
notifications (Figure 6.2).  
67%
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1%
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Table 6.3: Reporting authority of notifiable communicable 
diseases by sector, province and professional 
category, South Africa  
Weighted percentages are presented 
All categories where mutually exclusive – the few who indicated they reported to the 
department and others, were taken as reporting to the department 
 
 
a) Who reported to by sector and  province 
Who reported to  Public Sector N (%) Private Sector N (%) Total 
Gauteng KwaZulu-
Natal 
Limpopo Gauteng KwaZulu-
Natal 
Limpopo  
Department   63 (49)                             70 (55) 47 (57) 13 (35) 21 (49) 3 (18) 217 (51) 
Infection control 41 (39) 48 (30) 26 (28) 14 (45) 14 (34) 8 (58) 151 (34) 
Local clinic or 
hospital 
6  (3) 7 (5) 1 (1) 4  (3) 4 (3) 2 (16) 24 (4) 
Nurse in charge or 
Doctor 
10 (8)        11 (6) 13 (13) 4 (13) 3 (7) 3 (6) 44 (9) 
Patient and other 1   (0.1) 2  (4) 1  (1) 1  (3) 3 (7) 1 (2) 9 (2) 
Total 123 (100) 138 (100) 87 (100) 36 (100) 45 (100) 17 (100) 445 
(100) 
b)  Who reported to by sector and professional category 
Who reported to 
 
Public Sector N (%) Private Sector N (%) Total 
 Medical 
Doctors 
 Professional 
Nurses 
Public 
Total 
Medical 
Doctors 
Professional 
Nurses 
Private 
Total 
 
Department   70 (46)        110 (58)        180 (53) 11 (50)        26 (37)        37 (39) 217 (51) 
Infection control 58 (37)        57 (30)        115 (33) 5  (29)        31 (44)        36 (42) 151 (34) 
Local clinic or 
hospital 
6  (2)        8 (5)         14 (4) 8  (14) 2  (3)        10 (5) 24 (4)        
Nurse in charge or 
Doctor 
21 (15)   13  (4) 34 (9) 3  (5) 7 (10)        10 (9) 44 (9) 
Patient and other 1  (0.1)       3  (3) 4 ((2) 1   (2) 4  (6)       5 (5)    9 (2)   
Total 156 (100) 191(100) 347 (100) 28 (100) 70 (100) 98 (100) 445 
(100) 
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Figure 6.2: Reported correct notification by health care providers 
in South Africa, 2015  
 Factors associated with correct notification 
Unadjusted logistic regression analysis showed that general and critical 
care nurses were significantly less likely to notify correctly and that HCPs 
in PHC facilities were more likely to report correct notification. Other factors 
significant in unadjusted analysis were the possession of notification forms, 
knowledge of the notification process and the perception of ease of the 
notification process. All of the aforementioned factors were not significant 
in multivariable analysis.  
Only 15% of paediatricians notified correctly, with multivariable analysis 
showing that paediatricians were less likely to notify a notifiable disease 
correctly (OR 0.01, 95% CI 0.00 - 0.12, p=0.001) (Table 6.4). It also 
showed that HCPs perceptions of their workload (OR 0.84, 95% CI 0.70 - 
0.99, p=0.043) and their belief that notification data are not used for 
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outbreak response (OR 0.84, 95% CI 0.71 - 0.99, p=0.040), had a 
significant impact on them notifying diseases. The number of HCP patient 
consultations per day had no significant association with correct notification 
(OR 1.00, 95% CI 1.00 - 1.01, p=0.578).  
Table 6.4: Factors associated with Health care providers notifying 
a notifiable communicable disease correctly in the 
preceding year, South Africa, 2015 
Factor Unadjusted Logistic regression Multiple Logistic regression 
 Odds Ratio 95% CI  P-value Odds Ratio 95% C I P-value 
Age 1.02    1.00 - 1.04 0.063         
Gender 0.97   0.51 - 1.82 0.912         
Years’ 
experience 
1.02      0.99 - 1.05 0.261         
Professional 
Category 
1.36    0.71 -  2.59 0.345         
Paediatrician 0.07          0.01 - 0.59 
 
0.017* 0.01    0.00 - 0.12  0.001*       
General nurse 0.44    0.24 - 0.89 0.012*    1.29    0.57 - 2.91 0.522     
Critical Care 
Nurse 
0.01    0.00 -    0.12   
. 
0.001*      0.08 0.01 - 1.03 0.053 
Infection 
Prevention  
Nurse 
1.68    0.41 - 6.90 0.457         
Type of facility 1.3788     1.14 -  1.67 0.002*      1.38 0.41 - 4.59 0.583 
Primary health 
facility 
3.54    1.62 - 7.76 0.002*     3.80 0.01 - 1233.74 0.637 
Sector 
Employed  
0.57    0.30 -     
1.11 
0.094         
Knowledge of 
notification 
process 
1.07    1.00 -  1.14 0.037*     0.99    0.85 - 1.14 0.843      
Willingness to 
notify 
1.00    0.90 -  1.12 0.963         
Not easy to 
comply 
 0 .85    0.74 - 0.98 0.025 *      0.94    0.80  - 1.11 0.473      
Training on 
NDSS 
1.16    0.83 -  1.61 
 
0.383         
Formal training 
Epidemiology 
1.45     0.84 - 2.50 0.176    
Understanding 
the purpose of 
NDSS 
 0.97 0.88 - 1.14 0.736         
Knowledge on 
what to notify 
Immediately 
1.07    0.97 - 1.18 0.153         
Knowledge on 
what to notify 
1.05    0.98 - 1.13 0.142         
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       *P-value significant at 5% level.       95% CI = 95% Confidence Interval 
       ICU = Intensive Care Unit  NDSS = Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System 
HCPs' willingness to notify, experience, training on the NDSS, 
understanding of the purpose of NDSS, knowledge of what to notify, and 
perception of feedback given, had no association with correct notification. 
Working as infection control nurses was also not associated with the correct 
notification of communicable diseases. 
6.4 Discussion 
This is one of the first studies in democratic South Africa to determine HCPs’ 
compliance with the NDSS at a national level and to determine the factors 
associated with compliance. The study found that 58% of HCPs indicated 
that they diagnosed a notifiable disease in the year preceding the survey 
and that 92% of these indicated that they have reported the disease. 
However, only 51% of those notified the disease/s correctly to the DOH.  
A 2015 empirical study that compared South African notifications and 
laboratory surveillance, found that only 1.5% of suspected measles and 
meningococcal meningitis cases were notified [57]. This in sharp contrast 
to the HCP self-reports of 92% notification. The latter is also in contrast to 
the finding of a 1985-88 SA study that found that only one in seven 
hepatitis B cases were notified in South Africa [166]. The variations could 
in 24hrs  
Have 
notification 
forms 
  0.46 0.22 - 0.95 0.037*           0.30 0.03 - 2.96 0.285 
Number of 
patients seen 
per day 
1.00     1.00 - 1.01   0.578              
Workload 
prevents 
notification 
0.83     0.76 -0.91 
 
<0.001*      0.84 0.70 - 0.99 0.043*      
Feedback 
given 
0.92    0.82 - 1.03 0.151          
Data not used 
for response 
0.88    0.78 - 0.99 0.029* 0.84    0.71 - 0.99 0.040*    
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be due to differences in the denominator (the record reviews measured 
reporting per case while our survey does this per HCP), and the social 
desirability bias of self-reported information. The self-reported timeliness 
of the notifications (67% within 24 hours) was also high. This was in 
contrast to the poor perceptions of timeliness among key stakeholders, 
where 45% of national and provincial stakeholders considered the NDSS as 
timely [56]. Nonetheless, the high proportion of participants that reported 
notification, albeit incorrectly, is a reflection of HCP willingness to comply 
with the NDSS.   
In this study, one in two (51%) of HCPs reported correct notification of 
diseases. A 2002 American review, that measured HCP compliance with TB, 
HIV and sexually transmitted diseases (STIs) reporting, found it to be 79%, 
and  compliance of 49% when dealing with other diseases [141]. Our study 
excluded HIV, which is not notifiable in South Africa, and is based on HCPs 
reporting their compliance. We found a similar level of reported compliance 
as for other diseases in the American review and a lower level than for TB 
and STIs. Despite the difficulty of cross-country comparisons, and the 
methodological difference between this study and the American study, our 
study finding suggests low compliance, particularly in light of South Africa's 
high TB disease burden and the fact that TB is the most common notifiable 
disease [35]. The reported compliance in our study is also lower than a 
2014 Irish study which found 98% compliance, when hospital data were 
compared to notifications [140], and a Taiwan study which found 83.5% 
compliance amongst HCPs [180]. In Africa, a Nigerian state study found 
that only 38.2% of HCPs were aware of notifications and 71% reported 
disease notification [185]. A 2008 Nigerian study in six cities found that 
66.5% of doctors reported disease notification, with 65% of those that did 
not notify indicating that they never diagnosed a notifiable disease [187]. 
Differences with our study could be because we only focused on notification 
practices in the preceding year. However, a NDSS cannot function 
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effectively when only half of HCPs notify diseases correctly, particularly 
when it is not mandatory for laboratories to notify diseases.  
We found that significantly fewer HCPs in the private sector diagnosed 
notifiable diseases. This could be because  the private sector serves people 
with private health insurance, and communities who are dependent on the 
public sector have a higher incidence of communicable diseases [40]. The 
study found that a significantly higher number of public sector nurses 
diagnose and report a notifiable disease. This is because  PHC facilities in 
the public sector are staffed primarily by nurses,  who play a greater role 
in the diagnosis and management of diseases [40]. . This study also found 
that private sector nurses were less likely than those in the public sector 
nurses to notify correctly, even though they reported the highest level of 
training in the NDSS. Hence, they should be a focus group for NDSS 
intervention programmes. Our study found that similar proportions of 
public and private sector doctors diagnosed or notified diseases. These 
findings differ from the findings of other studies that reported differences 
between the two groups. An Indian study [182] and a study in Portugal 
[172] showed higher levels of compliance amongst public sector doctors, 
while a Maltese study showed earlier reporting amongst private doctors 
[174]. The implication of our finding is that similar interventions could be 
applied amongst doctors in both sectors to improve compliance with the 
NDSS. The finding that private HCPs in the peripheral and rural province of 
Limpopo notified fewer diseases correctly indicates the need for 
interventions to target rural areas. The 50% of private sector doctors (who 
were mostly GPs) who reported correct notification was comparable to the 
findings of a 2007 study which showed notification compliance of 37% 
amongst GPs in Gauteng province [84].  
Although there was a statistical association between HCPs perceptions of 
workload and their reported compliance, there was no statistically 
significant association between compliance and the reported number of 
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patient consultations per day. This could be because workload is influenced 
by disease burden, patient management, the number of patients and time 
spent per patient. However, these factors were not assessed in our study. 
Our study further showed that HCPs opinions on the usefulness of 
notification were associated with correct notification to the DOH. This 
implies that the DOH should communicate to HCPs that notifications 
influence outbreak management and response. Our study found willingness 
to notify, training on the NDSS, understanding of the purpose of the NDSS, 
knowledge on what to notify, possession of notification forms and feedback 
did not influence HCP compliance with the NDSS. Other studies have found 
these factors to be important [84, 141, 160, 176, 177, 183, 184, 190, 191]. 
The differences in our findings and these studies may relate to differences 
in methodology, and do not mean that these are not important factors that 
require ongoing attention in ensuring an effective NDSS. Our finding that a 
high percentage of HCPs did not notify correctly indicates that clear 
guidelines are needed to ensure optimal functioning of the South African 
NDSS.  
Most HCPs indicated that they reported the diagnosed notifiable disease to 
other HCPs, probably with the expectation that those individuals would 
report the disease to the DOH. Infection control nurses were the group 
most diseases were reported to. However, the study found that being an 
infection control nurse was not associated with correct notification.  
A limitation of the study is the self-reported information that may have 
been influenced by social desirability bias. Another limitation is its cross-
sectional nature - it provides a picture of practices at the time of the study. 
With the high clinical staff turn-over in South Africa [48], practices are 
unlikely to remain static and ongoing evaluations are needed. The survey 
also did not allow HCPs who diagnosed more than one notifiable disease in 
the preceding year, to differentiate their notification practices for these 
diseases. This might lead to an over-estimation of compliance among HCPs. 
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Despite the above limitations, the study has provided valuable insights into 
reported compliance with the NDSS in SA and showed that 51% of study 
participants reported correct notification, which we have used as proxy for 
compliance with the NDSS. HCPs demonstrated a willingness to participate 
with the NDSS when the percentage who reported diseases incorrectly to 
other HCPs is also taken into consideration. This level of willingness is 
encouraging and provides a foundation for the introduction of NDSS 
reforms. These include the introduction of a simplified notification system 
that makes it easy for clinicians to notify diseases to the correct authority, 
thus enabling the implementation of appropriate public health measures. 
Given the high penetration of mobile technology in the country and 
successful pilot studies on malaria surveillance with mobile technology 
[217], this is an area that should be explored in addressing the 
performance of the NDSS as part of the South African health sector 
reforms. Changes in the NDSS should be accompanied with clearly 
communicated guidelines and support programmes, both for the public and 
private health sectors. In other countries, infection control nurses played a 
critical role in improving communicable disease reporting [234, 235]. In 
our study, a high percentage of HCPs reported notifiable diseases to them, 
hence infection control nurses should be used more effectively as a channel 
of communication between the DOH and HCPs. Paediatricians should also 
be a specific focus group for training on NDSS and other appropriate 
interventions, considering their lower compliance with the NDSS and their 
work with children, who are prone to childhood infections. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Although a high percentage of HCPs reported compliance with notification 
of diseases, this compliance was not according to prescribed standards. 
Hence, the compliance of HCPs in South Africa with the NDSS is suboptimal. 
The study found that HCPs perceptions of workload and usefulness of 
notifications were associated with their compliance with the NDSS. In light 
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of the important role of HCPs in the effective functioning of the NDSS, 
regular feedback to HCPs on the usefulness of notifications, training of 
paediatricians and rural private sector doctors, as well as guidelines on 
correct notification procedures are needed to increase their compliance in 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 7. PERSPECTIVES OF HEALTH POLICY 
ACTORS ON REFORMING THE NOTIFIABLE 
DISEASES SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
7.1 Introduction 
There is global consensus that the threat from infectious diseases is 
growing [236]. The 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa and 2016 Zika virus 
outbreak in Brazil underscored the importance of effective surveillance and 
response systems, and the impact of weak national health systems on 
countries’ economic and social security [88, 118, 188, 219, 236-240]. The 
World Bank has estimated that the economic impact of a pandemic similar 
to the 1918-19 influenza pandemic is around 5 percent of global gross 
domestic product or US$3 trillion [236]. These enormous costs of 
pandemics can be prevented with strategic investments in research, 
surveillance systems, universal health coverage reforms, capacity building, 
and financing [241]. 
There is a substantial body of literature on the evaluation of national 
notifiable disease surveillance systems (NDSS), particularly in high income 
countries [118-121]. Although these surveillance systems perform 
reasonably well, studies have found weaknesses of data quality, variations 
in completeness of data for different infectious diseases, and for electronic 
versus paper-based systems, lack of timeliness, and complexity and 
inflexibility of some surveillance systems [118-121]. An emerging body of 
literature in low and middle-income countries (LMIC) have pointed to weak 
health systems, human resource constraints, under-reporting, and lack of 
feedback mechanisms [122-125]. In sub-Saharan Africa, studies have 
found that surveillance systems are hampered by numerous health system 
deficiencies, including inadequate or absent laboratory capacity, staffing 
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and resource constraints, inadequate supervision, poor monitoring, and 
weak organisational capacity [126-129]. 
In South Africa, my PhD study was one of the first objective assessments 
of the NDSS. My first study among key stakeholders involved in infectious 
disease control and response (Chapter 4) found that 25% perceived the 
system to be acceptable, 51% to be flexible, 45% to be timely, 61% to be 
useful, and 74% to be simple [56]. My second study (Chapter 5) used data 
on three tracer notifiable diseases – measles, meningococcal meningitis, 
and typhoid, to compare the NDSS with laboratory surveillance for the 
system attributes of data quality, stability, representativeness, sensitivity 
and positive predictive value (PPV). The study found that the NDSS 
performed poorly on most system attributes for the tracer conditions [57]. 
My third study (Chapter 6) examined notification compliance among health 
care providers and found that of those HCPs that diagnosed a notifiable 
disease in the year preceding the survey, only 51% notified the disease/s 
correctly to the Department of Health [242]. Hence, my PhD study findings 
present scientific evidence on the need for the revitalization of the NDSS in 
South Africa. This concurs with one of the key recommendations of the 
Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future, established 
in response to the threat and risks of infectious diseases, that national 
public health capabilities and infrastructure should be revitalized [236].  
Notwithstanding the scientific evidence generated by my PhD, the WHO’s 
2020 strategic policy framework [112] emphasises the importance of 
including all stakeholders in decision-making and health system reform 
initiatives [113]. The Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for 
the Future also underscores the importance of leadership and coordination 
for infectious disease preparedness and response [236]. In South Africa, 
several studies have pointed to sub-optimal policy implementation or policy 
failures because of the lack of involvement of policy actors, particularly 
those responsible for the implementation of these policies [110, 114-117]. 
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Hence, it is critical to obtain the perspectives of key health policy actors on 
the NDSS reforms that are needed. 
This chapter draws on Bressers’ Contextual Interaction Theory [243] to 
explore the perspectives of health policy actors on NDSS reforms needed 
in South Africa. The health policy actors are the key stakeholders involved 
in disease control and response, and the health care providers (HCPs) 
responsible for disease notification.  
7.2 Methods 
In this chapter, I have combined the findings of two surveys, one among 
key stakeholders (Chapter 4), and the other among HCPs (Chapter 6). The 
detailed methods on each survey are described in Chapters 4 and 6, and 
summarised in Chapter 3. 
 Conceptual framework 
Bressers’ Contextual Interaction Theory proposes that policy 
implementation occurs within specific, structural and wide context [243]. 
The specific context refers to the stakeholder or policy actor’s previous 
experience; structural context refers to the actor’s position and 
responsibilities for implementation, while wider context refers to political, 
economic and cultural issues that influence the actor’s activities or 
responses [243]. Stakeholders or policy actors interact with the context, 
and these interactions are influenced by their knowledge, motives, and 
power, all which shape policy implementation [243].  
 Study setting 
Survey 1 focused on key stakeholders involved in the NDSS at national and 
provincial levels, while the survey among health care providers was done 
in the provinces of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo.  
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 Research design and methods 
As described in Chapters 3, 4 and 6, cross-sectional surveys were 
conducted among key stakeholders and HCPs. Both surveys were based on 
structured, self-administered questionnaires (Appendices 8 and 10 
respectively for the two groups). In a section of the questionnaires, 
participants were asked to score the organisational capacity for the NDSS 
(facility, district, province or national), human, and financial resource 
investments, using a five point Likert-scale scale that ranged from very 
poor to very good. Another section asked these two groups of NDSS policy 
actors to rate the impact of certain interventions in the NDSS, using a ten 
point Likert-scale, from ‘1’ for ‘no benefit to ‘10’ for ‘maximum benefit’. The 
interventions that they were asked to rate were: addressing staffing, 
funding, and organisational needs, as well as introducing an electronic or 
mobile system.  
 Data analysis  
STATA® 14 was used to analyse the data from the two surveys. The data 
were weighted to take account of the sampling strategy in the HCP survey. 
For each of the categories of NDSS organisation, human and financial 
resource investments, I determined the proportion of participants in each 
survey that selected a particular score (very poor to very good). I also 
determined the mean scores for each of the two groups of policy actors on 
how they rated the different interventions on the NDSS. I performed linear 
regression analysis on the mean intervention scores at a significance level 
of 5%. 
7.3 Results  
 Organisational capacity for the NDSS  
The majority of key stakeholders who scored the organisational capacity 
for the NDSS as poor to very poor, varied from 58% to 87%; while the 
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proportion of HCPs who scored the organisational capacity as poor to very 
poor varied from 33% to 38% (Figure 7.1). Few key stakeholders scored 
the organisational capacity for the NDSS as very good, with the highest 
percentage of 4% for provincial organisation. The proportion of HCPs who 
regarded organisational capacity as very good varied from 4% (district) to 
9% (national). The proportion of key stakeholders who scored 
organisational capacity as satisfactory varied from 20% (facility level) to 
35% (national level). HCPs provided similar satisfactory scores for all NDSS 
levels (Figure 7.1). 
 
HCPs = Health Care Providers Informants = Key Stakeholders 
Figure 7.1: Policy actors’ perspectives on organisational capacity 
for the NDSS, 2015  
 Resources for the NDSS  
Most key stakeholders scored the human resources within the NDSS, as 
poor or very poor (Figure 7.2). In contrast, the proportions of HCPs who 
scored human resources as poor or very poor were lower (Figure 7.2). 
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Fewer key stakeholders scored human resources as good or very good, 
compared to HCPs (Figure 7.2). 
 
HCPs = Health Care Providers Informants = Key Stakeholders 
Figure 7.2: Policy actors’ perspectives on human resources for 
the NDSS in South Africa, 2015  
Similar to human resources, most key stakeholders scored financial 
resources for the NDSS as poor or very poor, (Figure 7.3). As was the case 
with human resources, fewer HCPs’ than key stakeholders scored financial 
resources as poor or very poor. Only 1% of key stakeholders scored 
financial resources at national level as very good, whereas 7% of HCPs 
scored financial resources as very good. 
  
16
13
11
12
25
14
27
15
41
22
43
23
43
24
41
21
35
41
31
41
23
42
27
37
6
17
11
17
9
13
5
17
3
7
3
8
0
7
0
10
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Informants Staffing  - National
HCPs Staffing  - National
Informants Staffing  - Province
HCPs Staffing  - Province
Informants Staffing - District
HCPs Staffing - District
Informants Staffing - Facility
HCPs Staffing - Facility
Very Poor Poor Satisfactory Good Very Good
113 
 
 
HCPs = Health Care Providers Informants = Key Stakeholders 
Figure 7.3: Policy actors’ perspectives on financial resources for 
the NDSS in South Africa, 2015  
 Policy actors’ opinions of the effect of interventions  
Key stakeholders rated the introduction of an electronic system as the 
intervention that would have the highest impact on the NDSS. They gave 
the intervention a mean score of 90%, while the HCPs scored it 80%, which 
was their second highest score. HCPs rated the use of mobile technology 
as the intervention with the highest score (81%; and scored investing more 
staff, more finances and addressing the level of organisation equally at 
76%. Key stakeholders scored all interventions, except for investing more 
staff, significantly higher than HCPs in bivariate linear regression. In 
multivariate linear regression, introducing an electronic system (Coefficient 
- 0.010 p<0.001), investing more staff (Coefficient 0.002 p=0.029), and 
addressing the level of organisation (Coefficient -0.006 p=0.049) are 
scored significantly higher for key stakeholders (Table 7.1). 
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Table 7.1 Key-stakeholders (KSHs) and Health care providers 
(HCPs) ratings of the effect of interventions on the 
NDSS South Africa 2015 
  
Interventions KSHs HCPs Bivariate 
Regression 
Multiple 
Regression 
 Mean Mean Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-
value 
Investment of staffing 81% 76%  - 0.002 0.146 0.002 0.029* 
Investment of funding 79%  76%  - 0.002 0.021* 0.005 0.151 
Addressing level of organisation  84%  76%  - 0.004 0.022* - 0.006 0.049* 
Introducing an electronic system 90%  80%  - 0.007 <0.001* - 0.010 <0.001* 
Using mobile technology 88%  81%  - 0.005 0.021* 0.003 0.337 
* Significant p-value 
 
7.4 Discussion 
This was one of the first studies to ascertain the opinions of policy actors 
(key stakeholders and HCPs) on NDSS reforms in South Africa. The study 
found that key stakeholders, i.e., those at policy planning, monitoring and 
evaluation levels, regarded organisation and investments as poor, whereas 
HCPs, i.e. those at the coalface of service delivery level regarded 
organisation and investments as satisfactory. As Bressers’ contextual 
theory proposes, differences in these groups’ specific, structural and wide 
context may account for their differences in perspectives [243-245]. Key 
stakeholders were older than HCPs, with more experience in the NDSS, and 
more training in the NDSS (Chapters 4 and 6), which may have shaped 
their opinions of the system.  
The finding that most key stakeholders regarded the current level of 
organisation and resource investment in the NDSS as poor, is in line with 
their low perceptions on the attributes of acceptability, flexibility, timeliness 
and usefulness of the NDSS (Chapter 4) [56], and the poor performance of 
the NDSS on the attributes of completeness, stability and 
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representativeness when compared against laboratory surveillance 
(Chapter 5) [57]. Poor human resources for health is a global problem [167, 
246, 247] and in most LMICs, especially in Africa [248-252]. African 
countries have also been affected negatively by the out-migration of HCPs 
[253]. Although South Africa has more human resources than most other 
African countries, a 2015 study found that South Africa had fewer doctors 
per population compared to India, China and Brazil [254]. The National 
Department of Health highlighted a critical shortage of nurses at all levels, 
in its  national nursing strategy [255]. Hence the perceptions of key 
stakeholders on human resource shortages are supported by evidence. 
The finding that almost one in two of HCPs scored the resources and 
organisational level for the NDSS as satisfactory is in sharp contrast to the 
opinions of the key stakeholders. This is surprising as HCPs are at the 
coalface of service delivery, where the impact of resource shortages, such 
as human resources, would be more evident. The comparative study on 
notifications and laboratory surveillance (Chapter 5) found that there were 
fewer laboratory confirmed cases in rural provinces, illustrating that 
financial and human resource inequities affected the NDSS [57, 195]. The 
surprising finding may be that the key stakeholders and HCPs interpreted 
the notion of “satisfactory” differently, as alluded to by Bressers’ Contextual 
Interaction Model [243]. The differences in context [243] with the longer 
NDSS training and experience that the key stakeholders had, may have 
contributed to better insights into the needs of the NDSS and translated 
into differences in their opinions. Both the key stakeholders and HCPs 
surveys could have been affected by social desirability bias [208]. Key 
stakeholders scored an intervention regarding NDSS organisation 
significantly higher than HCPs in multivariate linear regression (Coefficient 
-0.006 p=0.049). The IDSR emphasizes the need for strong organisation 
at all levels in establishing an effective NDSS [24]. Several studies in Africa 
have demonstrated the relationship between health system structure and 
organisational issues, such as over-centralization and weak laboratories on 
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the functioning of NDSS [128, 129, 256-258]. South Africa has a strong 
laboratory surveillance system [57], but a relatively weak primary health 
care system [259]. Although PHC reforms are underway in South Africa 
[51], policy analysts have proposed that concomitant NDSS reforms need 
to be introduced [260]. 
A limitation of this study was that it did not include an empirical study of 
the resources within the NDSS. However, there is evidence of human and 
financial resource constraints at all levels of the health system, which are 
more acute at the district health system level. The reform of the NDSS 
should include an assessment of resources, and benchmarking of the 
resource investments needed against other countries with similar levels of 
income and similar burden of infectious diseases. The assessment of 
current resources, and investments needed should be accompanied by a 
clear plan on addressing constraints in a phased manner. 
The finding that key stakeholders regarded the introduction of an electronic 
system as the best intervention for the NDSS is in line with global studies 
which have shown that electronic systems improved the functioning of the 
NDSS [261-264]. In South Africa, studies on the surveillance of TB have 
shown that the introduction of an electronic system can make a difference 
to the usefulness and other attributes of the system [85, 87]. The 
successful introduction of an electronic system for TB is a precedent that 
can be followed for the rest of the system. The fact that both the key 
stakeholders and the HCPs rated this intervention highly can be regarded 
as an indicator of their willingness to cooperate with the introduction of 
such a system. 
The finding that HCPs rated the use of mobile technology as the 
intervention with the highest score, is in keeping with the high penetration 
of mobile technology in the South African market – the country is ranked 
27th in the world on the number of mobile phones and has 117 phones per 
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100 people [265]. Given the high penetration of mobile technology in the 
country and successful pilot studies on malaria surveillance with mobile 
technology [217], this is an area that should be explored in reforming the 
NDSS. NDSS reforms should be accompanied with clearly communicated 
guidelines and support programmes. Mobile technology has been 
effectively used in communicable diseases surveillance globally [266-269] 
and in Africa [270-273]. In South Africa, there have been initiatives to use 
mobile technology in malaria surveillance [217] and in the care and 
management of pregnant woman [274]. HCPs are at the first level of 
interaction between patients and the health care system; the introduction 
of the use of mobile phones in the NDSS could lead to them effectively 
notifying diseases and to a better response to outbreaks. 
A limitation of the study is that it was based on a quantitative analysis of 
role-players’ opinions on the possible effect of a list of five interventions on 
the NDSS; a qualitative analysis with open questions would have allowed 
an assessment of a broader scope of issues to take into account, and 
additional interventions. Nonetheless, we focused on a list of interventions 
that have shown to be effective in other countries that are implementing 
NDSS reforms. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This study provided new knowledge on the perspectives of health policy 
actors on reforming the notifiable diseases surveillance system in South 
Africa. The policy actors at different levels of the NDSS in South Africa had 
different opinions on the level of organisation and resource investment in 
the NDSS, as well as the interventions needed to reform the surveillance 
system. Those at service delivery level regarded human and financial 
resource investments as satisfactory and regarded the introduction of 
mobile technology as the best intervention to improve the NDSS; while 
those at the monitoring and evaluation level regarded human and financial 
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resource investments as poor with the introduction of an electronic system 
as the best intervention. In light of the important role of both groups of 
policy actors in the effective functioning of the NDSS, their opinions should 
be used to inform the reforms of the NDSS in South Africa. An electronic 
system with a mobile interface for HCPs should be introduced and both 
resource shortages and organisational weaknesses at institutional, district, 
provincial and national level must be addressed as part of the NDSS 
reforms. 
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CHAPTER 8. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
8.1 Introduction 
The 2017/18 listeriosis outbreak in South Africa has highlighted the 
criticality of an effective NDSS to the health and well-being of communities, 
and the prevention of premature mortality [275].  
This PhD study was based on: two cross-sectional surveys conducted in 
2015, one among key stakeholders involved with analysing, interpreting, 
responding, reporting, monitoring and evaluation of the NDSS at a national 
and provincial level (Chapter 4); the other among HCPs involved with the 
identification and notification of communicable diseases at institutional 
level in both the public and private health sectors (Chapter 6); and a 
comparative study of notifications and laboratory surveillance (Chapter 5). 
The cross-sectional surveys also elicited the perspectives of policy actors 
(key stakeholders and HCPs) on organisational and resource reforms of the 
NDSS (Chapter 7).  
In this concluding chapter I integrate the key findings of this thesis 
(Chapters 4 to 7), to propose recommendations for reforming the NDSS in 
South Africa. In Section 8.2 I summarise the key findings and 
recommendations of the PhD study. In Sections 8.3 and 8.4 I highlight the 
scholarly contribution and policy impact of the PhD respectively. Section 
8.5 contains recommendations for further research. 
8.2 Key Findings and Recommendations 
 Summary of key findings 
The key findings of all the studies the PhD are summarised in Table 8.1, 
and discussed below 
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Table 8.1: Summary of the key findings of the PhD  
 25 % of key NDSS stakeholders perceived the system to be acceptable, 51 % to be 
flexible, 45 % to be timely, 61 % to be useful, and 74 % to be simple.  
 Stakeholders with more years of experience were less likely to perceive the NDSS 
system as acceptable (OR 0.91, 95 % CI: 0.84–1.00, p = 0.041); those in disease 
detection were less likely to perceive it as timely (OR 0.10, 95 % CI: 0.01–0.96, p 
= 0.046) and those participating in National Outbreak Response Team were less 
likely to perceive it as useful (OR 0.38, 95 % CI: 0.16–0.93, p = 0.034).  
 Using the three tracers of measles, meningococcal meningitis and typhoid, the 
comparative study  found that notifications for all three tracer diseases were 
significantly lower compared to laboratory diagnosed cases  
 Completeness for the laboratory system was higher for measles (63% vs. 47%, p 
< 0.001) and meningococcal meningitis (63% vs. 57%, p < 0.001), but not for 
typhoid (60% vs. 63%, p = 0.082).  
 Stability was higher for the laboratory (all 100%) compared to notified measles 
(24%, p < 0.001), meningococcal meningitis (74%, p < 0.001), and typhoid (36%, 
p < 0.001). Representativeness was also higher for the laboratory (all 100%) than 
for notified measles (67%, p = 0.058), meningococcal meningitis (56%, p = 
0.023), and typhoid (44%, p = 0.009).  
 The sensitivity of the NDSS was 50%, 98%, and 93%, and the PPV was 20%, 57%, 
and 81% for measles, meningococcal meningitis, and typhoid, respectively. 
 The study found that 58% of HCPs (n=919) surveyed diagnosed a notifiable 
disease in the year preceding the survey.  
 Although the majority of these professionals (92%) indicated that they had 
reported the disease, only 51% of those notified the disease/s correctly to the 
Department of Health.  
 Factors influencing notification were HCPs perceptions of workload (OR 0.84, 95% 
CI 0.70 - 0.99, p=0.043) and that notification data are not useful (OR 0.84, 95% 
CI 0.71 - 0.99, p=0.040). 
 58% to 87%; of key stakeholders scored the level of NDSS organisation as poor 
or very poor; 54% to 68% scored human resource investment as poor or very 
poor, while 67% to 84% scored financial resource investment as poor or very 
poor, In contrast, 33% to 38% of HCPs scored the level of NDSS organisation as 
poor or very poor; 35% to 38%. scored human resource investment as poor or 
very poor, while 35% to 38% scored financial resource investment as poor or very 
poor, 
 Key stakeholders rated the introduction of an electronic system as the best 
intervention to improve the NDSS, while HCPs rated the introduction of mobile 
technology as the best intervention to improve the NDSS 
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 Performance of the NDSS against system attributes 
An effective public health response, which is aimed at containing the spread 
of an outbreak of a communicable disease, is dependent on a NDSS that is 
acceptable, flexible, representative, sensitive, simple, stable, timely, 
useful, has quality data and with an appropriate positive predictive value 
(PPV) [9, 24, 25, 88, 89]. In this PhD, key stakeholders scored the NDSS 
in South Africa low on the attributes of acceptability, flexibility, simplicity, 
timeliness and usefulness. These findings were supported by the 
comparative study of notifications and laboratory surveillance for three 
tracer conditions of measles, meningococcal meningitis, and typhoid. The 
comparative study found that the NDSS performed poorly on data quality, 
representativeness, sensitivity, stability and PPV. The findings on the NDSS 
attributes are low when compared with South Africa’s self-assessment 
surveillance scores of 100%, submitted for the period from 2014 to 2015 
[27].  
There are no international gold standards for the scores on these attributes 
[229], and comparisons with other countries should be treated with caution  
because of differences in context, disease profiles, resources  and study 
methodologies [24, 88, 139]. Nonetheless, the attribute scores found in 
this study are a lower compared to those found in studies done in other 
countries [118-129]. In this PhD study, 25% of key stakeholders perceived 
the system to be acceptable, in contrast to Germany where 90% scored the 
NDSS as acceptable [130]. In Madagascar acceptability levels for influenza 
surveillance ranged from 84%-98% [134], albeit for a single disease. On 
the score of simplicity, 74% of South African stakeholders scored the NDSS 
as simple, which was lower than what was found in Madagascar where 94% 
of stakeholders scored the surveillance system as simple [134]. In a 
Ugandan study 68%-73% stakeholders scored the NDSS as timely [126], 
in contrast to my PhD study in which 45% of stakeholders regarded the 
NDSS as timely. 
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Given the difficulties with inter-country comparisons, it is more relevant to 
compare the study findings with similar studies in South Africa [24, 88, 
139]. As indicated earlier, there is a dearth of NDSS evaluation studies in 
South Africa on the attributes of the NDSS, and these studies were limited 
in scope and scale. These other studies in South Africa found that the 
electronic TB surveillance system was acceptable and simple [86, 87], but 
the studies were contradictory on flexibility as the one scored it as flexible 
[87], whereas the other one found that the system did not adapt to 
changes, and hence was not flexible [86].  
A direct comparison with my PhD study is not possible, as TB is a single 
disease, whereas my PhD focused on the NDSS as a whole.  
My PhD study contributed new knowledge on the performance of the NDSS 
on the system attibutes. It should form the basis for future studies on the 
NDSS attributes. Importantly, the findings suggest that the entire NDSS 
should be  reformed. As a minimum, the NDSS should make it easy for 
HCPs and laboratories to comply with notification of infectious diseases, in 
order trigger an appropriate public health response. The reforms of the 
NDSS should be implemented  using a phased approach and in consultation 
with all the key stakeholders. This would also be in line with the WHO’s 
2020 strategic policy framework [112] which emphasises the importance 
of including all stakeholders in decision-making and health system reform 
initiatives [113]. Although the HCP survey found that training and 
experience had no influence on compliance, any NDSS reforms should be 
accompanied by a change management process that includes clear 
communication on the need for change, training and capacity building on 
new guidelines and protocols.   
The study findings indicate a need for objective evaluations in support of 
annual IHR country submissions to the WHO. The tools used in this study 
could complement the JEE tool that has become the recommended 
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instrument for IHR objective assessments [79, 80, 276] because of their 
specific focus on the NDSS.  
 Comparing laboratory surveillance with the NDSS  
The comparative study between the NDSS and laboratory surveillance 
found that notifications for all three tracer diseases, measles, 
meningococcal meningitis and typhoid, were significantly lower than cases 
that were laboratory diagnosed [57]. The NDSS also performed poorly on 
most of the system attributes of data quality, representativeness, 
sensitivity, stability and PPV, for all of the three tracers. The findings on 
the poor performance of the NDSS were underscored by the poor 
perceptions of key stakeholders on the system attributes (Chapter 4) and 
the poor compliance of HCPs with the NDSS (Chapter 6).  
As indicated earlier there is a dearth of similar studies in the international 
literature. The sensitivity of 50% for measles in my study was lower than 
that in a similar 2005 Swedish study with sensitivities for salmonellosis of 
99.9%, and meningococcal infection of 98.7% [142]. In this PhD study, the 
sensitivity for typhoid was 93%, for meningococcal meningitis 98% and 
these were comparable to the Swedish study. However, as indicated in 
Chapter 5, the calculation of sensitivity and PPV was negatively affected by 
the poor data quality in the notification and laboratory records, which 
prevented the matching of a sizeable number of records between the two 
systems. Defining minimum data requirements for laboratory requests and 
NDSS notifications, and building these into guidelines and protocols would 
assist in addressing the problem of poor data quality. Further studies on 
the attributes of sensitivity and PPV once data quality improvement 
measures have been implemented, are indicated. 
A 1985 to 1988 South African study that compared notifications and 
laboratory surveillance for hepatitis B showed that 14% of hepatitis B cases 
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were notified [166]. Although this study was done more than 28 years ago 
and the South African health system has undergone major changes since 
then, it appears that under-reporting remains a serious problem as that 
only 1.5% of suspected measles and meningococcal meningitis cases were 
notified.  
Based on my PhD study findings, mandatory laboratory notification is likely 
to enhance the effectiveness of the NDSS as was the case in other countries 
[140-144, 148]. The DOH should therefore take steps to ensure that 
appropriate regulations in this regard are developed and promulgated. In 
light of technological advances in laboratories in South Africa [277], an 
electronic system in the country should be instituted once regulations are 
promulgated. However, mandatory laboratory notification should not 
replace mandatory HCP notification, and should be implemented in tandem. 
The role of HCPs in implementation of NDSS reforms is critical because 
notification of diseases such as measles, meningococcal meningitis and 
cholera based on clinical suspicion is essential.  
 Compliance of health care providers (HCPs) 
This PhD study found that 58% of HCPs indicated that they diagnosed a 
notifiable disease in the year preceding the survey and that 92% of these 
indicated that they have reported the disease. However, only 51% of those 
notified the disease/s correctly to the DOH. Hence compliance was not 
according to prescribed standards, supporting the finding in the 
comparative study that found that only 1.5% of suspected measles and 
meningococcal meningitis cases were notified [57]. The variations between 
self-reported compliance and the findings of the comparative finding could 
be due to differences in the denominator (the record reviews measured 
reporting per case while the survey computed this per HCP), and the social 
desirability bias of self-reported information. The self-reported timeliness 
of the notifications (67% within 24 hours) was also high and in contrast to 
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the poor perceptions on timeliness found amongst other key stakeholders, 
with only 45% scoring the NDSS as timely [56].  
Underreporting in countries’ NDSS is a common problem globally [140-143, 
159, 160, 169-184], with similar low levels of HCP compliance of HCPs 
found in Nigeria and in Zimbabwe [185-187, 189]. The underreporting has 
implications for the optimal performance of an NDSS as it may result in the 
late detection of outbreaks.  
In this PhD study, HCPs perceptions of workload and their opinions on the 
usefulness of notification were associated with their reported compliance 
with the system. This means that the DOH should address staffing levels, 
and give regular feedback and communicate to HCPs on the usefulness of 
notifications. Our study found that willingness to notify, training on the 
NDSS, understanding of the purpose of the NDSS, knowledge on what to 
notify, possession of notification forms and feedback did not influence HCP 
compliance with the NDSS. This was in contrast to other studies that have 
found these factors to be important determinants of compliance [84, 141, 
160, 176, 177, 183, 184, 190, 191]. In Africa, two studies in Nigeria found 
that the most common reasons for lack of reporting were a lack of 
knowledge amongst HCPs and a lack of infrastructure or logistics for 
reporting [186, 187]. The differences in our findings and these studies may 
relate to differences in methodology, and do not mean that these factors 
are not important that require ongoing attention in ensuring an effective 
NDSS. In rural areas a lack of infrastructure may have contributed to the 
lower levels of compliance in our study. Steps should therefore be taken to 
ensure that infrastructure and forms are available to all HCPs to ensure that 
there are no barriers to notification. 
Our finding that a high percentage of HCPs did not notify correctly indicates 
that clear guidelines are needed to ensure optimal functioning of the South 
African NDSS. The finding that paediatricians and rural private HCPs 
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notified fewer diseases correctly indicates the need for interventions to 
target paediatricians and rural areas. Apart from guidelines these 
interventions should include the introduction of a simplified notification 
system that makes it easy for clinicians to notify diseases to the correct 
authority, as well as appropriate training on the new system, both for HCPs 
in the public and private health sectors. In other countries, infection control 
nurses played a critical role in improving communicable disease reporting 
[234, 235]. In our study, a high percentage of HCPs reported notifiable 
diseases to them; hence infection control nurses should be targeted as part 
of the reforms of the NDSS. 
 Perspectives on reforms of the NDSS 
My study found that different policy actors had different opinions on the 
level of organisation, resource investment and reforms needed in the 
NDSS. Key stakeholders, i.e., those at monitoring and evaluation level, 
regarded organisation and investments as poor, whereas HCPs, i.e. those 
at the coalface of service delivery level, regarded organisation and 
investments as satisfactory. Key stakeholders regarded the introduction of 
an electronic system as the best reform for the NDSS, while HCPs regarded 
the introducing of mobile technology as the best reform. The differences in 
context [243-245] with the longer NDSS training and experience that the 
key stakeholders had, may have contributed to the differences in opinion. 
The differences may also be because of different understanding or 
interpretations of the questions.  
Poor human and financial resources are well-known problems of health care 
systems in LMIC [248-252]. Further studies are needed to assess current 
human and financial resources in all levels of the NDSS, and the knowledge 
and competencies of NDSS staff. This will enable costs of reforming the 
NDSS, which could be incorporated into a medium-term plan, and could 
feed into the overall discourse on the implementation of the NHI system.   
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The preference of key stakeholders for an electronic system is in line with 
global studies which have shown that electronic systems lead to 
improvement in the functioning of the NDSS [261-264]. The finding that 
HCPs rated the use of mobile technology highly is in line with the increased 
trend of using digital technology in health [266-273]. The implementation 
of an electronic NDSS with a mobile interface for HCPs is an appropriate 
recommendation for reform of the NDSS. The implementation of these 
reforms should be accompanied by stakeholder and HCP involvement, 
communication and awareness raising, appropriate training, dedicated 
budgets, guidelines and protocols, and monitoring and evaluation.  
 Summary of Recommendations 
In this section, I have drawn on the study’s conceptual framework 
presented in Chapter 1 and the key findings of the study to recommend 
essential NDSS reforms (Table 8.2). These proposed reforms should be led 
by the national Department of Health. The Department should involve, and 
be supported by the various role-players, as shown in Table 8.2.   
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Table 8.2:  PhD Study Recommendations 
Recommendation Individual 
HCP 
National 
Department 
of Health 
Provincial, 
local and 
private 
health 
sector  
National 
Health 
Laboratory 
Service 
1. Provide leadership to implement NDSS reforms in South Africa ~ X ~ ~ 
2. Use system attributes of usefulness, timeliness, simplicity, 
flexibility, acceptability, representativeness, stability, data quality, 
sensitivity and positive predictive value as a framework , to design 
a revitalised and reformed NDSS 
~ X ~ ~ 
3. Ensure that an electronic system with a mobile interface is 
incorporated into the design of the reformed NDSS  
~ X ~ ~ 
4. Ensure objective assessments of the NDSS during a five-year 
strategic planning cycle, drawing on the 2005 IHR, the IDSR, 
recommendations from the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and the 
tools and findings of this PhD study 
~ X ~ ~ 
5. Adapt and implement the guidelines and protocols for the IDSR, 
addressing all organisational levels from the community to national 
 X ~ ~ 
6. Develop and promulgate regulations in terms of the National Health 
Act to make it mandatory for all laboratories to notify listed 
infectious diseases 
 X ~ ~ 
7. Conduct an audit of dedicated NDSS human resources in both the 
public and private health sectors, including relevant staff 
knowledge, competencies and skills 
~ X ~ ~ 
8. Conduct an audit of dedicated NDSS financial resources in both the 
public and private health sectors  
 X ~ ~ 
9. Benchmark human and financial resource investments in the NDSS 
against those in other countries with similar levels of income 
 X ~ ~ 
10. Use results of benchmarking,  requirements indicated by audits and 
the reformed system to develop a business plan for NDSS reform 
implementation 
~ X ~ ~ 
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Recommendation Individual 
HCP 
National 
Department 
of Health 
Provincial, 
local and 
private 
health 
sector  
National 
Health 
Laboratory 
Service 
11. Reiterate the legal obligation of HCPs to notify communicable 
diseases in the regulations on mandatory laboratory notification 
~ X ~ ~ 
12. Emphasise the legal obligation of HCPs to notify communicable 
diseases in pre-service training in health science faculties and 
nursing colleges and in continuing professional development 
~ X X ~ 
13. Provide simple and clear protocols, guidelines and clinical 
management algorithms to HCPs, outlining the notification process 
and who to report to 
~ X X  
14. Educate and train all HCPs, in both the public and private health 
sectors, on the new reformed NDSS processes and tools, with 
particular attention paid to paediatricians and rural doctors 
~ X X  
15. Revitalise and emphasise the role and responsibilities of infection 
control nurses in hospitals  
~ X X  
16. Ensure regular feedback to HCPs on the use of notification data so 
that they appreciate the usefulness of their compliance with the 
NDSS 
 X X  
17. HCPs should comply with their obligation to notify listed 
communicable disease 
X   ~ 
 
X-key responsibility; ~ NDSS reform involvement and/or support role 
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8.3 Scholarly contribution of the PhD study  
 Generating new knowledge  
The PhD study has generated new knowledge on the performance of the 
NDSS in South Africa at a time when various infectious disease outbreaks 
(such as Ebola) underscored the importance of surveillance systems to 
national and global health security [209]. 
Study I involved all policy actors involved with the NDSS at a national and 
provincial level, and generated new knowledge on the performance of the 
NDSS against the attributes of acceptability, flexibility, simplicity, timeliness 
and usefulness. Study II was the first comparative study between the NDSS 
and laboratory surveillance, and it generated new empirical knowledge on 
the attributes of data quality, representativeness, sensitivity, stability and 
PPV of the NDSS that underscored the findings of the two surveys. 
Importantly, the comparative study was one of the first of its kind in a low 
and middle-income country setting, or in an African setting [210].  
Study III on the compliance of HCPs with notification of infectious diseases 
was the first such representative study done in the country, covering both 
public and private health sectors, and different levels of the health care 
system. It generated new knowledge on HCP compliance with the NDSS and 
on factors associated with their compliance. 
 Methodological innovation 
Studies I and II had a national coverage and are therefore representative 
of the entire country. Study III covered 77 randomly selected institutions, 
in the public and private health sectors, and 70 randomly selected GP 
practices in three randomly selected provinces. The cross-sectional surveys 
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conducted as part of the PhD obtained high response rates in excess of 
80%, and the findings can be generalized to the rest of the country.  
The methodology employed in the comparative study of notifications and 
laboratory surveillance was novel in South Africa, and can be used for 
similar studies in South Africa, and in other LMIC. 
8.4 The Policy impact of the PhD study  
The position I held as Chief Director: Communicable Diseases at the DOH 
and the publication of two papers in recognised peer-reviewed international 
journals, facilitated the provision of the recommendations of the research 
to decision makers in the country at an early stage of the PhD study. This 
allowed the study findings to inform some of the reforms that have begun 
to be implemented since the study was conducted. 
In 2015, the directorate tasked with the surveillance function in the DOH 
was moved to the Chief Directorate: Communicable Diseases, which allowed 
me to be directly responsible for both surveillance and outbreak response 
in the country. This facilitated the implementation of an integrated epidemic 
preparedness and response training programme in all of the provinces in 
the country, as well as the development of an integrated strategy for 
disease surveillance and response by 2016 [278].  
Following the adoption of the NaPHISA bill [53] that mandates the NICD to 
form the core of a future Institute, in 2016 the DOH entered into agreement  
with the NICD to assume responsibility for the implementation of the NDSS 
strategy in the country. In 2017, the draft regulations that make it 
mandatory for both the HCPs and laboratories to notify infectious were 
published for comments. Following the inputs of all policy actors these 
regulations were adopted in December 2017 [279]. An electronic 
notification system was also piloted under the auspices of the NICD in one 
institution in Gauteng province in 2017. 
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With regards to its IHR core competencies, South Africa underwent a JEE in 
December 2017, after the conclusion of the research for this PhD study. 
Subsequently, the WHO published their findings in a report [276].  
8.5 Recommendations for further research 
In light of the poor data quality found during the comparative study, there 
is a need to repeat the study, either using the same three tracers, or other 
conditions to recalculate sensitivity and PPV.   
This PhD study used quantitative methods primarily. Qualitative studies 
among health care providers using in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions on the reasons for non-compliance will add further insights into 
the performance of the NDSS.  
This PhD study found that paediatricians and HCPs in rural areas had lower 
levels of compliance with the NDSS. Further studies amongst these groups 
to understand the reasons for their non-compliance should be conducted. 
Infection prevention and control nurses appear to play a central role in the 
NDSS as a high percentage of HCPs reported notifiable diseases to them. 
There is a need for further studies to understand the compliance of these 
professionals with the NDSS.  
My PhD study showed that factors such as lack of infrastructure, forms and 
training did not affect the compliance of HCPs. These factors were shown to 
influence compliance in other countries. Further studies are needed in 
different provinces to confirm the factors that influence compliance of HCPs 
with the NDSS.  
An empirical study is also needed to assess the resources (human, financial 
and equipment) invested in the NDSS at all levels of the health system. This 
would inform the resource requirements to address the gaps so identified. 
Lastly, policy analysis studies should be conducted to determine the impact 
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of the NDSS reforms on early detection of outbreaks, and the prevention of 
premature deaths due to infectious diseases. 
8.6 Conclusion 
A strong national NDSS is essential to ensure public health preparedness 
and response to epidemics. This PhD generated new knowledge on the 
performance of the NDSS in South Africa, and proposed a set of strategic 
recommendations for NDSS reforms.  
A reformed NDSS is likely to revitalize public health capabilities of disease 
prevention, health promotion and health protection, provide the first line of 
defense against potential pandemics, and harness national leadership and 
coordination for epidemic preparedness and response [280]. The proposed 
reforms of the NDSS should be seen as an integral part of South Africa’s 
quest for universal coverage. 
.   
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Introduction to the Procedure Manual 
 
 This research study procedure manual sets out the procedures for the 
health care providers’ survey and the district record review. Each 
fieldworker must carefully follow the manual to ensure success of the 
study. 
 
 Every field worker must know all aspects of the procedure manual 
dealing with the health care providers’ survey. The research manager 
must know all aspects of the manual in detail. 
 
 We must all work together as part of a team. This means that staff stand 
in for, and help out other members of the staff when necessary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remember 
 In any study, preparation is very important to ensure that 
the recruitment and data collection processes run 
smoothly. 
 Before the actual start of the study, we should compile a 
checklist of all project forms, materials and equipment 
needed for the successful implementation of the study 
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Ethics and maintaining confidentiality  
 
This research has been approved by the Wits Research Ethics Committee. 
The steps that must be taken in the survey to ensure and maintain an 
ethical approach to the study, are listed below: 
 
1. Potential participants must be informed that their participation in this 
study is strictly voluntary and that they are free to withdraw from the 
study at any time.   
 
2. Following careful explanation of the survey, fieldworkers will give eligible 
health care providers the information sheet to read or, if necessary, the 
information sheet will be read to the survey participant by project staff.   
 
3. A tamperproof box must be provided at all the relevant institutions for 
participants to insert completed questionnaires in. 
 
4. Confidentiality must be maintained throughout the study. The 
tamperproof box with the completed questionnaires must be stored in a 
locked office or locked filing cabinet and handed to the principal 
investigator at the earliest opportunity. 
 
5. All participant questions that arise must be addressed.  
 
6. All participants will be given the name and telephone number of the 
principal investigator should they have any question about the study.  
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Key Study Information  
 
What is the study about? 
 
The last decade has seen the global emergence of infectious disease 
epidemics, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, 
the influenza pandemic (H1N1) of 2009, and the recent Ebola Virus Disease 
outbreak of 2013-15. These emerging diseases have drawn attention to the 
importance of strong country-based Notifiable Disease Surveillance 
Remember  
 Professional behaviour of the research team is critical 
at all times 
 Confidentiality, privacy and respect for individuals are 
not negotiable and must be adhered to 
 The information sheet is critical to give to Health Care 
Providers even if they choose NOT to take it with 
them! 
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Systems (NDSS) to ensure public health preparedness to respond to such 
outbreaks. Although the NDSS in South Africa has been in existence since 
the late 1970s, there is little information on its current status and there has 
been no systematic and objective evaluation of the national NDSS since its 
inception.  
 
The aim of this study is to conduct a systematic, country-wide analysis of 
the national NDSS of South Africa 
 
Who is doing the study? 
The study is being done by Dr Frew Benson as part of a doctoral degree at 
the School of Public Health at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. Dr Benson is supervised by Prof Laetitia Rispel, the Head of 
School, and Prof Lucille Blumberg of the National Institute of Communicable 
Diseases. All of their contact details are provided below. 
 
Who will be our target population? 
This procedure manual address two sub-studies of the research project with 
different target populations, namely a) a health providers’ survey and b) a 
record review. 
a) All health care providers (doctors and nurses) in City of Johannesburg 
and West Rand in Gauteng; eThekwini, uMgungundlovu and Ugu in 
KwaZulu-Natal; Capricorn and Vhembe in Limpopo, who are on duty 
at their institution on the day of the survey, will form the target 
population for this study.  
 
b) Records of notifications on three tracer notifiable diseases, namely 
meningococcal meningitis, measles and typhoid for the year 2013, at 
the above mentioned district offices will be accessed and reviewed by 
the principal investigator or research manager in the province. 
 
Where will the research study take place? 
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The survey will be done in a random sample of public facilities, as well as 
private facilities in the seven districts of the three provinces mentioned 
above. In hospitals, all professional nurses and doctors in the following 
divisions on the survey day, will be selected for study: internal medicine 
(including all outpatient departments and wards), medical casualty, 
paediatrics (including all outpatient departments and wards), paediatric 
casualty (where applicable) and infection control.  In Primary Health 
facilities all professional nurses and doctors will be selected. 
The record review will be done at the seven district offices. 
 
Contact information  
 
Principal Investigator       
Dr Frew Benson  
National Department of Health 
Phone: 012 395 8094 or Cell: 0823724199     
Fax: 012 395 8905         
Email: frewbenson@gmail.com or bensonf@health.gov.za 
 
Research Supervisors 
Professor Laetitia Rispel                
Centre for Health Policy, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg   
Tel: 011 717 3436  (office) or Cell: 082 372 0548 
Fax: 011 7173429 
Email : Laetitia.rispel@wits.ac.za 
 
Professor Lucille Blumberg 
National Institute of Communicable Diseases 
Tel: 011 386 6337 (office) or Cell: 082 807 6770 
Fax: 0867583326 
Email : Lucilleb@nicd.ac.za 
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Procedure for Health Care Provider Recruitment  
 
The Research Managers together with the fieldworkers will be involved in 
the recruitment of DOCTORS and PROFESSIONAL NURSES from the 
targeted facilities.  
 
1. ON THE DAY OF THE SURVEY THE MANAGER/ FIELDWORKER 
 Should be in possession of the following: 
 LIST OF RANDOMLY SELECTED FACILITIES  
 INFORMATION SHEET 
 QUESTIONNAIRE (WHICH CONTAINS THE CONSENT NOTE)- 
 PENCIL AND ERASER AND A PEN 
 TAMPERPROOF BOX (FOR THE INSERTION OF COMPLETED   
QUESTIONNAIRES) 
 COPIES OF THE APPROVAL FROM THE RELEVANT PROVINCE 
AND PRIVATE HOSPITALS 
 
The MANAGER/ FIELDWORKER MUST present and introduce himself/ herself 
to the CEO/FACILITY MANAGER in charge of the hospital/clinic, explain the 
survey and present them with a copy of the relevant approval granted (for 
public hospitals, from the provincial department and from private hospitals, 
from their head office). 
 
Greet the CEO/ FACILITY MANAGER and thank them for allowing us entry. 
Stress the importance of the study in generating information to improve the 
NDSS.  Remember first impressions are lasting impressions! 
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What is the procedure for recruiting health care providers in public 
facilities? 
 
 
Remember: Who is eligible to participate in the 
survey? 
 
Must be a doctor or professional nurse working in one of 
the targeted areas i.e. not other categories of staff 
 Enrolled nurses, student nurses, and assistant nurses are 
excluded from the survey 
 BUT Interns and Qualified nurses doing post-basic 
diplomas e.g. ICU are included in the study 
Script for manager/ fieldworker 
Hello, my name is………………..I am pleased to meet you. Thanks for 
your willingness to receive us and assist us with the study 
‘Analysing the South African National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System (NDDS).’  We are doing the study in seven 
districts in three provinces, namely Gauteng, Limpopo and KwaZulu-
Natal. The study focuses on health care provider compliance with 
the NDSS and the factors influencing compliance. The aim of the 
study is to inform recommendations for policy improvements of the 
NDSS We are interested in doctors and professional nurses working 
in internal medicine (including all outpatient departments and 
wards), medical casualty, paediatrics (including all outpatient 
departments and wards), paediatric casualty (where applicable) and 
infection control. We will make sure that we do not interfere with 
the normal functioning of the health care workers and the units. If 
necessary, we will stay here for the whole day, to select the most 
convenient time to get the survey done. Thanks once again 
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 After explaining the study, the CEO/ Facility Manager may refer the 
research team to the unit manager (s). It is preferable to talk to the 
managers responsible for these areas at the same time as talking to the 
CEO/Facility Manager. 
 The Research Manager/Field Worker will introduce the study in the same 
manner as to the CEO/Facility Manager. 
 In hospitals, the targeted clinicians are doctors and professional 
nurses working in internal medicine (including all outpatient 
departments and wards), medical casualty, paediatrics 
(including all outpatient departments and wards), paediatric 
casualty (where applicable) and infection control. 
 In Primary care facilities (CHCs and clinics), all professional nurses 
and doctors are targeted. 
 On the day of the survey, every clinician in target group (excluding 
enrolled nurses, student nurses and assistant nurses) will be 
asked to participate in the survey if they work in the areas mentioned 
above. 
 The Research Manager/Fieldworker will approach nurses on duty at the 
most suitable/ convenient time and explain the study to them (use the 
fieldworker script). 
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What is the procedure for recruiting doctors and nurses in private 
hospitals? 
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 After explaining the study, the facility manager may refer the research 
team to the unit manager (s). 
 The Research Manager/Fieldworker will introduce the study in the same 
manner as to the CEO/Facility Manager. 
 In private hospitals, the targeted clinicians are doctors and 
professional nurses working in internal medicine, medical 
 Script for encouraging doctors and nurses to participate 
 
My name is _________________________. I am from the School of 
Public Health.  We are doing research on the Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System, which focuses on the detection, prevention and 
control of public health threats in South Africa. The aim of this research 
project is to inform policy and health system interventions for 
improvements in the system. We believe that you can help us by sharing 
with us your knowledge, views and experiences of the system. It will take 
about 15-20 minutes of your time.  
 
We have obtained permission to conduct this study. Ethical approval for 
this study has been obtained from the University of the Witwatersrand 
Ethics Committee for Research on Human Subjects.  
 
The questions are not a test, so there is no right or wrong answers. It is 
your opinions and experiences that are important. Everything that you 
say will be treated as private and confidential. .Your name will not be used 
in the study.  
 
Your participation is completely voluntary. There will be no negative 
consequences if you do not want to participate. There will be no direct 
benefit to you if you participate in this study but we hope that the 
information collected will be helpful in improving nursing and health 
services in South Africa.  
 
If you are willing to give your consent and take part, we will appreciate 
your participation and the information that you are willing to provide. This 
is an information sheet which explains the study in more detail (GIVE 
THE CLINICIAN THE INFO SHEET). 
 
Please insert the completed questionnaire into to tamperproof box provided. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? 
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casualty, paediatrics, paediatric casualty (where applicable) and 
infection control. 
 On the day of the survey, every clinician in target group (excluding 
enrolled nurses, student nurses and assistant nurses) will be 
asked to participate in the survey if they work in the areas mentioned 
above. 
 The researcher/ fieldworker will approach clinicians on duty at the most 
suitable/ convenient time and explain the study to them (use the 
fieldworker script) 
 Note that few doctors will be available in private hospitals. A list of 10 
General Practitioners in each district will be randomly selected and 
provided to field workers to approach in their private practices at a time 
convenient to them.  
 
 
Encourage the clinician to complete the questionnaire on the same 
day, insert the completed questionnaire in the box provided and say that 
you will be returning at a given time to collect the box. If the clinician 
refuses to participate, ask them to Initial the statement of consent 
on the front of the questionnaire and return the form in the box 
provided. 
AFTER COMPLETION OF THE SURVEY 
Remember for some clinicians this may be their first time 
participating in a survey. Please explain the following to 
the participant 
 How to indicate an answer 
 How the skip patterns work  
 How to complete all the questions 
 The importance of completing the questionnaire 
 That she/he must ask any questions or assistance from 
you if needed 
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 Thank the clinicians for participating 
 Collect the box with the completed questionnaires from the facility. 
 Note the date, name of the facility and district on a cover page 
and insert into the box  
 
Thank the manager on duty for assisting with the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GENERAL TIPS 
 
1. Planning-make sure there are sufficient number of questionnaires and 
information sheets for clinicians. Do not make copies of the questionnaire 
at facilities. 
 
2. Working as a team and pro-active communication are critical.  
 
3. Punctuality is important-arrive early before the scheduled appointment 
with hospital management. 
 
4.  Initial presentation to hospital CEO and particularly nursing 
management is critical. We need to demonstrate enthusiasm for the 
survey, discuss why it is important, talk about planned feedback and 
acknowledge that people are doing us a great favour, often by giving us 
so much of their time and goodwill. 
 
REMEMBER 
PLEASE DO NOT FALSIFY INFORMATION OR COMPLETE THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON YOUR OWN. 
 
WE WILL BE ABLE TO PICK IT UP AND IT IS A SERIOUS OFFENCE 
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5. The survey requires active management- leaving questionnaires in 
wards do not work - the clinicians should be encouraged to complete the 
questionnaire as soon as possible. 
 
6. Aim to have 100% response rate in each facility - this means that you 
need to find out how many people are on duty that day and aim to  
7. Get all the clinicians to complete the survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
Randomly Selected Facilities 
 
In each district, the health facilities are divided into public and private health 
facilities. Public facilities are in turn be divided into tertiary hospitals, 
regional hospitals, district hospitals, community health centers (CHC) and 
clinics (Specialised hospitals, satellite and mobile clinics are excluded from 
the study). Private hospitals with more than 100 beds will be divided 
according to ownership into the Netcare group, Life Healthcare and 
Mediclinic. Facilities were then selected randomly, proportional to the 
number in each stratum. 
 
Table 1 below shows the sample size targets proportional to the number of 
Health Care Providers in each province, district and sector. Tables 2 to 4 
show the facilities randomly selected in each stratum. 
 
Remember  
 Please do not hesitate to contact the principal 
investigator or research manager if there are any queries 
or any problems.  
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The Research Manager should plan to reach the respective targets in the 
different sectors. 
 
 
Table1: Provincial Sample Size Targets 
 Public Private Total 
 Limpopo 121 52 181 
 KZN 249 146 416 
 Gauteng 272 160 454 
Total 642 358 1050 
 
 
 
Procedures to be followed with the Health Record Review 
 
This section is applicable for the Principal Investigator and Research 
Managers only. 
 
The MANAGER/ RESEARCHER MUST present and introduce himself/ herself 
to the DISTRICT MANAGER of the district, explain the survey and present 
them with a copy of the relevant approval granted from the provincial 
department. Preferably the District Surveillance Officer and Communicable 
Diseases Co-ordinator should be present in the meeting. 
 
Greet the DISTRICT MANAGER and thank them for allowing us entry. Stress 
the importance of the study in generating information to improve the NDSS.   
Remember first impressions are lasting impressions! 
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The Research Manager should be in possession of the following: 
 RECORD REVIEW  
 PENCIL AND ERASER AND A PEN 
 COPIES OF THE APPROVAL FROM THE RELEVANT PROVINCE AND 
PRIVATE HOSPITALS 
 A LAPTOP COMPUTER 
 
Ask politely to access the notification records for 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2013 for 
the three tracer diseases. The district may have a paper-based record 
system with a file for the notifications, or an Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
based system or both. If they have both please ask to access both systems 
and compare which best represents all of the fields in the record review 
form. 
Script for Researcher 
Hello, my name is………………..I am pleased to meet you. Thanks for 
your willingness to receive us and assist us with the study ‘Analysing 
the South African National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System (NDDS).’  We are doing the study in three provinces, namely 
Gauteng, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal. The aim of the study is to 
inform recommendations for policy improvements of the NDSS. In this 
part of the study, we are interested in notifications on three tracer 
notifiable diseases, namely meningococcal meningitis, measles and 
typhoid for the year 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2013 . We will make sure that 
we do not interfere with the normal functioning of the officials in the 
relevant unit. Thanks once again for your assistance. 
185 
 
 
Extract the records from the paper-based system and complete a review 
form per record (if the district only has a paper-based system). Where there 
is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet system, obtain a soft copy and use the 
paper-based system to complete blank fields that were not recorded during 
data entry. 
 
After completion of the review, thank the officials and Facility Manager 
for the co-operation and assistance. 
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Appendix 7: Information Sheet 
    
Introduction 
My name is Dr Frew Benson.  I am a doctoral student in the School of Public Health at the University 
of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. 
I am doing research on the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, which focuses on the detection, 
prevention and control of public health threats in South Africa.  
Why are we doing the study? 
The aim of this research project is to conduct an analytical study of the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System of South Africa in order to inform policy and health system interventions for 
improvements. We believe that you can help us by sharing with us your knowledge, views and 
experiences of the system. 
What are we asking you to do?  
We would like you to complete the questionnaire which will take you about 20 minutes.  Alternatively, 
one of us could help you to complete the questionnaire.  Your participation is voluntary. This is not a 
test, so there is no right or wrong answer.  It is your opinions and experiences that are important. You 
may refuse to answer any questions that you don’t feel comfortable answering.  
Please insert the completed questionnaire in the box provided. 
How do I know that the information I give you will not get out to others? 
The information that you give in the questionnaire will be kept confidential.  No one will know that it 
is you that have answered the questions. The information will not be given to your employer and will 
not affect your work.  All questionnaires will be assigned a code.  The answers given will be analysed 
and reported as group data. 
Did you get permission to do the study? 
Permission to carry out this project was obtained from the University of the Witwatersrand Research 
Ethics Committee. We have also obtained approval from the health authorities.  
Are there any benefits and risks of participation? 
Participation in this study is voluntary and there will be no direct benefits to anyone who completes 
the survey.  Similarly there will be no negative consequences for individuals who do not want to 
complete the questionnaire.  You will not be compensated for taking part in the study.  You have the 
right not to answer any questions that make you feel uncomfortable or that you do not want to answer. 
Whom do I contact if I want more information? 
We will be happy to answer any question you have about this study.  If you have any questions about 
your rights as a study participant, or questions or concerns about any aspect of the study, you may 
contact the University Ethics office on (011) 717 1234.  If you have questions about the research, you 
may also contact the Principal Researcher or the Research Supervisor: 
Principal Researcher       Research Supervisor  Research Supervisor 
Dr Frew Benson        Professor Laetitia Rispel Professor Lucille Blumberg 
National Department of Health      School of Public Health National Institute of Com Diseases 
Phone: +27 12 395 8094      Phone: +27 11 717 2543 Phone: 011 386 6337   
Email: frewbenson@gmail.com    laetitia.rispel@wits.ac.za  lucilleb@nicd.ac.za 
 
Analyzing the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System in South African 
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Appendix 8: Key Stakeholders Questionnaire 
Key Informants’ Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Questionnaire 
For Official use only 
1.  Questionnaire serial number   
 
    
 
2. 2 Province ID  
 
  
 
3.  District ID  
 
  
 
4.  Sector  Public   1 
 Private   2 
 
 
 
5.  National Committee ID 
  
   
 
6. 8 
Date of survey:   DD/MM/YY  
      
 
7. 1
2 
Was the questionnaire 
completed? 
 No   0 
 Yes   1 
 
 
 
8. 1
5 
Date checked: DD/MM/YY  
      
 
 
  
 Consent To Participate 
I have been given an information sheet and I understand the objectives of the study. I further 
understand that my responses will be kept anonymous and confidential and that it is up to me whether 
or not to complete the questionnaire. It has been explained to me that even if I choose not to complete 
this questionnaire, I should still return it to the box provided and indicate No in the space below. My 
refusal to participate will in no way prejudice me. I agree voluntarily to complete the questionnaire 
and to complete the survey only once. 
 (Please tick). 
 Yes        No  
Initial : ………………………………………. Date: …………………………………. 
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Section A – Demographic Information 
 Question Official 
use 
1.  In what professional category do you fall? (Only mark one block – that is most relevant) 
□ Communicable Disease Coordinator /Manager... 1 
□ Surveillance Officer/Manager... 2 
□ Malaria Coordinator /Manager... 3 
□ EPI Coordinator /Manager... 4 
□ TB Coordinator /Manager... 5 
□ Medical Scientist... 6 
□ Pathologist... 7 
□ Epidemiologist... 8 
□ Medical Officer... 9 
□ Other… 10  Please specify……………………………......................………………… 
□  
2.   
How many years of experience do you have in your current portfolio? ............................ 
□  
3.   
What is your age (in years)? ................. 
□  
4.  In what sector are you employed? 
□ Private … 1 
□ Public  … 2 
□  
5.  Did you ever receive training on Notifiable Communicable Diseases? 
No Yes ... 1 
No No ... 2 
No Not certain ... 3 
□  
6.  What was the duration of the training? (in weeks)  
                                                                                 .................................. 
□  
7.  How long ago did you receive this training? 
                                                                              .................................. 
□  
8.  Did you receive any formal training in Epidemiology or Surveillance? 
□ Yes… 1 
□ No… 2 (If No, go to question 10) 
□  
9.  If yes, what level of formal training did you receive?  
□ Certificate… 1 
□ Diploma… 2 
□ Bachelor’s degree… 3 
□ Master’s degree… 4 
□ Doctorate… 5 
□ Other… 6    Please specify…………………….............................................……… 
□  
10.  When did you complete your formal training (date)? 
 
................................................................................................................................................. 
□  
11.  How many years of experience do you have working with Notifiable Diseases? 
 
................................................................................................................................................. 
□  
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12.  Are you a member of: 
Provincial Outbreak Response Team… [Yes] [No] 
National Outbreak Response Team… [Yes] [No] 
South African Malaria Elimination Committee… [Yes] [No] 
National Surveillance Forum... [Yes] [No] 
□ Other Committee...   Specify........................................................................................ 
□  
13.  Members of provincial health departments, please state in which province you work 
□ Eastern Cape... 1 
□ Free State… 2 
□ Gauteng… 3 
□ KwaZulu-Natal… 4 
□ Limpopo... 5 
□ Mpumalanga… 6 
□ Northern Cape... 7 
□ North West… 8 
□ Western Cape... 9 
□  
14.  Members of district health departments, please state in which district you work     
□ City of Johannesburg ... 1 
□ West Rand … 2 
□ eThekwini… 3 
□ uMgungundlovu… 4 
□ Ugu... 5 
□ Capricorn… 6 
□ Vhembe... 7 
□  
 
Section B –Knowledge and Skills on the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NDSS) 
Below is a list of skills that you need and use as part of your participation in the NDSS.  For 
each, please indicate what your current level of skill is to perform the task on a scale of 1-10 ( 
with 1 being Low skills, needing more support or training) and 10 being (Very high skills, no 
support or training needed).  Circle the relevant block or mark with an X 
 
 NOTIFICATION  MY SKILLS 
Low Skills 
 
Very High Skills 
Offi
ce 
Use 
15.  I know what the purpose of the notifiable diseases 
surveillance is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
16.  I know which diseases should be notified immediately 
on clinical suspicion   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
17.  I know which diseases should be notified within 24 
hours of laboratory confirmation of diagnosis   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
18.  I know which diseases can be notified after 24-48 hours 
after laboratory confirmation of diagnosis   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
19.  I know what processes should be followed in 
notifying a disease  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
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20.  I am  able to train other team members on the 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
 CASE MANAGEMENT  Low Skills Very High Skills  □  
21.  I am confident in the management of   
meningococcal meningitis.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
22.  I am confident in the management of  measles 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
23.  I am confident in the management of  typhoid 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
24.  I am able to access the latest protocols and 
guidelines on notifiable diseases   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
25.  I know who to consult if I am uncertain on the 
management of any notifiable disease  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
26.  I am able to train other team members on the 
management of meningococcal meningitis  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
27.  I am able to train other team members on the 
management of measles 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
28.  I am able to train other team members on the 
management of  typhoid 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
 OUTBREAK RESPONSE 
Low Skills  Very High Skills 
 
29.  I know what steps to follow in responding to an 
outbreak of a notifiable disease 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
30.  I am confident on the basic elements of an 
epidemiological investigation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
31.  I am able to complete an outbreak investigation 
report  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
32.  I am able to make appropriate recommendations to 
prevent outbreaks that are similar to the one I 
investigated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
□  
33.  I am able to make appropriate recommendations to 
control outbreaks that are similar to the one I 
investigated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
□  
34.  I am able to  train other team members on the 
response to notifiable diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
 PREVENTION AND TRAINING Low Skills  Very High Skills □  
35.  I am knowledgeable on the prevention of notifiable 
diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
36.  I am able to  educate the community on the 
prevention of notifiable diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
37.  I am able to  train other team members on the 
prevention of communicable diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
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Section C – Perceptions on attributes of the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
Listed below are statements on Attributes of the Notifiable Disease Surveillance. Using the provided 
scale state how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement.  
PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS – DO NOT LEAVE ANY OUT. 
 Statement Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Disagree 
slightly 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Agree 
Slightly 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
38.  The form used to notify diseases is 
easy to understand 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39.  The form used to notify diseases 
takes a long time to fill in 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40.  The notification process is easy to 
comply with 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41.  Clinicians are not willing to 
participate in the notifiable disease 
surveillance system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42.  Clinicians do not notify 
meningococcal meningitis within 
24 hours of clinical suspicion 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43.  Clinicians notify measles within 24 
hours of diagnosis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44.  Clinicians notify typhoid within 24 
hours of diagnosis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45.  Outbreak response teams do not 
respond timeously  to an outbreak  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46.  Data obtained through the 
notifiable disease surveillance 
system is not used for outbreak 
response 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
47.  Data obtained through the 
notifiable disease surveillance 
system is used for policy and 
guideline formulation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48.  Data obtained through the 
notifiable disease surveillance 
system do not contribute to 
knowledge on the prevention and 
control of infectious diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
49.  The notifiable disease surveillance 
system has been changed to meet 
changing circumstances and needs 
in the last decade 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
50.  The department provides regular 
feedback to doctors or nurses on 
notifiable diseases  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
51.  Lack of facility supervision does not 
impact on compliance with the 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Section D – Other Comments on the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
a. Please rate the availability of staffing for the notifiable diseases surveillance system at the 
following levels: 
 Organisational level Very Poor Poor Satisfactory Good Very Good 
52.  National 1 2 3 4 5 
53.  Province 1 2 3 4 5 
54.  District 1 2 3 4 5 
55.  Facility 1 2 3 4 5 
 
b. Please rate the level of investment of funding for the notifiable diseases surveillance system 
at the following organisational levels: 
 Organisational level Very Poor Poor Satisfactory Good Very Good 
56.  National 1 2 3 4 5 
57.  Province 1 2 3 4 5 
58.  District 1 2 3 4 5 
59.  Facility 1 2 3 4 5 
 
c. Please rate the organisational capacity for the notifiable diseases surveillance system at the 
following levels: 
 Organisational level Very Poor Poor Satisfactory Good Very Good 
60.  National 1 2 3 4 5 
61.  Province 1 2 3 4 5 
62.  District 1 2 3 4 5 
63.  Facility 1 2 3 4 5 
 
d. Please indicate to what extent the following interventions would benefit the notifiable 
diseases surveillance system (on a scale of 1 -10, with 1= No benefit and 10 = Maximum 
benefit) 
 Intervention No benefit Maximum benefit 
64.  Addressing staffing gaps  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
65.  Addressing the gaps in the organisational 
capacity of the department 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
66.  Investing more financial resources in the 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 
67.  Introduction of the use of an electronic system 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
68.  Introduction of mobile technology  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
69.  Do you have any further comments on the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
□  
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70.  Do you have any recommendations on how to improve the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
□  
 
Thank you for participating 
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Appendix 9: Record Review 
Section A – General (Official use) 
 Field Code 
1.  Source of Record:  
□ DOH… 1     
□ NHLS… 2               
□  
2.  Province  where data is obtained  (if DOH)  _______________  
 
District where data is obtained (if DOH)   _____________________ 
□  
3.  Communicable Disease Diagnosed 
 Measles… 1 
 Meningococcal Meningitis… 2 
 Typhoid… 3 
□  
4.  Record number     □  
5.  Date of review:                                                          DD/MM/YY       □  
6.  Completeness of record  - Number of fields not completed   □  
Section B – Demographic Information 
 Field Code 
7.  
Surname___________________________  Name_________________________ 
 
8.  Gender 
 Male… 1 
 Female… 2 
□  
9.  
Age at time of occurrence (in years) .................... 
□  
10.  Population group 
 Black… 1 
 Coloured… 2 
 Indian… 3 
 White… 4 
 Other… 5 
□  
11.  Facility that patient presented to 
                                                    ……………………………………………………………… 
□  
12.  District of residence at time of occurrence  
                                                                   ................................................................................. 
□  
13.  Province of residence at time of occurrence 
 KZN… 1 
 Limpopo… 2 
 WC… 3 
 EC… 4 
 NC… 5 
 North West… 6 
 Free state… 7 
 Gauteng… 8 
 Mpumalanga… 9 
□  
14.  Travel history 
 Yes… 1 
 No… 2 
□  
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 Unavailable… 3 
 Where travelled to…......................................................................................................... 
Section C – Medical Information 
 Field  
15.  Date of onset of illness                                          
(DD/MM/YY) 
      □  
16.  Presenting symptoms  and signs  
                                     .............................................................................................................. 
    
                                     .............................................................................................................. 
    
                                     .............................................................................................................. 
□  
17.  Date of diagnosis   (DD/MM/YY)       □  
18.  Date of notification       (DD/MM/YY)       □  
19.  Outcome 
 Recovered fully… 1 
 Developed complications… 2 
 Passed away… 3 
 Not known… 4 
 other… 5      Specify …………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
□  
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Appendix 10: HCP Questionnaire 
Health Care Providers’ Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey  
Analysing the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System in South Africa 
For Official use only 
9.  Questionnaire serial number   
 
    
 
10. 2 Province ID  
 
   
 
11.  District ID  
 
   
 
12.  Sector  Public   1 
 Private   2 
 
 
 
13.  Health Facility Type ID 
  
   
 
14. 8 
Date of survey:   DD/MM/YY  
      
 
15. 1
2 
Was the questionnaire 
completed? 
 No   0 
 Yes   1 
 
 
 
16. 1
5 
Date reviewed: DD/MM/YY  
      
 
 
Please insert the completed questionnaire in the box provided. 
Consent to Participate 
I have been given an information sheet and I understand the objectives of the study. I further 
understand that my responses will be kept confidential and that it is up to me whether or not to 
complete the questionnaire. It has been explained to me that even if I choose not to complete this 
questionnaire, I should still return it to the box provided and indicate No in the space below. My refusal 
to participate will in no way prejudice me. I agree voluntarily to complete the questionnaire and to 
complete the survey only once (please tick). 
 Yes        No  
 
Initial : ……………………………………….  Date: …………………………………. 
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Section A – Demographic Information 
 Question Official 
use 
1.  In what professional category do you fall?  
□ Professional Nurse...1……go to question 2 
□ Doctor... 2…..go to question 3 
□  
2.  If a Professional Nurse, are you : 
□ Primary Health Care Trained Nurse...1 
□ Infection Prevention and Control Practitioner... 2 
□ Paediatric Trained Nurse...3 
□ Other... 4 Please specify............................................................................................... 
□  
3.  If a doctor, are you :  
□ Intern...1 
□ Medical Officer ... 2 
□ Private General Practitioner ...3 
□ Registrar... 4 
□ Infection Prevention and Specialist.... 5  
□ Family Medicine Specialist.... 6 
□ Specialist Physician... 7 
□ Paediatrician... 8 
□ Other… 9 
 Please specify……......................…...……………………………………………… 
□  
4.  
Your age in years ................. 
□  
5.  What is your gender? 
□ Female… 1 
□  Male… 2 
□  
6.  In which sector are you employed? 
□ Private… 1 
□ Public… 2 
□  
7.  In what type of facility do you work? 
□ Central Hospital...1 
□ Provincial Tertiary Hospital...2 
□ Regional Hospital ... 3 
□ District Hospital... 4 
□ Private Hospital.... 5  
□ Community Health Centre... 6 
□ Clinic... 7 
□ Private GP practice... 8 
□ Other... 9 Specify: ................................................................................................... 
□  
8.  Did you ever receive training on Notifiable Communicable Diseases? 
No Yes ... 1 
No No ... 2…………...go to Q11 
□  
198 
 
No Not certain ... 3 .....go to Q11 
9.  What was the duration of the training?  
                                                                                 ..................................................................... 
□  
10.  How long ago did you receive this training? (In years and months) 
                                                                                                                      ...................................... 
□  
11.  Did you receive any formal training in Epidemiology or Surveillance? 
□ Yes… 1 
□ No… 2 (If no go to question 14) 
□  
12.  If yes, what level of formal training did you receive?  
□ Certificate… 1 
□ Diploma… 2 
□ Bachelor degree… 3 
□ Master’s degree… 4 
□ Doctorate… 5 
□ Other… 6    Please specify…………………….............................................……… 
□  
13.  When did you receive your formal training? (Date- year) 
................................................................................................................................................ 
□  
14.  How many years of experience do you have working with Notifiable Diseases? (answer 0 if 
less than one year) 
 
................................................................................................................................................. 
□  
 
Section B – Practices related to the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
 
 Question Official 
use 
15.  Have you diagnosed any notifiable infectious diseases in the last year? 
□ Yes...1 (please answer all questions below) 
□ No... 2 (please go to question 20 and answer all questions after that) 
□ Unsure... 3 (please go to question 21 and answer all questions after that) 
□  
16.  If yes, which notifiable infectious diseases did you diagnose? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………….………….............................................. 
 
................................................................................................................................................ 
□  
17.  Did you notify the infectious disease(s)? 
□ Yes… 1 
□ No… 2 
□ Unsure... 3 
□  
18.  Who did you notify the disease(s) to? 
 
……………………………….............................................……………...........................……. 
□  
19.  How long after diagnosis did you notify the disease? 
□ Within 24 hours… 1 
□ Within 48 hours… 2 
□ Within 72 hours... 3 
□  
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□ Within 1 week... 4 
□ Within 2 weeks... 5 
□ Longer than 2 weeks... 6 
20.  If you did not notify the disease(s) diagnosed, please state the reasons for not notifying:  
 
................................................................................................................................................ 
 
................................................................................................................................................ 
□  
21.  How many patients do you attend to personally per day? 
 
................................................................................................................................................... 
□  
22.  Do you have notification forms available in your facility/practice? 
□ Yes… 1 
□ No… 2 
□ Unsure... 3 
□  
 
Section C –Knowledge and Skills on the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NDSS) 
Below is a list of skills that you need and use as part of your participation in the NDSS.  For each, 
please indicate what your current level of skill is to perform the task on a scale of 1-10 ( with 1 being 
Low skills, needing more support or training) and 10 being (Very high skills, no support or training 
needed).  Use X to mark the relevant block 
 NOTIFICATION  MY SKILLS 
Low Skills 
 
Very High Skills 
Office 
Use 
23.  I know and understand the need for a notifiable diseases 
surveillance system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
24.  I know which diseases should be notified immediately on 
clinical suspicion   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
25.  I know which diseases should be notified within 24 hours 
of laboratory confirmation of diagnosis   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
26.  I know which diseases can be notified after 24 -48 hours 
after laboratory confirmation of diagnosis   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
27.  I know what process to follow in notifying a disease  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
28.  I am able to  train other team members on the notification 
of diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
 CASE MANAGEMENT  Low Skills Very High Skills  □  
29.  I am confident in the management of  meningococcal 
meningitis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
30.  I am confident in the management of measles 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
31.  I am confident in the management of typhoid 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
32.  I am able to access the latest protocols and guidelines on 
notifiable diseases   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
33.  I know who to consult if I am uncertain on the 
management of any notifiable disease  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
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Section D- Perceptions on the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NDSS) 
Listed below are statements on Attributes of the Notifiable Disease Surveillance. Using the provided scale state 
how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement.  
PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS – DO NOT LEAVE ANY OUT. 
 
 Statement Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Disagree 
slightly 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Agree 
Slightly 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
41.  The form used to notify 
diseases is easy to 
understand 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42.  The form used to notify 
diseases takes a long time to 
fill in 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43.  The notification process is 
not easy to comply with 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44.  Meningococcal meningitis 
does not need to be notified 
within 24 hours of clinical 
suspicion 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45.  Measles must be notified 
within 24 hours of diagnosis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46.  Typhoid can be notified after 
48 hours of diagnosis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
47.  I am willing to participate in 
the notifiable disease 
surveillance system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48.  Data obtained through the 
notifiable disease 
surveillance system is not 
used for outbreak response  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
49.  Outbreak response teams do 
respond timely to most 
outbreaks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34.  I am able to  train other team members on the 
management of meningococcal meningitis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
35.  I am able to  train other team members on the 
management of measles 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
36.  I am able to  train other team members on the 
management of typhoid 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
 PREVENTION AND TRAINING Low Skills  Very High Skills  
37.  I am knowledgeable on the prevention of notifiable 
diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
38.  I am able to  educate my patients on the prevention of 
notifiable diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
39.  I provide  access for my patients to education material on 
the prevention of notifiable diseases in my facility 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
40.  I am able to  train other team members on the prevention 
of communicable diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 □  
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50.  Data obtained through the 
notifiable disease 
surveillance system is used 
for policy and guideline 
formulation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
51.  Data obtained through the 
notifiable disease 
surveillance system do not 
contribute to knowledge on 
the prevention and control 
of infectious diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
52.  The notifiable disease 
surveillance system has been 
changed to meet changing 
circumstances and needs in 
the last  three years 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
53.  Lack of facility supervision 
do not impact on compliance 
with the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
54.  The department provided no 
feedback to providers on 
notifiable diseases over the 
last  year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
55.  A high workload prevents 
me from notifying diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
56.  A lack of access to 
communication equipment 
prevents me from notifying 
diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Section E – Other Comments on the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
a. Please rate the availability of staffing for the notifiable diseases surveillance system at the 
following levels: 
 Organisational level Very Poor Poor Satisfactory Good Very Good 
57.  National 1 2 3 4 5 
58.  Province 1 2 3 4 5 
59.  District 1 2 3 4 5 
60.  Facility 1 2 3 4 5 
 
b. Please rate the level of investment of funding for the notifiable diseases surveillance 
system at the following organisational levels: 
 Organisational level Very Poor Poor Satisfactory Good Very Good 
61.  National 1 2 3 4 5 
62.  Province 1 2 3 4 5 
63.  District 1 2 3 4 5 
64.  Facility 1 2 3 4 5 
 
c. Please rate the organisational capacity for the notifiable diseases surveillance system at 
the following levels: 
 Organisational level Very Poor Poor Satisfactory Good Very Good 
65.  National 1 2 3 4 5 
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66.  Province 1 2 3 4 5 
67.  District 1 2 3 4 5 
68.  Facility 1 2 3 4 5 
 
d. Please indicate to what extent the following interventions would benefit the notifiable 
diseases surveillance system (on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1= No benefit and 10 = Maximum 
benefit) 
 Intervention No benefit Maximum benefit 
69.  Addressing staffing gaps  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
70.  Addressing the gaps in the 
organisational capacity of the 
department 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
71.  Investing more financial resources in the 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 
72.  Introduction of the use of an electronic 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 
73.  Introduction of mobile technology  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
74.  Do you have any further comments on the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
□  
75.  Do you have any recommendations on how to improve the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
□  
Thank you for participating 
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